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The purpose of this paper is to make policy recommendations for the current fiscal decentralization discussion by examining the operating mechanisms of local taxes, unconditional grants, and conditional grants within the fiscal relationships between the national government and local governments in Korea.

After examining the current fiscal relationships between the national government and the local governments, this paper analyzes trends of local taxes, unconditional grants from both national and high-level local governments, and conditional grants from both national and high-level (or provincial level) local governments between 2002 and 2015. Local governments are classified into high-level local governments, and three types of low-level local governments are: si, kun, and ku.

Since the structure of local government finances in Korea is very complicatedly intertwined, the present decentralization discussion regarding increasing the share of local tax revenues may not achieve its purpose of fiscal decentralization. The authorities in charge of revenue allocation should be first decentralized at high-level local governments; high-level local governments should then arrange unconditional and conditional grants from high-level local governments to low-level local governments while taking into consideration unconditional and conditional grants from the national government to low-level governments.

The dichotomy between the central government and local municipalities has been utilized in the existing discussion regarding fiscal decentralization in Korea, but this study highlights the important resource allocation roles of high-level local governments.

Changing political landscape often renews the call for dramatic changes to federal community and economic development grant-in-aid programs. The most dramatic proposal in recent years was President Bush’s 2006 call to consolidate federal assistance programs for communities into a new block grant known as the Strengthening America’s Communities Initiative (SACI). This conceptual study reviews key characteristics of intergovernmental transfers including grant types, features, changes in the intergovernmental fiscal environment, the fungibility/flypaper debate, and the symmetry/asymmetry response of governments to declining intergovernmental revenue. The effects of intergovernmental transfers on state and local governments are connected to differences in grant design features. Potential fallout from proposed or similar changes to grant structure is discussed using the SACI proposal as an example.

Federal systems are often more sophisticated than assumed in the literature. In many cases, at least three tiers of government are involved in federal decision making. The purpose of this paper is to cast some light on this increasingly important issue in fiscal federalism.

In a model with three tiers of government, the author analyzes corrective policies in the presence of fiscal externalities generated by federal redistribution.

The author identifies an additional qualitative incentive effect, particularly for intermediate governments. They behave strategically to attract additional redistribution funds from outside, though still using corrective policies to provide investment incentives toward their own regions. The results also suggest that differently from the USA the federal system of the EU may lead to inefficiently low regional investment.

The presented model is a first step toward analyzing strategic behavior and the effect of corrective policies in more complicated federal set ups with three tiers of government involved. This is relevant for federal structures such as Germany or the USA, as well as for government interactions at the international level.

October 12, 13; November 5,1970 Dock — Dock workers — Licence to employ — Application by firm for licence to employ dock workers — Firm transferring business and assets to company — Conditional licence granted to company — Whether application for licence refused — Whether firm entitled to compensation for diminution of business's assets — Docks and Harbours Act, 1966(14 & 15 Eliz II, c.28),s.l3.

Drawing on network and fiscal federalism theories, we investigated central government patronage and donor aid as antecedents of budget performance in local government (LG). A mixed methods design with data collected from 18 LGs, two ministries, and four donor agencies in Uganda was employed. Results revealed that both central government patronage and donor aid predict budget performance. Moreover, autonomy does not mediate the interactions as initially hypothesized. Implications for theory and practice are discussed and future research direction is provided.

Recognition, measurement and disclosure of public sector assets constitute relevant matters for national and international public sector accounting standard-setting. This chapter develops a theoretical analysis drawing upon a dualistic approach contrasting current value and historical cost accounting models. Accordingly, the latter should be adapted and then preferred to cope with public sector specificities, with a view to providing information for and enforcing accountability to citizens and their political representatives. Drawing upon this theoretical setting, our analysis develops a consistent design for the overarching conceptual framework for assets in general, providing illustrative examples for specific categories such as financial, heritage, natural and military assets.

The literature documents a shortage in the supply of external funding to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in general and to innovative SMEs in particular. This study separates cognitive from financial constraints on innovative SMEs’ growth opportunities. Using data gathered through in-depth interviews with the CEOs of 115 SMEs, we reveal that over and above a problem with supply, there exists a twofold problem on the demand side. Specifically, we document that there is a tendency for these companies to avoid approaching external funding sources, especially ones that gear their investments toward innovation. Our results reveal a cognitive bias (over-pessimism) affecting the entrepreneurs’ (lack of) demand for external financing over and above other firm-specific factors. CEO tenure — our proxy for human and social capital — is significantly lower (higher) in firms that did (did not) pursue external funding. This finding may provide some support for our hypothesis regarding the cognitive bias and over-pessimism of the more veteran CEOs who have had negative experiences regarding recruiting external resources. The impact of this entrepreneurial cognition is shown to be economically detrimental to the enterprise. Nevertheless, the negative effects are not limited to the micro level, but have implications at the macro level as well, due to under-realization of the potential for employment, productivity, and growth of the firms comprising the vast majority of the economy.

If anyone needs more persuasion that the progress and prosperity of British industry is in direct relation to the quality of its management, they should read ‘Thrusters and Sleepers’. It is the report of an investigation carried out by an organisation which has no axe to grind and which is only concerned to report the truth as it finds it.

At the annual meeting of Cow & Gate Ltd., in April, the Chairman of the Company said: “I think everyone looks forward to the day when the Ministry of Food ceases to exist. This is not meant in any way to reflect upon the ability with which this Ministry was administered during the war and immediate post‐war years, but a Ministry of Food should not really be necessary in peace‐time. Before the war the milk industry was largely governed by the Milk Marketing Board, and we have great admiration for the Board’s activities; but it was representative only of the producers’ side of this great industry. The distributive and manufacturing trade in the British Isles has grown out of all knowledge since 1939, and this country has relied more and more upon home manufacture as well as home production, both during and since the war. If some of the powers at present delegated to the Ministry of Food are to be placed in other hands, they should in all fairness be shared by the producers, distributors and manufacturers, who have at least an equal stake financially and who should be equally capable of discharging these duties in a conscientious and publicspirited manner. In my opinion, moreover, the day is long outlived when it can possibly be expedient or in the public interest to allow a statutory body representing purely producers’ interests to be the sole arbiter in regard to such a vital matter as the nation’s milk supply.”