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Civil society organisations (CSOs) contribute essentially to welfare states and society. In Europe they play a key role in the provision of social services, but also fulfil a large variety of other functions, such as giving voice to unaddressed issues, offering alternative ways of occupational socialisation or facilitating social inclusion (cf. Kramer, 1981; Rose-Ackerman & James, 1986; Kendall, 2003). Current research suggests that the third sectors’ societal roles considerably vary between countries, depending on the welfare state they are embedded in: Starting with a revision of Esping-Andersen's welfare regime typology (1990) and also based on the earlier work of Moore (1966), Salamon and his colleagues developed a typology of four different ‘non-profit regimes’ (Salamon & Anheier, 1998; Salamon, Hems, & Chinnock, 2000a). As key dimensions for this classification, they applied the extent of governmental welfare spending and the size of the third sector (cf. Johnson, 1999). According to this typology of nonprofit regimes, in countries with a large third-sector CSOs mainly fulfil the service function. Countries with a relatively small third sector, so the implicit conclusion, would tend to engage in ‘the expression of political, social, or even recreational interests’ (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, p. 229).

The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternative way of calculating the deadweight loss triangle in oligopolistic markets which takes inefficient use of inputs into account. The author shows that the result of the approach coincides with the one that exists in the economics literature. However, the author explicitly accounts for the inefficient use of inputs.

The market supply curve that is extensively used for competitive markets has been reconsidered for the imperfectly competitive markets. The necessary condition for the efficient use of resources is investigated and a price level is derived at which the market output of oligopoly is produced efficiently. The degree of inefficient use of inputs is reported via the definitions of Input Inefficiency Measure (IIM) and the Ratio of Inefficient usage of Inputs to Total Deadweight Loss (RITD).

The author discovers that the area under the supply curve of the competitive market corresponds precisely to the minimum total costs of producing any given market output. To make this important finding operational in imperfectly competitive markets, the IIM reports the degree of distorted input allocation among firms with differentiated cost structures in producing a given equilibrium imperfectly competitive market output. In measuring the monopoly power, it is known that CRn or HHI market concentration indexes, which are calculated based on the market shares of firms regarding the demand side of the market, are widely used. The measures, which take into account of the distortions in input usage, and hence, the supply side may be considered as an additional index. For example, if the market demand were shared equally by two firms (no dominant firm with respect to the demand side), it is known that the leadership would still arise when the costs of firms differed as in the dominant firm model in favor of the lower cost producing firm.

The author recommends some more theoretical research extensions of the approach suggested here to other oligopolistic markets like the Cournot-Nash, the Stackelberg and other models. In all cases, there is a need for additional work to find some measurable variables in practice in order to estimate the input inefficiency given by the two measures and differentiate it from the inefficiency of units of outputs that are not produced.

It may be interesting to decompose the various estimates of welfare losses due to monopoly power as a percentage of GNP that were discussed in the literature into two inefficiency components: units of outputs that are not produced and units of inputs that are misallocated among firms.

The government officials might be interested in assessing the degree of loss of input usage by firms in addition to output loss in oligopolistic markets summarized by the two inefficiency indexes. Law economists may be inspired in discussing the issue of input inefficiency in the context of on antitrust policy.

The author emphasized that the area under the market supply curve minimized the aggregate cost of producing a given total market output in competitive markets. Having recognized the importance of this finding, the author tried to apply it to imperfectly competitive markets and especially to the calculation of deadweight loss in such markets. The author showed that the total social cost could be calculated by including the input inefficiency which can be defined as the extra cost to society arising from not using the most appropriate economic resource allocation among firms in addition to the usual deadweight loss triangle. Moreover, the author had to introduce some more new terms like the market supply curve allocation, the adjusted competitive price, efficiency gain and so on, as they were necessary along the course of the analysis.

