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More pluralistic approaches have recently emerged in entrepreneurship, yet the discipline remains disinterested in the ideological influences underpinning its research and teaching practices. Following Louis Althusser’s work on interpellation, the process by which ideology enrols and consummates its subjects, the chapter examines the interpellation of entrepreneurship-as-practice researchers and draws attention to the powerful nature of ideology. Critical reflexivity is put forward as an exercise to explore the researchers’ beliefs and identity and to tease out their relationship with the discipline. Finally, using three autoethnographic accounts, the chapter argues that the boundaries of the entrepreneurship discipline can only be shifted if and when researchers learn to recognise themselves as ‘the person in the mirror’. The reflexive spotlight also allows researchers to spot ideological breaks and engage in acts of ‘ideological resistance’.

Why is it that, despite repeated claims that digital-content firms and internet-based businesses can internationalize everywhere almost instantly, many seem unable to profitably expand outside their home markets? Why have emerging market firms (EMNEs) caught up with established developed-country multinationals (DMNEs) so much faster than expected? In this chapter, the author argues that the clue to these two puzzles lies in the realization that, contrary to the dominant view in the international business (IB) literature that focuses only on the intangibles exploited by DMNEs and assumes that these firms are free to unilaterally decide on their mode of entry and operation, doing business in a foreign country is only possible if intangibles are bundled with complementary local resources, usually held by local firms. Taking into account these complementary local resources and their owners makes it clear that DMNEs are not always free to choose their entry mode but must enlist the cooperation of local resource owners. The need of digital-content and internet-based firms for local complementary resources also explains why they sometimes experience problems when expanding abroad. Lastly, control of complementary local resources provides EMNEs with a home advantage against DMNEs competing with them in their home market. The author shows how EMNEs can capitalize on this advantage to obtain the intangibles they lack and need. The fact that these advantages are available on efficient global markets, while complementary local resources are not, explains the surprising speed of EMNE catch-up.

In this study, we develop understanding of factors that shape the propensity of market incumbents to collaborate in response to the threat posed by new market entrants. We are particularly interested in instances when a market's competitive structure becomes unsettled by new entrants who engage in nonconforming strategic tactics. In such situations, we propose two factors – strategic similarity among competitors and market-share instability – will systematically shape competitors' collaborative response to new entrants. To test our theory, we use data on strategic tactics and collaborative dynamics in the US airline industry from 1989 to 2010. We demonstrate that greater strategic similarity among a market's incumbents increases the likelihood of cooperation in response to the threat of a nonconforming new entrant, while greater market-share instability reduces cooperative response. Through this study, we extend existing understanding of the contextual circumstances under which established competitors recognize their mutual interests and band together.

Our prior work has identified a trade-off that new entrants face in obtaining favorable market reception, whereby initial entrants suffer from a deficit of legitimacy whereas later entrants suffer from a deficit of authenticity. This research has also proposed that a single mechanism is responsible for this trade-off: the tendency for customers and other stakeholders to assess the entrant's claim to originality based on the visible work that it has done to legitimate the new product or organizational form. This chapter extends and deepens our understanding of such “legitimation work” by showing how it can illuminate cases that seem in the first instance to defy this trade-off. In particular, we focus on two “off-diagonal” cases: (a) when, as in the case of “patent trolls” and fraudulent innovators, early entrants are viewed as inauthentic despite having a credible claim to originality; (b) when late entrants, as in the case of Dell Computers, mechanical watches and baseball ballparks, are viewed as authentic despite obviously not being the originators. We clarify how each off-diagonal case represents an ‘exception that proves the rule’ whereby audiences attribute authenticity on the basis of legitimation work rather than on the order of entry per se. The last case also leads to an opportunity to clarify why “cultural appropriation” can sometimes project authenticity and sometimes inauthenticity, why audiences bother to make inferences about a producer's authenticity on the basis of visible legitimation work, and why legitimacy is a universal goal of early movers whereas authenticity varies in its importance.

In recent years, decision-making regarding business growth has attracted the attention of many researchers. Also, considering the importance of scale in startups for their survival and the development of economies, investigating the scalability of startups in emerging markets that are booming, can be useful. Scaling for international business has taken on a new meaning: they must be leaders in both emerging as well as advanced markets; they must be responsive to customers in both departments, which require tremendous innovation and agility; they have to build the competency needed in designing, developing, and marketing the opposite for advanced world markets; and they need to demonstrate rapid decision-making, innovation, and opportunism in delivery to the cost-sensitive underdeveloped markets. As a result, decision-making about the scale of start-ups at the international level plays an important role. The internationalisation of start-up activities is an extremely important and attractive topic among researchers, entrepreneurs, and practitioners. But there is very little research and also projects on the internationalisation of start-up venture activities, particularly after the gain of scaling and exponential growth.

Alliances between companies are an example of a collaborative strategy adopted in anticipation of highly uncertain markets. Since 1980, the commercial airline industry has been affected by a progressive liberalization worldwide. In this historical context, most airlines reacted with defensive movements in the face of high competition. In the case of airlines in the Spanish market, one of the largest in the world due to the weight of the tourism sector in its economy, airlines responded in various ways to the intensification of competition. Iberia, the main Spanish airline, established different defensive alliance policies. In the 1980s, alliances were mainly collaborative. Since 1998, airline alliances have become coopetitive in nature, as was the case with the creation of One World group (American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Qantas and Iberia). The partners began to interact in a more horizontal way, maintaining various agreements (code-sharing, handling, schedule coordination, shared sales, fleet maintenance) without renouncing their independence in the face of global competition. Iberia has subsequently modified the composition of its portfolio to move towards a more vertical collaboration with the integration into the IAG Group (Iberia, British Airways, Air Lingus and Vueling). This second phase is a quest to increase market power with deep changes in the nature of its alliances while maintaining coopetitive alliances.