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In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central bankers for bench testing policy measures or rules. We distinguish experiments that analyze the reasons for non-neutrality of monetary policy, experiments in which subjects play the role of central bankers, experiments that analyze the role of central bank communication and its implications, experiments on the optimal implementation of monetary policy, and experiments relevant for monetary policy responses to financial crises. Finally, we mention open issues and raise new avenues for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is room for a stabilising fiscal policy, through an analysis of the supporters of the new classical economics and the supporters of the new Keynesian economics. There are no reliable results on the Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policies. As such, the policy-mix becomes a problem of theoretical approach, in the sense of a strategic game between monetary authorities and tax authorities (among them). This points to the problem of coordination between budgetary authorities as being the central debate within the Eurozone. The end-result is that without fiscal policy coordination, Eurozone member states are working on a series of non-cooperative games that are inefficient, because no player can improve its position by unilaterally changing its strategy.

The analysis starts from the experience of three countries in the 1980s, these are Denmark, Ireland and Sweden. In all three cases the adoption of restrictive budget policies has provoked a strong, rapid and enduring resizing of public debt, and growth did not weaken, moreover it accelerated. In all three cases the logic behind the policy-mix actions allowed the individualisation of the respective roles of fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal policies were joining with fiscal instruments and reduction in public spending and furthermore monetary policy was accommodated in respect of the budget contraction.

First, the authors were not able to identify an analytical method that can ensure the success of a fiscal policy. Second, analysing fiscal policies within the Eurozone implies also that the authors reflect on the need for a coordination of these policies. In fact, the authors have shown how the possible coordination of economic policies in the Eurozone would result in major benefits for all member countries.

In the absence of fiscal policy coordination, member states are engaged in a series of non-cooperative games that prove inefficient, when no player is able to improve its position by unilaterally changing its fiscal policy. The coordination of national fiscal policies generates a collective advantage, bringing each state to consistently change its strategies.

Models fiscal policy interactions between fiscal authorities and private investors in the foreign exchange market in a game‐theoretic framework. Using a two‐period game, I consider the credible and noncredible announcements of the domestic fiscal authority with respect to the stance of its future fiscal policy. Each country faces a trade‐off between its current account and budget deficit objectives and time‐inconsistency arises due to lack of a sufficient number of policy instruments. For this game I derive explicitly the time consistent and precommitment policies for the domestic fiscal authority and explain that precommitment is welfare improving relative to the time‐consistent policy. In a two‐country framework, both precommitment with respect to the private sector and co‐operation between the two policymakers tend to improve welfare.

In this chapter, the authors ask two questions: (i) Is the conduct of monetary policy stable across time and similar across major economies? and (ii) Do policy decisions of major central banks have international spillover effects? To address these questions, the authors build on recent semi-parametric advances in time-varying parameter models that allow us to increase the vector autoregressive () dimension and to jointly model three advanced economies (USA, UK and the Euro Area). The main reduced-form finding of this chapter is an increased connectedness between and within countries during the recent financial crisis. In order to study policy spillovers, we jointly identify three economy-specific monetary policy shocks using a combination of sign and magnitude restrictions. The authors find that monetary policy shocks were larger in magnitude and more persistent in the early 1980s than in subsequent periods. The authors also uncover positive spillover effects of policy between countries in the 1980s and diminished, and sometimes negative ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ effects in the second half of the sample. Moreover, during the 1980s, the authors find evidence for policy coordination between the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the institutional setting of monetary policy making that mitigates the effects of productive public investment on inflation persistence.

In the theoretical approach, the authors consider a simple monetary game model à la Barro-Gordon introducing, apart from stochastic output shocks, indexed wage contracts and public investment effects. Then, the authors empirically produce inflation persistence and public investment persistence by estimating a first-order autoregressive model in a fixed rolling window of 36 months for the UK and also use a dummy in order to incorporate the regime switch in monetary policy since 1997, giving a clear increase in the level of central bank independence.

The theoretical framework suggests that an independent central banker could better manage inflation expectations and therefore inflation persistence despite the occurrence of persistent public investment shocks. From the perspective of fiscal policy, the appointment of a conservative and independent central banker could absorb adverse effects on inflation dynamics resulting from persistent expansionary fiscal policies. Empirical evidence in the UK indicates that the creation of an independent monetary policy committee reduces the positive link between public investment and inflation persistence.

From a monetary policy perspective view, the best response to public investment policies is to increase the degree of independence to alleviate effects on inflation dynamics. From the perspective of fiscal policy, an independent central banker can provide the necessary conditions to undertake a long-run public investment plan, since long-run growth will not be undermined by adverse inflation inertia.