There is still no universal definition of the third sector in Europe, but it can be seen as including all types of non-governmental not-for-profit entities such as non-profit organizations, mutuals, cooperatives, social enterprises and foundations. This article attempts to make sense of the current shifting conceptualization of the third sector in Europe. It is based on short country summaries of the images and concepts of the third sector in 13 European countries by EMES Network’s members, first presented in 2008 (Defourny and Pestoff, 2008; nine of them were recently revised and are found in the appendix to this article.). The perception and development of the third sector in Europe is closely related to the other major social governance institutions/mechanisms, like the market, state and community and through the third sector’s interaction with them. Moreover, many third sector organizations (TSOs) overlap with these other social institutions, resulting in varying degrees of hybridity and internal tensions experienced by them. TSOs can generate resources from their activities on the market, by providing services in partnership with the state and/or by promoting the interests of a given community or group. The country overviews document a growing professionalization of TSOs in most countries and a growing dependency of public funds to provide services. This has important theoretical and practical implications for orienting the articles included in this book. Thus, it can provide a key for better understanding the discussion and analysis in the remainder of this volume.

Climate finance is regularly not only seen as a tool to efficiently combat global warming but also to solve development problems in the recipient countries and to support the attainment of sustainable development goals. Thereby, conflicts between distributive and allocative objectives arise, which threaten the overall performance of such transfer schemes. Given the severity of the climate change problem, this study aims to raise concerns about whether the world can afford climate transfer schemes that do not focus on prevention of (and adaptation to) climate change but might be considered as a vehicle of rent-seeking by many agents.

Future designs of international transfer schemes within the framework of the Paris Agreement are to be based on experience gained from existing mechanisms. Therefore, the authors examine different existing schemes using a graphical technique first proposed by David Pearce and describe the conflicts between allocative and distributional goals that arise.

In line with the famous Tinbergen rule, the authors argue that other sustainability problems and issues of global fairness should not be primarily addressed by climate finance but should be mainly tackled by other means.

As there is still ongoing, intense discussion about how the international transfer schemes addressed in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement should be designed, the research will help to sort some of the key arguments.

There are prominent international documents (like the Paris Agreement and the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) seeking to address different goals simultaneously. While synergies between policies is desirable, there are major challenges for policy coordination. Addressing several different goals using fewer policy instruments, for example, will not succeed as the Tinbergen Rule points out.

The integration of co-benefits in the analysis allows for taking into account the social effects of climate policy. As the authors argue, climate finance approaches could become overstrained if policymakers would consider them as tools to also solve local sustainability problems.

In this paper, the authors will not only examine what can be learnt from the clean development mechanism (CDM) for future schemes under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement but also observe the experiences gained from a non-CDM scheme. So the authors pay attention to the Trust Fund of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) which was established with global benefit orientation, i.e. – unlike the CDM – it was not regarded as an additional goal to support local sustainable development. Yet, despite its disregard of local co-benefits, the authors think that it is of particular importance to include the GEF in the analysis, as some important lessons can be learnt from it.

The Indonesian healthcare system has been reformed in tune with economic and political changes. The reform was pursued by encouraging growing reliance on individual contributions. Consolidating citizens' support has become increasingly important for the long-term sustainability of the programme. This study explores individual views and experiences in negotiating solutions for health security under the situation where pre-industrial modes of informal network remain intact, while private healthcare continues to be in demand by population segments targeted by the system.

Individual attitudes toward the current healthcare system were explored using online interviews (N = 75) in the cities of Jakarta and Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The qualitative exploratory approach resorted to personal views on the importance of the state, family and market in health risk management. Perceptions on who should be responsible for healthcare, and the political legitimacy of the welfare-state approach to healthcare were also observed. A thematic coding strategy was used for the data analysis.

Those interviewed value and support the formal system (either state and market), yet place reliance on informal support (family and relatives). Intertwining views of religious teaching, filial piety, moral obligation were the most common reasons for individuals to support such dual welfare systems. The findings reflect the common attitudes toward welfare in the context of changing realities of individualised society at the early stage.

