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The purpose of this paper is to investigate institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. It addresses the paucity of empirical research on institutional shareholder activism in sub-Saharan Africa.

This study uses agency theory to understand the institutional shareholder approach to shareholder activism in Nigeria. The data are collected through qualitative interviews with expert representatives from financial institutions.

The findings indicate evidence of low-level shareholder activism in Nigeria. The study provides empirical insight into the reasons why institutional shareholders might adopt an active or passive approach to shareholder activism. The findings suggest the pension structure involving two types of pension institutions affects the ability to engage in shareholder activism.

The research study advances our understanding of the status quo of institutional shareholder activism in an African context such as Nigeria.

The paper makes a practical contribution by highlighting that regulators need to consider how the financial market conditions and characteristics affect effective promotion of better governance practices and performance through shareholder activism.

This study draws attention to the implication for shareholder activism of complexities associated with an institutional arrangement where two types of financial institutions are expected to operate and manage the private pension funds in a country.

This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.

This paper aims to deal with the issue of shareholder activism of private equity investors in public companies. The study identifies characteristics of target firms and investors related to the likelihood of private equity activism. The research also examines whether shareholder activism strategy of private equity investors is associated with the better performance in future and value creation of target firms.

The paper applies econometric modeling to hand-collected data on private equity investments in listed companies, in the form of private investment in public equity and open-market share purchases, from eight Continental Europe’s countries for the period 2005–2014.

The findings indicate that the probability of shareholder activism is higher if the target firm’s industry corresponds to the private equity investor’s industry specialization, if the private equity firm is older, if the target is larger and the average ownership share purchased by the investor is higher. Conversely, the probability of shareholder activism is lower where a private equity firm invests in the target for the first time. A target firm with an activist investor has poorer operational performance results one year following the investment compared to a target firm with a passive private equity investor.

Results from the analysis of transactions in Continental Europe countries with French and German legal origin may be not generalizable to other markets with the different legal tradition and institutional environment.

This research provides new empirical evidence on private equity activism in listed companies of Continental Europe. By distinguishing between active and passive investments, testing rarely considered characteristics to provide valuable insights and analyzing the effect of activism on the target firm’s performance, the study contributes variously to the still-limited body of literature on private equity activism in public companies with a governance structure based on concentrated ownership. The findings emphasize the relationship between shareholder activism and both target and investor’s characteristics from perspective of mitigating agency problem and value creation in target firms. By simultaneously investigating investments in public companies from several European markets, the study complements empirical evidence mostly obtained from studies of a single national market.

“Shareholder activism works when shareholders understand something about the characteristics of the business that the board doesn’t”. As complex the term shareholder activism may seem, it demonstrates a very simple phenomenon of how shareholder take control of a situation to turn it in their favor. The whole world has taken an activism “twist” where every person has a word to say. The same characteristic of the society is showcased in this paper where engagement of shareholder is questioned whether it helps to promote effective corporate governance. Given the fact that Mauritius has a rather low shareholder activism framework, this research aims to depict the international picture of the issue at different levels to reach a consensus with the local market. It was a major challenge as very little research has been conducted to accurately contrast shareholder activism with corporate governance. However, the international standards aim at giving a clear picture of how the shareholder activism actually functions.

The research has adopted a black letter approach by analyzing relevant laws and legislations governing corporate governance matters in Mauritius and the USA, Malaysia, France and South Africa. Thereafter, a comparative analysis was made between Mauritius laws and the aforementioned countries. Recommendations were then put forward on the subject matter which is shareholder activism.

Research has shown development in corporate governance alongside the increase in shareholder activism. However, these research studies fail to prove that the development is because of shareholder activism itself. In fact, it could be because of increase in corporate intellects, removal of trade barriers, sustainable corporate practices and many such changes that have affected the corporate market somehow. Hence, it is difficult to conclude, with certainty, that the driver of good corporate governance is, in particular, the phenomenon of shareholder activism. Nevertheless, many result of shareholder activism has demonstrated a rather positive impact on the ongoing of the corporate dealings and on a personal note, it can be said that shareholder activism is a domain where much research and development should be effected as it represents a promising improvement in the way corporations are governed.

