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Most recent bank bailouts, from a financial and economic perspective, turn political. This paper seeks to frame ten effective implications/lessons of the most recent bank bailouts of 2007‐2009 in the Western economy model when analyzing actual shareholders' value retrenchment or growth opportunities.

The paper uses a literature review and a re‐conceptualized framework of event study methodology, secondary data analysis of qualitative and quantitative information.

Recent bank bailouts relate to: global bailout interconnections, economic downturn and liquidity boost, abnormal returns, efficiency recovery, evasion of social costs, new opportunities for M&A, new risk management applications, opportunistic investors and eventually patience. Most important, findings recommend shareholders to grasp opportunities for bargains from bailout banks as well as to harvest their existing investments. At the same time, economic education and control become another important solution.

Consequently, as the paper targets most recent bailouts, a still ongoing event, there is a need for extended financial data that could enhance some cause‐related solutions after economic recovery.

The practicality of the paper refers to guiding management of both government and financial institutions on the choice for reasoning bank bailouts, providing some critical thinking views to investors as well as academics.

Research or studies on the most recent financial crises bailouts have not yet been written, due to the process continuation. The novelty of the paper resides not in calculating ratios and interpreting them, but rather in looking more into some interesting strategic moves used to boost shareholders' value.

This paper aims to examine the characteristics of banks that were the target of intervention in the form of bailout or failure during the financial crisis and, of those subjected to intervention, what characteristics distinguish those that received bailout funds from those that were deemed failures.

The study estimates a series of logit regressions in an effort to identify the causes of regulatory intervention while controlling for bank-level characteristics and the economic and regulatory environment.

The empirical results indicate that many of the same characteristics associated with banks receiving bailout funds are similar to the characteristics associated with failed banks. However, non-performing loans increased the likelihood of failure, but reduced the likelihood of a bank receiving Capital Purchase Program (CPP) funds, suggesting that regulatory authorities discriminated in their use of CPP funds based on the quality of a bank’s asset portfolio. Further, those banks located in states with limits on de novo branching and those banks that are part of a multi-bank holding company structure were less likely to fail but were more likely to receive CPP funds.

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of regulatory intervention in the banking industry during the late 2000s financial crisis and the impact of different banking organizational structures, economic circumstances, and financial fragility on the likelihood of a bank failing or receiving bailout funds.

Are firms able to time the market? The purpose of this paper is to focus on the study of own stock trading, emphasizing both repurchase and resell operations on the open market as well as over the counter.

The authors use data on 37,997 own stock transactions from 2005 to 2015 of Euronext Lisbon listed firms. Following Dittmar and Field (2015), this paper uses relative transaction prices to ascertain the relative performance of own stock transactions, in the open market and over the counter.

Results show that firms can time both repurchases as well as resales. Firms repurchase (resell) at lower (higher) prices than those prevailing in the market. Moreover, market-timing ability proves to be higher after the bailout period and to be influenced by the own stock trading frequency. Trading on the open market allows for increased timing ability for own stock repurchasing and reselling activity. Finally, results show seasonal effects both in repurchase and resale performance. Also, more efficient but less valuable firms are more likely to be successful in timing the market.

The authors study both the repurchasing and the reselling activity of the same set of firms, of already issued stock, using high-frequency (daily) data. In addition, the authors study own stock trading both in the open market and OTC, and also study the impact of a major economic shift on the firms’ ability to time the market.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight how the basic binomial option pricing model (BOPM) might be used by regulators to help formulate rules, prior to financial crisis, that help prevent loan overstatement by banks in emerging market economies undergoing financial crises.

The paper draws on the theory of soft budget constraints (SBC) to construct a simple model in which banks overstate loans to minimize losses. The model is used to illustrate how guarantees of bailout assistance (BA) (to banks) by crisis stricken countries’ financial authorities may encourage banks to overstate loans and delay the implementation of IFRS for loan valuation. However, the model also illustrates how promises of BA may be depicted as binomial put options which provide banks with the option of either: reporting loan values on poor projects accurately and receiving the loans’ liquidation values; or, overstating loans and receiving the guaranteed BA. An illustration is also provided of how authorities may use this representation to help minimize bank loan overstatement in periods of financial crisis. In order to provide an illustration of how the option value of binomial assistance may evolve during a financial crisis, the model is generalized to the Mexican financial crisis of the late 1990s. During this period, Mexican authorities’ guarantees of BA to the nation’s largest banks encouraged those institutions to overstate loans and delay the implementation of (previously adopted) international “best practices” based loan valuation standards.