This article represents a valuable contribution at the empirical level because it provides an assessment of individuals' attitudes toward Indonesia's recent health arrangements. Such individuals are those belonging to the targeted population of the contributory system. This study also offers an alternative framework for understanding the nature of the healthcare regime generated from the perspectives of individuals.

With the aim of finding a balance between social and economic benefits, the social economy has reemerged in the crisis of the welfare state. The Fordist welfare state can be characterized by state-provided welfare, the mediation of paid work and welfare by the labor market and redistributive policies. Globally, neoliberalism and the market have given rise to social exclusion; in this context, the social economy is emerging as an alternative to the market domination of societies. This paper aims to construct a conceptual framework of welfare provision in an open innovation era.

The welfare state system between the Fordist welfare state and post-Fordist welfare state is different on provision and delivery of welfare service. To construct the conceptual relation among the social economy, the state and the market and welfare provision in the social economy, this study mainly used the literature review.

Attention should be paid to civil society at the local level to ignite social economy through open social innovation. Various social actors in the local community need to change and develop the social economy with collaborative entrepreneurship and collaborative economic mindsets.

This paper presents the welfare service model led by social economy and open innovation, as well as social change. To fill the shortage of welfare provision caused by crisis of the welfare state, social economy is considered as an alternative for neo-liberalism. This study emphasizes that endogenous local development is a prerequisite for social economy as a welfare supplier.

In the social economy, reciprocity, democracy, self-help and social capital at the local level are emphasized. Also, open innovation put emphasis on collaboration economy among the local community, firms and the public sector: this emphasis can be expected to affect the welfare provision system and the social relations surrounding welfare. To address social problem and social needs, the social economy can adapt and apply the open innovation model.

The previous researches on open innovation mainly deal with the business sector and the public sector, but this paper has a focus on the relation between provision of social welfare and social innovation. The social economy is likely to function properly on the foundation of open social innovation.

Holbrook Working (1949) discovered that the percentage change in futures prices seemed to be largelyrandom. This led Paul Samuelson (1965) to develop the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) which claims that the current spot and futures1 prices fully reflect all relevant information. Furthermore, because the future flow of information cannot be anticipated, price changes will not be serially correlated. These papers linked the notion of randomness of price changes to informational efficiency. From that point on, a major part of the empirical studies of asset markets has been the application of time series analysis to asset prices, in order to evaluate whether the price changes are random and whether futures prices reflect all available information. As the statistical tests became more sophisticated, the number of empirical studies increased and the results became more contradictory and difficult to interpret. An economic theorist can only be bemused by contemplating the empirical/econometric studies in the finance literature.

This paper aims to clear whether the monopoly structure of the internet industry has produced market power and discussed the welfare change of the internet industry monopoly.

By using new empirical industrial organization methods and taking the e-commerce market as an example, the authors measured market power and economies of scale of the internet platform companies.

Internet platform enterprises have formed scale economy, but it has not had market power, and the industry still maintains high levels of competition; also, the emergence of large enterprises may increase the welfare of consumers.

The conclusion of this paper clarified actual competition status of internet industry and provided a new foothold for regulation and ideas for the traditional industry to crack the Marshall Conflict.

The distinction between nominal and effective tariffs (or protection) is well established in the theoretical literature, albeit in the context of the traditional analysis of inter‐industry trade flows. This analysis is based upon assumptions such as product and production homogeneity, non‐increasing returns, armslength trade, and small open economy country conditions. Relaxation of some or all of these assumptions has direct implications for effective protection analysis under any type of trade flows. As is now widely recognised, however, relaxation of these assumptions is also likely to be associated with intra‐industry specialisation and exchange. It is to this wider issue of effective protection analysis in the context of “within‐industry” specialisation (vertical and/or horizontal) and of two‐way trade, that this paper is addressed.