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This article examines the dialectics of wrongful life and wrongful birth claims in Israel from 1986 until 2012. In May 2012 Israeli Supreme Court declared that while wrongful birth claims were still permitted, wrongful life claims were no longer accepted in a court of law. The article examines the conditions that allowed for and supported the expansion of wrongful life/birth claims until 2012. The article identifies two parallel dynamics of expansion: a broadening of the scope of negligent conduct and a view of milder forms of disabilities as damage that merits compensation. The article further suggests four explanations for such doctrinal evolution, two of which emanate from doctrinal ambiguities and the other two are rooted in social factors that have shaped the meaning of disability as a tragedy and state of inferiority. While recent developments seem promising, the article concludes with a word of caution. Such changes may reproduce past injustices mainly because the compensation mechanism has remained an individual-torts based one, which may run counter to the broader struggle for social change for disabled people.

Can one describe the ‘natural’ process of pregnancy as ‘harm’, even when negligently brought about? What does that harm consist of? Offering a contextual analysis of the English judiciary's characterisation of wrongful pregnancy, this paper demonstrates from a feminist perspective that the current construction of pregnancy as a ‘personal injury’ is deeply problematic. Forwarding an alternative account, this paper argues for law to embrace a richer notion of autonomy that will better resonate with women's diverse experiences of reproduction, and articulate the importance of autonomy in the reproductive domain: notably, women gaining control over their moral, relational and social lives.

Our moral thinking sometimes focuses on the possibilities given before birth. However, depending on circumstances, some children might never be brought into the world. The problem is how to consider the viewpoint of such children. In regard to this problem, while Parfit lays stress on the estimation of the state of the world, Steinbock emphasizes the importance of the parental responsibility. However, it seems that the viewpoint of the child itself is still important and not fully covered by these two approaches. Therefore, the best thing we can do now is to go back and forth between these two approaches.

Over the past 15 years or so, a very large proportion of the forensic economics literature has been devoted to research concerning better ways of estimating damages in cases involving personal injury and wrongful death (PI/WD). This is probably not surprising since the largest fraction of consulting income for forensic economists (at least those in the National Association of Forensic Economics, NAFE) comes from such cases.

Forensic economists are often asked to calculate economic damages in cases that are tried in the United States but involve the death or injury of a citizen or resident of a foreign country. Commonly called international cases, they can range from a single tourist who is killed or injured while visiting the United States to mass torts such as plane crashes or product liability claims. The single plaintiff cases are typically relegated to state courts, whereas the Federal District Courts are often deemed to have jurisdiction over the determination of liability and subsequent economic damages in mass torts. In these and other types of international cases, macroeconomic data compiled by various governmental or private sources within the United States are of very limited use to the forensic economist preparing economic loss estimates. The decedent or injured party's economic, demographic, and social environment will in all likelihood differ significantly from individuals living in the United States. Rather, they are impacted by the macroeconomic conditions of their country of domicile or residence.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem calls into question the claims of both the state and individuals when they purport to act for the benefit of future children. This paper discusses how adoption of the non-identity argument as a legal argument could affect reproductive and family policy, demonstrating that it undermines the child-centric approach to assigning legal parentage. The paper concludes, however, that these non-identity problems can be solved by the expected value approach, which demonstrates that efforts to benefit future people can be logically coherent even if those efforts also affect the genetic identities of the future people.