Application of the model to the Mexican financial crisis provides evidence that, in spite of Mexico’s “official” 1997 adoption of international “best accounting practices” for banks, “iron clad” guarantees of BA by the country’s financial authorities to Mexico’s largest banks provided those institutions with an incentive to knowingly overstate loans in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The model is compared against only one country in which the BA was directly infused into banks’ loan portfolios. Thus, as conceived, it is directly applicable to crisis countries in which the bailout took this form. However, the many quantitative variations of SBC models as well as recent studies which have applied the binomial model to other forms of bailout (e.g. direct purchases of bank shares by authorities) suggest that the model could be modified to accommodate different bailout scenarios.

The model and application show that guaranteed BA can be viewed as a put option and that ex-ante regulatory policies based on the correct valuation of the BA as a binomial option might prevent banks from overstating loans.

Use of the binomial or similar approaches to valuing BA may help regulators to determine the level of BA that will not encourage banks to overstate the value of their loans.

Recent research has used the BOPM to value, on an ex-post basis, the BA which appears on the balance sheet of institutions which have been rescued. However, little research has advocated the use of this type of model to help prevent, on an ex-ante basis, the overstatement of loans on poor projects.

The examination of the differential effects of bailout legislation on well‐capitalized versus under‐capitalized thrifts is the focus of this study. The study examines return responses for portfolios of thrift stocks, formed on the basis of capitalization, to news events concerning bailout funding leading up to and concluding with the President's signing of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA). The results indicate thrifts react differently to legislative news events based on their capitalization levels. This is evidenced by 1) the presence of abnormal returns for portfolios of relatively well‐capitalized and relatively under‐capitalized thrifts, 2) the trends in the size of abnormal returns across well‐capitalized (under‐capitalized) portfolios as the average level of capitalization decreases (increases), and 3) the opposite signs of abnormal returns for relatively well‐capitalized versus relatively under‐capitalized portfolios.

The authors examine the Taiwanese government's budgetary responses to COVID-19, with a focus on the special budgets created for containing the virus, undertaking bailouts and providing economic stimulus. The authors assess the short-term and long-term fiscal implications of the budgetary measures and discuss how Taiwan's experiences could provide lessons for other countries for future emergencies.

The authors collect data from Taiwan's official documents and news reports and compare the special budgets proposed by the Taiwanese government during the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors discuss lessons learned from the 2008–09 special budget and possible concerns of the 2020 special budgets. In the conclusions, the authors discuss potential long-term implications for Taiwan's budgetary system as well as possible lessons for other countries based on Taiwan's experiences

The authors found that the 2008–09 special budgets focused only on economic stimulus, whereas the 2020 special budgets covered COVID-19 treatments, bailouts and economic stimulus. In 2020, the Taiwanese government devised targeted bailout plans for industries and individuals most affected by the pandemic and created the Triple Stimulus Vouchers to boost the economy. Since the special budgets were largely funded through borrowing, the authors pointed out concerns for fiscal sustainability and intergenerational equity.

COVID-19 has changed how the world functions massively. This work adds to the literature on COVID-19 by providing Taiwan's budgetary responses to the pandemic. This work also identifies ways for Taiwan to improve the existing budgetary system and discusses lessons for other countries.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and then analyze the interdependency between bank and sovereign risk before, during and after the financial crisis.

The authors' approach is based upon an examination of 44 large banks headquartered in 13 countries; eight of these countries belong to the European Union, seven belong to the eurozone, and the remaining five belong to neither group. This provides a good comparison group of countries.

Evidence is found supporting the existence of significant bank and sovereign risk linkages. There are, however, different patterns in the relationships across countries and even across banks within the same country. Also, higher correlations between bank and sovereign risk are found in countries in which the ratio of the assets of banks relative to their home country's GDP is relatively high.

Based upon the empirical results, allowing banks to invest in sovereign debt without requiring them to hold any capital against the “true” risk of such debt increases the likelihood of insolvency. This means that interdependencies between bank and sovereign risk are extremely important when setting regulatory capital requirements and considering whether action is needed to limit any increase in the likelihood of contagion.

The paper provides a new examination of the interdependencies between individual bank risk and the sovereign risk of the countries in which they are headquartered, with special emphasis on the recent global financial and eurozone crises.

This paper aims to analyze the impact of conjectural “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) guarantees on big and small US financial institutions’ stock prices during the 2008-2009 banking crisis.