The concept of shareholder activism is quite new to the Mauritius legislation. There has not been research done on whether shareholder activism, particularly, is the reason for corporate success or failure. In this light, this paper aims to analyze shareholder activism practices in other countries and puts forward recommendation in the Mauritius context which may be of use to stakeholders concerned.

This paper aims to investigate the long-term impact of shareholder activism on Brazilian listed companies.

This study uses a sample of 194 companies in 2010, 2012 and 2014 and a two-stage data envelopment analysis to generate an efficiency score based on corporate governance, ownership structure and financial characteristics of companies. In the second stage, the study applies a bootstrap truncated regression to identify whether there is a relationship between the efficiency scores and a company-level activism index.

The results show a negative correlation between the efficiency scores and the activism index, suggesting that activist shareholders tend to target less efficient companies. A time analysis over the period 2010-2014 does not offer evidence of impacts of activism on changes of the efficiency scores.

Activist shareholders target less efficient companies. Shareholder activism increased after regulation that facilitated shareholder voting and required greater company transparency was introduced.

The two-stage nature of the procedure used in the analysis ascertains that this result is not spurious, assuring data separability between productive resources and contextual variables. This study contributes to the scarce literature on activism in emerging markets.

This study aims to foster a deeper understanding of socio-ethical shareholder activism by outlining the corporate campaigning strategies of a UK-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) and by assessing their impact on both institutional investors and the practices of two multinational companies. As we move into a world where shareholder ownership is becoming more democratised, shareholder activism is gaining prominence in the USA, Europe and Asia, opening new avenues for participation in corporate governance by stakeholders such as NGOs who have traditionally been uninvolved in corporate decisions.

The article adopts a qualitative methodology and case study research design. It relies on semi-structured interviews, analysis of documents and participant observation.

First, the study sheds light into the ways in which NGOs are connecting themselves to the financial sector. It argues that they can pursue their political goals by framing their arguments in a way that emphasises the short-term financial risks/benefits for investors. Secondly, it demystifies the term “shareholder activism”, transforming it from an action tool belonging only to big and powerful institutions, to a tool which gives other stakeholders such as NGOs and ordinary people a real stake in companies’ affairs. What is more, the study highlights the divergent nature of institutional shareholder activist intervention in the USA and the UK.

Given the generally long-term nature of shareholder campaigns, which can sometimes span over several years, it could be beneficial to adopt a longitudinal research design. Future research can endeavour to focus on a number of different campaigns over a period that exceeds three years.

The research has implications for NGOs adopting a shareholder activist campaigning model and for policy makers aiming to encourage investor stewardship.

The fact that the research field of NGO socio-ethical shareholder activism is relatively new and under-explored by academia, coupled with the growing incidence of the phenomenon in the UK and across the world, as well as its potential benefits for society as a whole, renders further investigation into the topic necessary.

In this paper the authors aim to examine whether shareholder activism is associated with accounting reporting complexity (ARC).

The authors employ ordinary least squares (OLS) and a sample of 19,530 firm-year observations (representing 3,377 unique firms) over the 2010–2019 period to test the prediction.

The authors find that firms with shareholder activism provide more complex accounting reporting. Further, both types of activism (including Concern & Dispute and Control & Discussion) are positively associated with ARC. The authors also find that the association between shareholder activism and ARC is more pronounced when the firms have a higher level of litigation risk and a higher proportion of institutional ownership. Collectively, the findings suggest that firms with shareholder activism may be under more pressure to disclose more accounting items, leading to more complex accounting reporting.

The study may be informative to regulators considering the costs and benefits of shareholder activism in financial reporting.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the propensity of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) for shareholder activism and their potential impact on corporate governance.

