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This study aims to examine the influence of board gender diversity on audit quality demand, considering auditor choice and audit efforts within the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries. It further examines the role of political connections and the impact of gender equality policy initiatives on this relationship.

Fixed-effects regression models are employed in a sample of 1,822 firm-year observations for financial firms across the GCC from 2011–2022 to test the hypotheses. Moreover, the two-stage-least-squares and the propensity score matching methods are used for sensitivity analysis.

The study shows a negative relationship between board gender diversity and the demand for audit quality, reflected auditor choice and audit efforts. However, the study shows a positive association between firm’s political connections and audit quality demand, which is more pronounced in gender-diverse boards. Policy initiatives for gender equality show no significant effect on the relationship between board gender diversity and audit quality demand.

The results inform governments, policy-makers, regulatory authorities and corporations by providing new evidence on the relationship between board gender diversity and the demand for audit quality, as well as the moderating role of political connections and policy initiatives in this relationship. To promote the meaningful participation of female directors in board decision-making, the findings indicate that gender stereotypes, both explicit and implicit, that can hinder female directors’ influence in board decision-making need to be addressed. Second, the study underscores for governments, policy-makers regulatory authorities and corporations that the mere appointment of female directors does not necessarily ensure their engagement in board decision-making. The appointment of female directors should go beyond symbolism and translate into meaningful engagement and influence with the board.

This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by offering new insights on the link between board gender diversity and the demand for audit quality. Beyond confirming a negative relationship between board gender diversity and the demand for quality audit, this study provides new insights on the moderating role of a firm’s political connections on this relationship. In addition, existing studies are primarily based on firms in Western countries and cannot be generalized due to differences in governance and legal structures. Given that the GCC countries have different cultures, economies, institutions, governance practices and norms compared to developed and emerging countries, our study offers a pertinent discussion on the relationship between board gender diversity and the demand for audit quality, as well as the moderating role of political connections in this relationship in the GCC countries.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between political connections and corporate tax aggressiveness in Malaysia. In addition, this paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance variables and corporate tax aggressiveness. Next, the study investigates the mitigating role of corporate governance in the relationship between political connections and corporate tax aggressiveness.

The sample of this study is based on 2,538 firm-year observations during the 2000-2009 periods. This study employs a panel least square regression with both period and industry fixed effects. The study retrieved the corporate governance variables from the downloaded annual reports, whilst the remaining data were collected from Compustat Global.

This study finds that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than non-connected firms. Furthermore, the study finds that large board size decreases the likelihood of tax aggressiveness and a non-linear relationship exists between institutional ownership and tax aggressiveness suggesting increase in monitoring as the ownership increases. However, the study finds no evidence to suggest that corporate governance mitigates the influence of political connections in promoting tax aggressiveness behavior. The findings suggest that the impact of political connections could outweigh the benefits of changes in corporate governance in Malaysia.

The data are not recent, but it reflects a rather longitudinal research period.

This paper extends the literature of tax research in Malaysia which is in its’ infancy stage. Furthermore, it investigates the role of political connections in tax-planning research.

This study mainly aims to examine whether entrepreneurs’ utilization of political connections is purely egoistic. Addressing this issue could shed light on traditional debate which concerns whether political connections still have strategic value at advanced stage of institutional transition today in China. Here, at the background of Chinese economic transformation, the utilization of political connections is studied, and a double-role model of the pro-self-mechanism and the pro-social mechanism between political connections and performance in China is put forward.

This study uses survey of questionnaires randomly from 363 entrepreneurs in Jiangsu, Anhui and Shandong Provinces of China and adopts the first stage and direct moderation model in examination.

The results show that there exists mediated mechanism of both pro-self and pro-social mechanism in the relationship between political connections and firm performance. The authors conclude that utilization of political connections is not only purely egoistic but also altruistic. So, both dark-side and bright-side mechanisms of political connections in China are of equal importance. In addition, the authors take into consideration of the contingency effects of institution, industry and firm-level factors of this moderation model. The pro-self and pro-social mechanisms have differences in terms of moderator-within and moderator-between comparisons of these three contingency effects. Among these comparisons, the pro-self-mediating mechanism is most sensitive to changes of institutional quality, whereas the pro-social mediating mechanism is most sensitive to the uncertainty of industry competition.

This evidence furthermore verifies that the process of institutional transition is nonlinear and political connections still have strategic value in advanced stage of institutional transition today.