The authors introduce, in the debate of inflation persistence, both theoretically and empirically, the role of public investment and monetary policy design.

The international linkages between money stocks (and inflation rates) has received much attention. Focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Fixed rate systems require credible commitments to the rules of the game by the central banks involved. Credible commitment can be achieved through cooperative (symmetric) or coercive (asymmetric) regimes. Did the USA (Germany) dominate other developed (European) countries during the Bretton Woods (European Monetary) system? Examines the linkages, if any, between the USA (German) money stock and money stocks in other developed (European) countries, using the cointegration and error‐correction methodology. Finds evidence that USA (German) money stock did affect other (European) countries′ money stocks during fixed exchange rates. Finds, also, reverse causality which raises serious questions about either the dominance of the USA (Germany) within the Bretton Woods (European Monetary) system, or the usefulness of causality tests is answering such questions.

This chapter contributes to the continuous debate on the effects of public information. The debate initiated with Morris and Shin (2002) who showed that heightening the precision of public information can be detrimental to welfare in a beauty contest framework, because when agents have both private and public information, they may overreact to the public information since it acts as a focal point. If the private agents overreact to public information, then a policy of limited transparency may be warranted. Some researchers suggest partial announcement (limited publicity), others propose to disseminate the public information privately to each agent (limited precision) with some idiosyncratic noise in order to reduce overreaction. Those chapter, however, miss the following fact; they don’t take into account the interaction between private sector and the central bank. We extend those studies by setting the framework as a two-player monetary policy game between the central bank and the private sector by allowing explicitly for a central bank to be one of the many contributors of the public signal. We show (1) how introducing a certain degree of opacity affects both players and determines the conditions under which an intermediate transparent strategy improves the outcome of the private sector, as well as of the central bank. We find that reducing transparency doesn’t affect the two players in the same way. (2) It turns out that respective players’ losses are strictly identical when the central bank implements the optimal degree of transparency or the optimal degree of publicity. We establish then an equivalence relationship in terms of effects between publicity and transparency for both actors.

A number of recent papers have raised serious questions about the validity of the German dominance hypothesis, using Granger (temporal) causality tests. If Germany dominates within the European Monetary System, then German monetary policy, measured by either money stocks or interest rates should Granger (temporally) cause other EMS countries’ monetary policies, but not vice versa. Empirical evidence leads analysts to conclude that the German dominance hypothesis is invalid, or at a minimum, in need of significant reformulation. Explores similar Granger causality tests, using the recent cointegration and error‐correction modelling strategy, for the US and a group of developing countries during the Bretton Woods period, where conventional wisdom suggests that US policy dominated. Finds significant evidence of two‐way causality between the US money stock and the money stocks of a large number of developing countries. These findings raise a serious questions about the interpretation and/or appropriateness of the Granger causality test for investigating policy dominance hypotheses.

This chapter attempts to analyze mainly the interactions between the implementation of inflation targeting (IT) policy and performance in the conduct of economic policies (fiscal and exchange rate) in emerging countries. More precisely, empirical studies conducted in this chapter aim to apprehend the feedback effect of this strategy of monetary policy on the budget deficit and volatility of exchange rate performance. This said, we consider the institutional framework as endogenous to IT and analyze the response of authorities to the adoption of this monetary regime. To do this, the retained methodological path in this chapter is an empirical way, based on the econometrics of panel data. First, our contribution to the existing literature is to evaluate the time-varying treatment effect of IT’s adoption on the budget deficit of emerging inflation targeters, using the propensity score matching approach. Our empirical analysis, conducted on a sample of 34 economies (13 IT and 21 non-IT economies) for the period from 1990 to 2010, show a significant impact of IT on the reduction of budget deficit in emerging countries having adopted this monetary policy framework. Therefore, we can say that the emerging government can benefit ex post and gradually from a decline in their public deficits. Retaining the same econometric approach and sample, we tried secondly to empirically examine whether the adoption of IT in emerging inflation targeters has been effectively translated by an increase in the nominal effective exchange rate volatility compared to non-IT countries. Our results show that this effect is decreasing and that this volatility is becoming less important after the shift to this monetary regime. We might suggest that this indirect and occasional intervention in the foreign exchange market can be made by fear of inflation rather than by fear of floating hence in most emerging countries that have adopted the IT strategy. Finally, we can say that our conclusions corroborate the literature of disciplining effects of IT regime on fiscal policy performance as well as the two controversial effects of IT on the nominal effective exchange rate volatility.