The study highlights the relationships between SWFs and corporate governance and also applies eight antecedents/determinants of institutional activism to analyze whether SWFs have a predisposition for shareholder activism.

The study only finds two instances of SWF activism. Additionally, it finds that despite their mostly passive investments, SWFs possess a natural tendency toward shareholder activism. Some are more likely to engage in activism than others, however. SWFs with a higher proportion of their assets invested in equities, those with portfolios fully or partially constructed to emulate the broader financial markets through indexing, and those that depend less on external fund managers are the likeliest candidates for activism. The study also finds that the regulatory environment can curb the natural SWF inclination for activist behavior.

Due to the lack of transparency within the SWF universe, this study largely depends on the limited data available for sovereign wealth funds.

Given the growing importance of SWFs, managers, directors, and policymakers must assess SWF activism, its influence on corporate governance, and its implications for public policy deliberations.

This project, to the best of the author's knowledge, is the first study that applies tested financial models to SWFs in order to determine if they have inherent activist tendencies.

Shareholder activism is gaining popularity across the globe especially in today’s context where the option of giving up and selling shares to exit the company has become obsolete. Hence, the purpose of this research paper is two-fold, firstly, to investigate the extent to which the minority shareholders of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius adopt and make use of the various tools of activism; and secondly, to compare the UK laws on shareholder activism with that of Mauritius.

To achieve these objectives, this study adopted the qualitative research method. Primary data was collected by conducting a survey on minority shareholders of Mauritian listed companies to figure out the extent to which they resort to activism tools, while secondary data was collected through a qualitative legal, document and content analysis to scrutinise regulatory provisions and existing literature on the researched topic.

The results show a moderate implementation level of shareholder activism by the minority investors in Mauritius although it was noted that minority shareholders are more likely to resort to the internal tools of activism rather than external methods. Further to the comparative study conducted, this research recommends a more active participation of the Mauritian regulatory bodies, amendments to the Mauritius Code of Corporate Governance and Mauritius Companies Act and the establishment of a commission responsible for overseeing the exercise of shareholders’ powers and promoting derivative lawsuits among minority shareholders.

Few researchers like Beebeejaun and Koobloll (2018) analysed shareholder activism through the lens of corporate governance with the view of providing recommendations to bring amendments in the Mauritian corporate law landscape. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no research has yet been effectuated on the extent to which shareholder activism is practised by the minority investors in developing countries, for which this existing study aims at filling in the research gap.

The purpose of this paper is to examine social issue proxy filings by shareholders of US corporations in a period commonly referred to as the “shareholder spring” to understand who the filers are, what issues are typically the focus of the filings, what the dominant strategy is of various filers and the success rate of proxy-based shareholder social activism.

Using the shareholder-filed proxy as the unit of analysis, the study parsed the data from 410 proxies to gain insight into the process of shareholder social activism.

Religious groups, in contrast to large pension and mutual funds, use a small shareholding approach to form coalitions with other stakeholders to gain voting support. Proxies that call for disclosure elicit greater support than those that demand a change in a company’s business practices. If the goal of shareholder social activism is to keep the proxy issue alive from one shareholder meeting to the next, then non-individual proxy filers can be considered successful.

While the study only considered proxies for 250 of the Fortune 500 companies, there is evidence that social activism can succeed if a coalition strategy is used and the shareholder’s motives appear to be legitimately altruistic.

It is important for corporate managers to consider the prevailing shareholder sentiment on social issues because such sentiments largely echo general societal concerns.

While the debate is still unsettled on the shareholder versus the stakeholder argument, there is a high level of scrutiny on how a company operates in the larger societal context.

Propelled by the Dodd–Frank law and the shareholder spring movement, certain types of shareholders (primarily religious groups) are quite adept at eliciting support for social issues because of both their legitimacy and by the strategy that they follow.