This study combines the dual perspectives of “give” and “take.” The former implies the pro-social motivation, while the latter implies the pro-self-motivation. Based on the framework of “resource-conduct-performance,” this study explores how these two mechanisms mediate the relationship between political ties and firm performance. In addition, the authors adopt the framework of “Strategy Tripod,” which was proposed by Peng et al. (2009) and examine the difference between pro-self and pro-social motivation at different level of institution environment improvement, industry dynamics and firm absorptive capacity.

The purpose of this study is to assess the differential impact on the stock market of statements made by and information about directors and companies who are politically connected, compared to directors and companies with no political connections. The authors also analyze the role played by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which the authors have identified as politically connected companies because most board members are appointed by political authorities. Furthermore, the boundaries and institutional environment within which SOEs operate are likely to be different from private companies.

The sample is composed of over 60,000 news articles on the boards of directors (both with political roles and without political roles) of listed Italian companies in the period 1998–2013. On that sample the authors run a regression analysis under the signaling theory approach.

Results suggest a positive effect on market capitalization associated with individual political connections. This effect decreases when the political connection extends to the whole enterprise although it still remains, while a negative effect is associated with state-controlled enterprises. The impact of negative news content does not change depending on whether a board member has a political role or not.

Previous research has demonstrated a causal link between stock prices and their reaction to corporate news (Engelberg and Parsons, 2011; Peress, 2014), but no studies have quantified the different reactions that occur when the news mentions politically connected companies and individuals who hold a political role.

This study aims to investigate whether socially responsible businesses with corporate social expenditure are less prone to engaging in tax avoidance. The study also examines whether political connections moderate the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and tax avoidance.

The study uses ordinary least squares to analyse the panel data of all 30 listed banks on the Dhaka Stock Exchange covering 2012 to 2020. The study uses a set of alternative variables to check the robustness of the findings.

Confirming the corporate culture theory, the study findings indicate that the higher the firms’ CSR expenditure, the lower the tax avoidance. Contrarily, the moderating effect of political connection weakens the role of CSR in tax avoidance, implying that political relation makes the firms socially irresponsible. Besides, the findings document that firms with strong political connections are more likely to be tax aggressive by weakening the role of CSR. The findings imply that firms with weaker political connections are more socially responsible than firms with strong political ties.

The study provides the bank management and regulatory bodies valuable insights to take necessary actions so that they can easily monitor whether the banks follow their instructions regarding CSR and tax payments. As the politicians make the firm socially irresponsible, the regulatory bodies and bank management should not keep them or their relatives on the board.

The study contributes to the CSR and tax avoidance literature considering the moderating role of political connections in Bangladesh banking sector.

This study examines the effect of employees' perceptions of political connections on performance measurement systems (PMS) design choice and firm performance. In addition, this study explores the moderating effect of social networking, a very common and widely used factor by domestic and foreign multinational firms operating in China, and its joint effect with political connections or PMS design choice on firm performance. We collected survey responses from a sample of 110 managers from manufacturing firms in China. Our results reveal that highly politically connected managers use nonfinancial measures, leading to improved firm performance. Our results suggest that social networking interacts significantly with political connections, and nonfinancial and financial measures on firm performance. The theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between uncertainty and corporate cash holdings with the moderating role of political connections.

We employ fixed effects estimation on a panel dataset of 669 Vietnamese listed firms over the 2010–2020 period, with one- and two-way standard error clustering. We conduct various robustness tests, including two-stage least squares/instrumental variable and generalized method of moments regressions, alternative cash holding measure, and additional controls for macroeconomic conditions and ownership types.

The effect of uncertainty on cash holdings is weakened for firms with political connections relative to those without the connections. Although general firms depend on cash flows to adjust their cash holding behavior when uncertainty increases, our findings suggest that politically connected firms do not rely on internal cash flows to accumulate cash when confronted high uncertainty.

Our findings on the role of political connections in moderating the relationship between cash holding and economic policy uncertainty have practical implications for policymaking. Since political connections serve as a buffer for a firm’s liquidity, firms may want to seek those connections, which can, in turn, lead to increasing informal costs and unfair business environment.

This is the first study investigating the role of political connections to the nexus of cash, cash flow and uncertainty, providing novel evidence regarding the less dependence on internal cash flows to save cash by politically connected firms. Second, the paper enriches the literature on the motives of cash holdings by proposing a modified agency view in the context of weak investor protection. Therefore, our findings strengthen the explanation for the positive effect of uncertainty on firms’ cash holdings in emerging markets.