The paper analyzes shocks to stock market investors’ expectations of government aid to banks in distress and respective spillover effects using an event study approach. We focus on three major events in late 2008, namely, the Lehman bankruptcy, the Citigroup bailout and the first announcement of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) by the US Government.

The authors found significant differences in market reactions to the respective events between small and large banks. For both the Lehman and the CPP event, abnormal returns on big banks’ stocks are negative, while small banks’ stocks tend to generate positive abnormal returns. In contrast, large banks strongly outperform small banks in the case of the Citigroup bailout. Results for a control group of non-financial firms indicate that this behavior may be specific to the banking industry. The authors observed significant spillover effects to both competitors and non-competitors of Lehman and Citigroup, and concluded that while the Lehman event shook the widely held belief in an implicit TBTF subsidy to large banks, the TBTF doctrine was reinstated shortly thereafter.

This paper shows that conjectural TBTF guarantees are priced in by equity investors. While government aid to large banks in distress may prevent negative effects on the stability of the financial system, it may also create negative externalities by putting small banks at a competitive disadvantage. The findings suggest that US and European regulators’ recent policy measures directed at establishing reliable bank resolution schemes should be a step in the right direction to level the playing field for small and large financial institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between banking crises and the subjective well-being of individuals. In addition, the authors examine the transmission of crises from the banking sector to well-being and show that negative financial shocks have significant adverse effects.

The authors employ agent-based modeling to test for the direct and indirect welfare effects of banking crises. The model includes a support vector machine (SVM) optimized subjective well-being function. The existing literature suggests that this is influenced by both the negative psychological effects of recessions and the adverse economic effects of income loss and increased unemployment.

The authors show that the different choices of policy response to a banking crisis carry different opportunity costs in terms of welfare and that societal preferences should be taken into account. The authors demonstrate that these effects influence different population classes in an asymmetric manner. Finally, the results demonstrate that the welfare loss of a bank failure is much higher than the cost of a bailout.

The authors are able to propose to the authorities the best policy mix in order to handle banking crises in the most adequate manner, according to society's preferences between financial stability and public goods.

The findings extend the existing literature on subjective well-being, by quantifying the welfare cost of banking crises and showing that authorities should reconsider bank bailouts as a policy solution to bank distress.

The originality of this article lies in the use of an agent-based model to model the relationship between societal well-being and financial stability. Also, the authors extend existing agent-based methodologies to include machine learning optimization techniques.

This paper aims to explain the importance of the international cooperation and coordination among supervisory authorities of different countries in event of banking crises. It also suggests that the harmonious relationship has to be attained in the adoption of ex ante financial regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes. In other words, the paper highlights the linkage between ex ante preventive regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes, on the one hand, and cooperation among national regulatory and supervisory authorities in globalized financial markets. Although the paper is relevant to most developed and emerging financial markets, it chooses Hong Kong as a context to examine this proposal. In the current literature, there are no similar approach linking these two paradigms and examining them in an integrated context.

The paper adopts a conceptual framework after the 2008 global financial crisis and takes Hong Kong, an international financial centre in which numerous branches or subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions locate, as an example to examine how the coordination with foreign supervisory authorities are being conducted and to analyse whether the present regulatory framework in Hong Kong is effective and sufficient against banking crises. Through the review of the literature, the important link between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes is found to be significant in adopting proper solutions.

Through analysing the Hong Kong financial regulators’ reports on the collapse of Lehman Brother, the paper finds out that even though there is some weakness in the cooperation and coordination between regulators after the 2008 financial crisis, Hong Kong is still in the progress of proposing bank special resolution regime. Although there has been some awareness on the issue of coordination between home and host states regulatory measures, there is still a lack of awareness of the connection between regulatory measures and compensation schemes.

Conflict of interests could hardly be prevented in the course of cooperation and coordination among home and host regulatory authorities, and the coordination of the important link between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation scheme which involves legal and economic analyses is a challenging task.

The paper’s findings show that there are practical implications for the recent rapid development of special resolution regime for global systematically important financial institutions against future banking crises and for managing the balance between the adoption of financial supervisory laws and special resolution measures.

This paper suggests that the harmonious coordination between ex ante regulatory measures and ex post compensation schemes has to be achieved through international context to avoid the absurd situations. This conceptual integrated framework presented in the current paper is not touched upon by the existing literature. This important concept is valuable for future research, and it is significant to financial regulators, legislators and the government in adjusting policy against banking crises in both developed and developing countries.