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There is great conflict between some developed countries and developing countries regarding attitudes toward reducing global warming (e.g. the USA vs China). The aim of this paper is to argue that open trade doesn't necessarily increase world pollution if clean development mechanism (CDM) is generously undertaken and if the CDM devotes considerable real resources in transfers of the associate abatement technology.

The impacts of trade on environment can be decomposed into scale, technique and composition effects. This paper incorporates abatement assets into Copeland and Taylor's model to argue that the technique effect stems from an increasing in pollution taxes and in international diffusion of abatement technology; however, the former is fully offset but the latter is facilitated by the CDM.

While world pollution is jointly determined by the composition and technique effects, in contrast to literature, open trade doesn't necessarily increase world pollution if CDM is generously undertaken with considerable real resources in abatement technology transfers.

Currently, there are more than about one half of the CDM projects that allocate no real resources in technology transfers. This study addresses how voluntary investment of the CDM from the North (e.g. the USA) to the South (e.g. China) might reduce pollution on a global level only if having “generously” technology transfer.

Society has to find ways and means to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide, to prevent global warming when considering inter‐generational equity with respect to environmental quality. The aim of the carbon dioxide emission control is to keep the level of carbon dioxide below a certain threshold level. This paper deals with the various policy instruments that are available to control greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. The criteria that should be used in selecting the appropriate policy instruments in controlling carbon dioxide emissions are: efficiency, equity and flexibility. Based on these criteria, the author is of the view that in the short‐run it is important for all the countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. However, in the long‐run, it may be possible to use the Kyoto targets to achieve an international carbon dioxide emission tradable permit system.

In a simple reciprocal dumping model of trade, this study scrutinizes the strategic role of trade and commodity taxes as environmental instruments when consumption of an imported product generates pollution. The results suggest that for sufficiently small values of the marginal disutility from pollution, commodity taxes can be preferred over import tariffs, and compared to the case of trade policies, free trade can be welfare dominating even for higher values of the marginal disutility from pollution when commodity taxes are used strategically as environmental instruments.

The authors employ a reciprocal dumping model of trade.

A sufficiently high marginal disutility from pollution (or sufficient asymmetries between the countries in terms of their marginal disutility from pollution) may jeopardize bilateral trade, especially if countries are given the option to set tariffs freely for imported goods (consumption of which generate environmental pollution). For sufficiently weak transboundary pollution and sufficiently low marginal disutility from pollution, (1) both Nash trade and domestic policies may prove to be helpful in addressing consumption-based pollution, and (2) it is possible to show in such a case that Nash domestic policies may be preferred over Nash trade policies, especially when both transboundary pollution and the trading partner's marginal disutility from pollution are sufficiently low.

The novel contribution of this paper is (1) to capture asymmetries among trading partners in terms of how much they account for environmental pollution when deciding on their (domestic/trade) policy measures and (2) to focus on environmental degradation that is caused by final consumption of a product imported from a trading partner.

The absence of government intervention and market supervision cannot effectively promote green process innovation in manufacturing industries. As a new government regulation approach, environmental taxes provide a platform to internalize the externality of environmental pollution. This paper empirically investigates the impact of environmental taxes on green process innovation and the moderating effects of industry pollution heterogeneity and green credit.

This research collects manufacturing industry data ranging from 2008 to 2020, resulting in a total of 351 observations. Time-individual, two-way fixed effect models are constructed to examine the hypotheses.

The results indicate environmental taxes have an inverted-U effect on green process innovation in manufacturing industries. Implementation intensity of the current environmental taxes on China's manufacturing industries does not reach an inflection point. Further analysis suggests that environmental taxes exert influence on the inverted-U relationship with low-pollution industries displaying a steeper curvilinear pattern than high-pollution industries. Moreover, the analysis shows that green credit plays a moderating role in the inverted-U relationship, as low green credit provides more limited stimulus than high green credit in terms of the effect of environmental taxes on green process innovation.

This study offers empirical evidence to accommodate negative externalities of corporate production and provides new perspectives in nudging corporate green-process innovation.

This paper verifies the effect of environmental taxes on green process innovation amid industry pollution heterogeneity by introducing an industrial-level analysis unit. This study improves the means by which environmental taxes are measured. Existing literature has narrowly used pollution discharge fees as a proxy for environmental taxes. The authors have summed up the taxes on vehicle and vessels, urban land use, urban maintenance and construction, vehicle purchases, waste gas, wastewater and solid waste to measure the effect of environmental taxes in this study.

The purpose of this study is to better understand the nexus between environmental taxes and other environmental management systems (EMSs) and to propose an alternative framework for implementing environmental protection tax (EPT) in China.

The study uses a multimethod approach encompassing document analysis and comparative analysis. The archival data covers laws, reports, regulations, guidelines and standards related to the EPT and EMS sub-systems in China.

The study identifies several institutional features of environmental taxes that have not been fully explored in past tax research. In addition, the study reveals that information-sharing mechanisms are key to addressing the risks and uncertainties associated with the implementation of an environmental tax and that the mechanisms are grounded in the nexus among EPT and two EMS sub-systems.

The findings of this study have implications for the understanding of China’s environmental tax system, the Environmental Impact Assessment system and the pollutants discharge permit (PDP) system. The construction of an alternative framework provides insights for approaches to environmental taxation. A limitation of this study is that the application of the framework might be undermined by the inaccurate manual sampling, as some pollutants may be non-replicable.

