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Let there be two individuals: “rich,” and “poor.” Due to inefficiency of the income redistribution policy, if a social planner were to tax the rich in order to transfer to the poor, only a fraction of the taxed income would be given to the poor. Under such inefficiency and a standard utility specification, a Rawlsian social planner who seeks to maximize the utility of the worst-off individual will select a different allocation of incomes than a utilitarian social planner who seeks to maximize the sum of the individuals’ utilities. However, when individuals prefer not only to have more income but also not to have low status conceptualized as low relative income, and when this distaste is incorporated in the individuals’ utility functions with a weight that is greater than a specified critical level, then a utilitarian social planner will select the very same income distribution as a Rawlsian social planner.

Merger review policy among countries varies according to the weight given to consumers relative to producers. When both receive their full welfare weight it is said that the efficiencies defense is fully realized. No well-developed economic rationale has been given for giving more weight to consumers. Such a rationale is given here by considering equity and efficiency both as goods for which there is a willingness to pay. The willingness to pay approach not only provides a rationale for giving consumers greater weight as with, e.g. a price standard, but also shows how in principle the weight is to be derived. The merger of Superior Propane and ICG Propane in Canada raises issues of the tradeoff of equity and efficiency. The willingness to pay approach is applied to this merger as an illustration.

This paper explores the fragmented social policy choices imposed in Greece during the turbulent period 2010–2020. The institutional, political, and economic crisis brought in the enforcement of huge austerity reforms provoking deep socioeconomic devaluation: in GDP, in available income, in job opportunities, in living standards, in social protection. The decade is marked by a couple of mismatches diminishing welfare provision and mounting social need, inexpedient national administration, and unbalanced international intervention. A major cause of the national bankruptcy has been the stark imbalances of a residual social policy system which never aimed at tackling inequalities, challenging market outcomes, or fighting poverty. A fractured system distributing welfare according to individualistic/corporatist criteria, preserving a clientelistic/corrupting pattern, focusing upon an unfair/irrational pension provision. At a first sight, the urgent changes during the crisis have reinforced residualism, deregulated social/labor rights, reproduced inadequacies, exacerbated the discontinuities with the European Social Model. At a second reading, they have also recalibrated the system embracing elements of universality, unity, rationality, sustainability, and equity. In sum, the 2021 social policy starting point provides modest protection and keeps complexities, contradictions and controversies. The crisis imposed a welfare strategy of cuts that has produced less provision, stricter conditions, more harmony, dubious viability, dribs, and drabs of justice. The pandemic health crisis gives now prominence to the neglected but crucial role of the NHS and, in a broader sense, to the vital importance of institutionalised welfare provision.