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This paper assesses the projected growth of food supply relative to population growth and estimated food demand growth over the next four decades.

World population projections are analyzed for the main developed and developing regions. Implied food demand growth is then compared to grain and oilseed supply projections from a few of the most reliable sources. Three of these are 10-year projections and two extend to 2030 and 2050. To the extent possible, comparisons are made among the alternative projections. Conclusions about food availability and prices are finally drawn.

Meeting the growth in demand for food, feed, and biofuels to 2050 will not be a steep hill to climb, but there will need to be continued private and public investment in technology to induce increased production growth rates through productivity enhancements and increased purchased inputs.

The main food security challenge of the future, as in the present, is not insufficient production but rather increasing access and reducing vulnerability for food insecure households. The dominance of future population growth in the food insecure regions of Africa makes this challenge even more critical between now and 2050 and even more so in the years beyond 2050 when climate change effects on resource constraints will be more severe.

We provide new measures of relative UK and US GDP per capita and output per worker for the crucial years between 1830 and 1870. Our estimates are current price comparisons that compare expenditure on GDP for five benchmark years using new price data. They show that the US leads in income per capita and output per worker compared to Great Britain and the United Kingdom. We check our estimates against sectoral productivity data and real wages.

We analyze several dimensions of food security in Ethiopia, taking into account projected population growth, economic growth, and price information to estimate future food consumption by income decile. The analysis looks at the potential impact of large consumer price increases on food security metrics. We use the new USDA/ERS demand-based modeling framework in order to carry out this study. The modeling approach captures economic behavior by making food demand systematically responsive to income and price changes based on a demand specification well-grounded in microeconomic foundations. The projected change in food consumption can be apportioned to population growth, income growth, and changes in food prices and real exchange rates. We found that Ethiopia is highly food insecure, with 54% of the population consuming less than 2,100 calories a day at calibration levels. Income growth under unchanged prices mitigates food insecurity with the number of food-insecure people falling to 42.5 million in 2016. If domestic prices were free to fall with world market prices, the food-insecure population would decrease farther to 36.1 million. If domestic prices increased because of domestic supply shocks and constrained imports, the food-insecure population could rise to 64.7 million. The food gap (i.e., the amount of food necessary to eliminate Ethiopia’s food insecurity) would reach 3.6 million tons. The practical implications of this are that measures of food security are sensitive to changes in prices. Maintaining higher prices when global prices are low maintains higher levels of food insecurity than would otherwise prevail. Expanded access to lower cost imports could significantly improve food security in Ethiopia.

The American agricultural economist Marion Clawson advised the Israeli government during 1953–1955. Clawson, a protégé of John D. Black and Mordecai Ezekiel, criticized the government for ignoring economic considerations, and stated that Israel’s national goals – defense, Negev Desert irrigation, immigrant absorption via new agricultural settlements, and economic independence – were mutually contradictory. His major recommendations were to improve the realism of Israel’s agricultural plan; end expensive Negev irrigation; enlarge irrigated farms eightfold; freeze new settlements until the number of semi-developed settlements falls from 300 to 100; and limit new Negev settlements to 10 over 5–7 years. Thus, Clawson ignored political feasibility and made value judgments. Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol and Minister of Agriculture Peretz Naphtali rejected Clawson’s recommendations because they ignored Israel’s national goals. By September 1954, Clawson shifted towards greater pragmatism: He acknowledged that foreign advisors should not question the national goals or make value judgments, and sought common ground with the Ministry of Agriculture. At his initiative, he wrote Israel Agriculture 1953/54 in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture. Israel Agriculture was a consensus document: Clawson eschewed recommendations and accepted that the government might prioritize non-economic goals. In proposing Israel Agriculture, Clawson made a pragmatic decision to relinquish some independence for (potentially) greater influence. Ultimately, Clawson was largely unsuccessful as an advisor. Clawson’s failure was part of a general pattern: Over 1950–1985, the Israeli government always rejected foreign advisors’ recommendations unless it was facing a severe crisis.

The pricing kernel puzzle of Jackwerth (2000) concerns the fact that the empirical pricing kernel implied in S&P 500 index options and index returns is not monotonically decreasing in wealth as standard economic theory would suggest. Thus, those options are currently priced in a way such that any risk-averse investor would increase his/her utility by trading in them. We provide a representative agent model where volatility is a function of a second momentum state variable. This model is capable of generating the empirical patterns in the pricing kernel, albeit only for parameter constellations that are not typically observed in the real world.

The study provides medium-term estimates of recovery paths for Indian economy using a dynamic factor (DF)-based approach that employs data on high-frequency indicators à la Bhadury, Ghosh, and Kumar (2020). The DFs are used to analyze the post-pandemic recovery and convergence with its pre-COVID-19 trend for India between March 2021 and March 2022. A broad sectoral assessment of the impact of COVID-19 is also conducted. In addition, forward-looking measures based on stock returns are used to analyze the transmission of additional banking sector risks to the real sectors by constructing daily delta conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) estimates. Our estimates based on the DFs suggest that the aggregate economic activities may catch up to the estimated pre-COVID trend by March 2021 predominantly driven by the growth in services sector. The industrial sector and consumer goods sector continue to show moderate signs of recovery. Our CoVaR estimates corroborate these findings. Banking sector transmission risk is among the lowest for services such as healthcare and information technology (IT), for both the lockdown period between March 25 and June 8, 2020, and for the latter months. The transmission risk continues to remain high for metal, oil and gas, and capital goods sector. Broadly, the evidence on forward-looking banking sector risk transmission for major sectors is in alignment with our finding on their recovery based on DF models, after easing of COVID-19 lockdown.