The findings of this study are relevant to policymakers who are designing, improving or abandoning environmental taxes for alternate solutions to environmental issues.

The insights gained from this study may be of assistance to lower the risks and uncertainties associated with the implementation of an environmental tax.

The study contributes to approaches to environmental taxes by constructing an alternative framework that connects an environmental tax system with two EMSs. The framework lays the groundwork for some promising research opportunities. Additionally, the study extends the tax accounting literature (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010) by connecting accounting and environmental knowledge and developing a transdisciplinary approach. The study also contributes to the emerging body of literature that addresses the challenges in implementing environmental taxes in China.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the interdependencies between trade and environment policies, as they get jointly determined in a political‐economy model of a small open economy. In theoretical literature, government is usually modeled as benevolent. In real economies, however, it is not a pure social welfare maximizer. Lobbies have stakes in the specific policies, and they negotiate with/bribe the government over the latter's policy stance. The influence of industry lobbying on both trade and the environment policies at the political equilibrium is the focus of the paper.

Concepts from non‐cooperative game theory are used to incorporate a Nash‐bargaining game between the industry lobby and government. Government is not benevolent. Campaign contributions help win elections and provide incentive to distort policies to attract lobby contributions. Several situations are modeled. Given a politically set environment policy, tariffs may be zero in view of the free trade agreements. Or, a sequential game is modeled where environment policy is set to maximize social welfare, given a politically determined trade policy. Alternatively, in the full political equilibrium, government and lobby bargain simultaneously over tariff and the environmental tax.

Lobbying implies that government may trade‐off one policy for another. When only environment policy is politically manipulable by the lobby, pollution tax is lower than the Pigouvian tax. If, instead, the lobby can influence trade policy only, government provides protection to domestic import‐competing sector. In a sequential game, the trade policy outcome does not change, but pollution tax is always higher than the Pigouvian level, even with the environmental lobby absent. With both the policies political, the government “concedes” and offers positive tariff protection, but, not on environment policy; that is, imposes a pollution tax higher than the Pigouvian level.

The paper provides useful insights into how, under the influence of special‐interest politics, and bargaining between the government and lobbies, the trade and environment policies interact with each other. In comparison with the existing literature on this issue, it derives several stronger and (apparently) counter‐intuitive conclusions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of information structure in the design of the structure and parameters of an optimal regulatory mechanism. In particular, the paper analyzes both firm and public agency behavior under environmental externality internalization schemes and stochastic externality measurements of emissions and concentrations. It is shown that in general, the optimal environmental control policy involves the derivation of regulatory controls, measurement controls and the sequential estimation of inaccessible emissions and concentrations by a Kalman filter.

This paper aims to explore how upstream supply chain companies will control the carbon emissions and price decisions of products when the government implements environmental tax policy on consumers. It provides some suggestions to control carbon emissions for the government and manufacturers.

This study establishes two-echelon Stackelberg game models with and without the implementation of environmental tax policy on consumers in a centralized scenario and a decentralized scenario. Through the comparative analysis of the four models, the optimal emission abatement and pricing strategies are obtained.

This paper concludes that implementing environmental tax policy on consumers within the market’s acceptable range is more beneficial to the retailer and the environment, as well as the overall social welfare, except for the manufacturer. Moreover, consumer’s low-carbon preference always has a broader impact on carbon abatement and corporate profits than environmental tax coefficient. Finally, the side-payment self-executing contract can effectively ensure that the supply chain members make rational decisions spontaneously while achieving a win-win solution of centralized scenario.

This paper first considers how the government’s environmental tax policy on consumers will affect the decision-making of supply chain companies, and proposes an improved side-payment self-enforcing contract to maximize environmental and economic benefits of centralized scenario. In addition, it provides a reference for the government to adopt both the carbon cap policy and the environmental tax policy.

Increased environmental pollution and the globalization of economies have initiated an academic debate on the relationship between international trade and the environment. Addresses the question of whether the present GATT/WTO regime conflicts with effective policies to cope with transboundary environmental problems, including the protection of global commons. Analyses the welfare effects of transboundary pollution tariffs by using a simple partial equilibrium framework. Contrasts the results with an assessment of the existing GATT/WTO regime, in which no distinction between national and transboundary environmental problems has been made. Outlines, in conclusion, some basic elements of a necessary reform of the GATT/WTO regime. These proposals would allow border tax adjustment for certain types of production‐related environmental charge without undermining an open and non‐discriminatory multilateral trading system.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential for emissions control policy using the example of the power generation sector in China.

The analytical model is developed using a joint production function, where carbon emissions and electricity are jointly produced using capital and fossil fuel inputs. Abatement of emissions can be achieved by investment in production capital that improves the production efficiency or abatement capital that removes the emissions. The results are estimated using data from China's electricity generation sector.

The analytical model shows that economic growth can be achieved while still keeping the emission stock at a stable level. The results show that the level of the tax required to stabilize emissions depends greatly on the efficiency of abatement activities. As an illustration of this result, one finding shows that the required emission tax would be reduced greatly from 16 to 5 yuan/ton of emission when the abatement technology is improved from removing 10 to 30 percent of emissions flow.

The lack of carbon capture and storage technology in the real‐world limits the ability to estimate some of the results from the economic growth model.

Unlike many other papers, the empirical analysis is based on conditions from the economic model. In contrast to previous work that models emissions as an input into the production process, the model and estimation are consistent with the joint nature of electricity and emissions production.