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In 2017, it was a challenge to assess the future of global trade. It was an open question whether the US financial crisis and the recession that it triggered would mark a turning point for the liberal post–World War II world order. If one looked toward Europe, China, Latin America, and Japan, there was a flurry of activity. New trade agreements were being completed and pursued. In Washington, DC, on the other hand, President Donald Trump seemed set on ripping apart and/or renegotiating any trade deal the United States was ever part of.

This case explores Trump's opinions and emerging policy stance on trade, bilateralism, and the global economy, among others. It also gives an overview of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and asks whether the Trump presidency would constitute a major challenge to the WTO and what it stood for in 2017.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the largest shareholder's voting stake on the firm's capital structure decision.

To empirically analyze the influence of the voting stake on leverage, a large sample of 814 exchange-listed firms is applied. The baseline regression analysis is complemented by several robustness tests and a difference-in-difference regression analysis to mitigate endogeneity concerns.

The authors find a negative relationship between the voting stake of the largest shareholder and leverage, consistent with the notion that large, undiversified shareholders have the incentive to reduce risk. Additionally, results reveal that family control has a positive moderating effect, indicating that the negative relationship is less pronounced for family controlled firms.

The authors contribute to the research by suggesting ownership concentration as another determinant of capital structure. Further, the authors add to the literature by showing how the association between ownership concentration and leverage is moderated by family control and that the identity of the largest shareholder is of great importance.

The paper provides important insights to the current debate on the proposal of the European Commission to reintroduce shares with multiple votes as part of the Listing Act. The authors expect the regulation to exacerbate the concentration of voting rights, which results in lower leverage and thus limits corporate growth.

The authors differentiate from previous studies by focusing the largest shareholders' voting stake, instead of using the ownership stake, to assess the impact of ownership concentration on leverage.

This study aims to examine the role of institutional investors (using proxy voting and voice) in influencing the decisions and governance landscape of their investee firms.

The authors use exploratory research design due to the underdevelopment of the problem phenomena, especially in the context of emerging economies. Using asset management companies (AMC) as a proxy for institutional investors, the authors use a multiple case study design. This design was relevant in the setting as it assured triangulation by studying the same phenomenon across firms with distinct characteristics. The authors sourced the data for the multiple cases from primary sources (such as semi-structured interviews) and secondary sources (such as official Webpages and social media pages of AMC and examination of archival documents). Finally, the authors used qualitative content analysis to analyse the data.

The findings suggest that shareholder activism by institutional investors has grown in India over the period, particularly in matters related to corporate governance, related party transactions, remuneration and compensation. These AMC in India use proxy voting services for advising on voting resolutions in their investee companies. However, voting by AMC does not generally affect resolution results. This is particularly true in the presence of a high concentration of promoter holdings in investee companies.

The study is a novel attempt in an emerging market context to explore the role of institutional investors in influencing firm decisions and improving the governance landscape of the company using proxy voting and voice. This is especially important as the institutional framework in emerging markets is not as strong as in developed markets.

This study investigates how the interrelated elements of organizational roles – activities, motives, resources and relationships – are mobilized to construct a code of conduct for the proxy advisory (PA) industry in Europe.

This qualitative study uses archival documents from three consecutive regulatory consultations and 16 interviews with key stakeholders. It analyzes how different stakeholder groups (i.e. PA firms, investors, issuers and the regulator) perceive and mobilize the elements of PA firms’ role to construct the accountability regime’s boundaries (accountability problem and action, and users and providers of accounts).

This study shows how PA firms, investors, issuers and the regulator refer to the perceived motives behind PA firms’ activities to construct an accountability problem. The regulator accepted the motives of an information intermediary for PA firms’ role and required PA firms to develop a corresponding accountability action: a code of conduct. PA firms involved in developing the code of conduct formalized who is accountable to whom by aligning this accepted motive with their activities, relationships, and resources into a common role.

The study highlights how aligning role elements to reflect PA firms’ common roles enables the construction of an accountability regime that stakeholders accept as a means of regulation. Analyzing the role elements offers insights into the development and functioning of accountability regimes that rely on self-regulation. We also highlight the role of smaller regional firms in helping shape transnational accountability regimes.

The aim of this paper is to study the relationship between banks' ownership structure and their risk-taking behavior as well as the impact of banking regulation on banks' approach to taking risk, after the 2008 financial crisis.

The empirical analysis considers a sample of listed banks from European Union (EU) countries, over the period of 2011–2016 and uses the generalized least squared (GLS) random effect (RE) method, following Baltagi and Wu (1999) and Pathan (2009).

The authors find that the structure of the board of directors can influence bank risk behavior but not the ownership concentration. No significant relation was found between the influence of the regulatory environment and bank risk, i.e., stricter regulation has no effect on risk taking by banks.

The paper contributes to the literature in risk measures and banks' corporate governance. It also considers the impact of regulatory framework on banks' risk-taking behavior. The aim of this empirical analysis was to examine in greater detail these subjects and the dynamics between them after the significant structural changes in the macroeconomic environment and in the financial system, particularly with regards the regulatory and supervisory framework following the 2008 financial crisis, using data from European Union countries.

In June 23, 2016, voters in the United Kingdom have just approved a referendum calling for leaving the European Union. The case describes the motives for European integration, the rise of separatist movements in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, and the referendum process itself.

The purpose of this case is to provide a contemporary counterpoint to a discussion of the economic and political motivations for the American Civil War. Dominant themes highlighted here are economic nationalism, political nationalism, cultural centrism and ethnocentrism, and populism.

This case invites students to assess the impact that Brexit, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, might have on a New York–based hedge fund's portfolio and, specifically, its UK assets. The case is designed to prompt students to make market assumptions and investment hypotheses based on a combination of numerical data and qualitative information. It requires no numerical computations; instead, it asks the student to interpret both markets' short-term reactions to the Brexit vote and strategy shifts from UK and European business leaders in order to evaluate longer-term implications for the economies of the United Kingdom, Europe, and the world.