Audit rotation (AR) is a key policy initiative implemented in global jurisdictions to deal with concerns about audit quality. Auditing financial reports involves communicating attested value-relevant company information to investors, and hence audit quality plays a role in the quality of financial reporting information. This paper aims to investigate whether AR affects the degree of information asymmetry (IS) between investors. It further aims to examine whether voluntary AR results in less asymmetric information compared to mandatory AR. Additionally, it examines whether political connections moderate the association between AR and IS.

The authors use data from publicly traded banks across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for the period 2010–2018. The authors include several variables to control for corporate governance and other firm-specific characteristics by using country-year fixed-effects regression model.

The authors find higher IS for banks that periodically rotate auditor, while banks voluntarily choose to rotate auditors obtain high-quality audits, which results in higher trading volume and lower stock return volatility, hence lower IS. The results suggest that when banks voluntarily choose to rotate auditors, investors perceive these banks as more committed to obtaining high-quality audits relative to mandatory AR. Providing higher quality audits enhances the credibility of reported information and thus reduce the level of IS. Moreover, IS following AR is higher for politically connected banks than for similar but politically unconnected banks. Finally, investors perceive voluntary AR as a disciplining tool, which mitigates IS. This mitigating role is not affected by bank political connectedness.

This study has limitations as the definition of AR could be interpreted as binary or too narrow, and hence it may not be appropriate to generalize findings to different contexts. Nonetheless, this study casts light on a new perspective to reconcile the existing mixed evidence on the influence of AR on IS and the moderating role of political connections. A further limitation is that because of data unavailability, the authors were unable to use other proxies (e.g. bid-ask spreads and analyst forecast dispersion) of IS.

The present findings provide insight to regulators, policymakers and standard setters on the potential adverse effect of political connections on the role of AR in mitigating IS. The results underscore the importance of voluntary AR, and suggest that regulators, policymakers and standard setters encourage firms to rotate their auditors periodically.

This study provides evidence in a setting that is unique at the economic, social and regulatory levels. Prior literature is lacking and has been centered on developed countries or focusing on single-country specifications. The data set of this study is unique and allows us to examine the interplay between political influence that arises through ownership and management roles of influential members of state.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) and firm performance.

We focus on the political connections of SBs and BODs separately and estimate a quadratic model based on 1,099 Indonesian listed firm-year observations. Additionally, we address endogeneity problem by using sample selection model, generalized method of moments (GMM), propensity score matching\ and lagged variables regression.

We find that political connections of SBs are more significantly associated with firm performance than that of BODs. Furthermore, such an association is not monotonic, in that the relationship declines after a certain level of political connections. We also find that stand-alone firms with political connections perform better than firms belonging to family business groups. Our results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.

This study contributes to the literature by proposing non-linear model to incorporate the rent-seeking and resource dependence arguments. Although previous studies use regression analysis (linear model) and find mixed results on the association between political connections and firm performance, our non-linear model extends our understanding of the relationship between political connections and firm performance. We extend corporate governance literature by examining the role of political supervisory boards in the dual board system and the role of family business group in Indonesia. Several limitations are addressed to interpret all the findings. We use one period of the presidency (SBY-Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) in Indonesia as our sample, but other regimes are not considered. We collect political connection and family business group information based on publicly data available. For politically connected firms, we do not have information whether they obtain connections through ruling parties or not.

Practitioners (such as companies and policymakers) can use our models to consider the level of political connections that can improve corporate’s performance. Additionally, they can use our findings to design corporate governance policies.

The paper identifies the use of the non-linear model on the association between political connections and firm performance in Indonesian dual board system.

Despite fast-growing interest in research on political connections, most papers on this topic belong to the economics or public administration fields. Few studies, if any, look into the role of firmsʼ political connections in the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition area. This paper attempts to bridge this gap by investigating the impact of political connections on the excessive profitability of DoD contractors. We find that, in contrast to what the “corruption hypothesis” predicts, the excessive profits are less (more) pronounced for those contractors with politically connected (non-connected) boards. Our findings suggest that those politically connected board directors may use their experience to serve a benevolent role to the public in keeping DoD contractors from opportunistic profitseeking behaviors that could reach or even cross the federal governmentʼs regulatory redline.