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Financial crimes involve several offenses without violence with some people obtaining financial benefit and causing financial loss to some others. The globalization of financial systems, the growing volume of trading transactions, and the acceleration of information technologies have brought many conveniences to the financial world; but unfortunately, financial crime has spread and diversified. Therefore, the fight against financial crimes, which are often complex and organized in a way which is nonviolent but causes significant financial damage to people and organizations, is gaining importance. In this sense, the struggle against this type of crime, which has become a serious threat, must be resolved by applying a comprehensive policy that should include all segments of the society.

In this chapter, we aim to give a general framework of financial crimes and carry out a literature review on the subject. Moreover, we outline the different types of financial crime (such as money laundering, insider dealing, fraud, market abuse, bribery, corruption, terrorist financing, white collar crimes, tax evasion, embezzlement, forgery, counterfeiting, identity theft, etc.) and their impact. As a result, this study has the purpose of providing awareness by drawing attention to the concept of financial crime, which is an important threat nowadays that an ordinary person may suffer at any time in daily life.

Climate finance is regularly not only seen as a tool to efficiently combat global warming but also to solve development problems in the recipient countries and to support the attainment of sustainable development goals. Thereby, conflicts between distributive and allocative objectives arise, which threaten the overall performance of such transfer schemes. Given the severity of the climate change problem, this study aims to raise concerns about whether the world can afford climate transfer schemes that do not focus on prevention of (and adaptation to) climate change but might be considered as a vehicle of rent-seeking by many agents.

Future designs of international transfer schemes within the framework of the Paris Agreement are to be based on experience gained from existing mechanisms. Therefore, the authors examine different existing schemes using a graphical technique first proposed by David Pearce and describe the conflicts between allocative and distributional goals that arise.

In line with the famous Tinbergen rule, the authors argue that other sustainability problems and issues of global fairness should not be primarily addressed by climate finance but should be mainly tackled by other means.

As there is still ongoing, intense discussion about how the international transfer schemes addressed in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement should be designed, the research will help to sort some of the key arguments.

There are prominent international documents (like the Paris Agreement and the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) seeking to address different goals simultaneously. While synergies between policies is desirable, there are major challenges for policy coordination. Addressing several different goals using fewer policy instruments, for example, will not succeed as the Tinbergen Rule points out.

The integration of co-benefits in the analysis allows for taking into account the social effects of climate policy. As the authors argue, climate finance approaches could become overstrained if policymakers would consider them as tools to also solve local sustainability problems.

In this paper, the authors will not only examine what can be learnt from the clean development mechanism (CDM) for future schemes under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement but also observe the experiences gained from a non-CDM scheme. So the authors pay attention to the Trust Fund of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) which was established with global benefit orientation, i.e. – unlike the CDM – it was not regarded as an additional goal to support local sustainable development. Yet, despite its disregard of local co-benefits, the authors think that it is of particular importance to include the GEF in the analysis, as some important lessons can be learnt from it.

The purpose of this paper is to present an up-to-date estimation of the tax gaps (TGs) of 35 countries (28 EU member states and 7 additional countries – Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey, Switzerland and the USA, both as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) and a nominal value (in US$).

The authors’ empirical study was carried out on 35 selected countries. To estimate the TG, indirect methodology has been applied, where the basic components used in the estimation procedure are the level of the shadow economy estimated with the multiple indicators multiple causes method, the GDP at current prices (in US$), the total tax rate (TTR) of a given country and the indirect method of follow-up and estimation of lacking data.

The basic finding of the research is that the level of the TG is determined individually for a given country and is strongly correlated with the GDP, i.e. if the GDP is high, the TG as the percentage of the GDP is lower in the majority of countries. It is particularly easily noticeable in countries such as the USA (TG – 3.8 per cent of the GDP), the Great Britain (TG – 3.2 per cent of the GDP) or Japan (TG – 4.3 per cent of the GDP).

A limitation of the adopted research method is the lack of application of direct (supplementary) methods which would include potentially lost contributions from foreign sources and not registered taxpayers. Another research constraint is that the authors’ estimations do not take into account the so-called direct top-down approach based on the VAT Theoretical Total Liability. The weakness of the adopted procedure of estimation is also the use of TTR only instead of comparative approach including tax burdens and average tax rate.

TG has recently become a hotly debated issue and poses a big challenge to the public finance in many countries. The paper provides some recommendations for the policymakers how to reduce the size of the TG.

Tax evasion and tax avoidance leading to the emergence and expansion of the TG erode the business ethics and distort the rules of fair competition, thus undermining the social trust and moral infrastructure of business transactions.

One of the major research findings is that 30 per cent of the TG in a given country is determined by the TTR, which – for the first time – provides empirical proof that tax policy (as part of overall economic policy) plays an important role and that it may determine the fiscal effectiveness of a given country.

Explains why and how lawyers become involved in money laundering schemes. Describes three recent cases of UK solicitors convicted for money laundering ‐ Denis Jebb, Louis Glatt and Noel Horner ‐ and notes that US lawyers are convicted more often than in the UK; this is possibly because in the USA there are more sting operations, phone intercepts, use of accomplice evidence, and a different exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Moves on to the services that lawyers provide launderers: advice, use of client accounts, purchase or sale of property, creation of corporate vehicles and trusts, lawyer ‐ client privilege, guarantees, introductions, powers of attorney, and false legal documentation. Discusses next the low level of disclosures by solicitors in the UK of suspicious transactions; reasons may be the general culture of non‐suspicion, the duty of client confidentiality, and confusion over laundering and tax evasion. Outlines new UK money laundering offences, which are likely to lead to an increase in the numbers of solicitor prosecutions.

This paper studies the formation and management of an international entity for promoting the provision of global public goods in a setup of international treaties on concessions and reservations. Based on the so-called Vienna Convention by which there can be a discrepancy between the original treaty obligation and the ratified one in the multi-lateral treaty implementation, we construct two-stage mechanisms for international treaties on global public goods; the concession stage and the ratification stage with reservations. We explicitly analyze the optimal reservation levels from the optimal mechanism when the countries face asymmetric information on the preference parameters to global public goods. Specifically, we characterize the environments where the optimal mechanism with dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility and ex-post participation- constraint in the literature of mechanism design exists. The result shows that the sophisticatedly calculated transfers in the principal of quid pro quo control the international concessions and reservations.