Search results

Federal systems are often more sophisticated than assumed in the literature. In many cases, at least three tiers of government are involved in federal decision making. The purpose of this paper is to cast some light on this increasingly important issue in fiscal federalism.

In a model with three tiers of government, the author analyzes corrective policies in the presence of fiscal externalities generated by federal redistribution.

The author identifies an additional qualitative incentive effect, particularly for intermediate governments. They behave strategically to attract additional redistribution funds from outside, though still using corrective policies to provide investment incentives toward their own regions. The results also suggest that differently from the USA the federal system of the EU may lead to inefficiently low regional investment.

The presented model is a first step toward analyzing strategic behavior and the effect of corrective policies in more complicated federal set ups with three tiers of government involved. This is relevant for federal structures such as Germany or the USA, as well as for government interactions at the international level.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non‐poor in the local demand for income redistribution and, in particular, to provide an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed by Pauly, incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers.

First, the authors motivate the discussion by allowing for an “iceberg cost” as participation for the poor individuals in Pauly's original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, the authors estimate the effect of the proximity between poor and non‐poor on the demand for redistribution.

All of the authors' distance‐related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non‐poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a one‐hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth et al., but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in the demand for redistribution and might reduce targeting in Brazil. Lastly, the results indicate that “size matters”; i.e. the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting.

Our results suggest that a totally centralized supply of transfers may be more inefficient than local redistribution in terms of targeting, either due to higher participation costs or because of the eventual greater geographical distance between the national median voter and poor individuals. However, a partial role for the federal government, such as providing funds for redistribution, seems to improve targeting.

In particular, the paper provides an empirical test for the geographically limited altruism model proposed by Pauly, incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers. The authors motivate this discussion by adding the possibility of distance‐related “iceberg costs” of delivering benefits to poor individuals and show that these two effects of distance may act to lower the demand for transfers, making it difficult to distinguish between the two effects. These two effects of distance act by lowering the demand for transfers, making it difficult to disentangle the effect of altruism from the effect of cost. The authors' empirical strategy seems to allow to identify each of them and to provide a suggestion on whether it is advantageous to carry out redistribution at the local level.

To compare in a fruitful way the human resources (HR) policies that exist in the European Union (EU) and in the United States of America (USA). Nowadays, the world is evolving to a situation in which big economic spaces like Brazil, Russia, India, China, Japan, the EU and the USA are becoming dominant. Those spaces can learn from one another on how to guide their HR policies. The comparison between the EU and the USA is further justifiable because the EU seeks to become the world leader by 2010, and is facing a strong “neo‐liberal” ideological trend.

Having in mind the known theories on HR, the various types of welfare states that may underlie HR policies and also some basic questions regarding the practical organization of those policies are analyzed.

The EU comprises five different types of welfare states, the USA one. Regarding specific aspects of HR policies, for example, the role of the Federal authority, redistribution, eligibility and policy priorities and the evaluation procedures, the USA has the edge over the EU.

This is an initial work. Further analysis could be made both enlarging the analysis to another cases (Brazil, Russia, India, China, Japan) and trying to find more specific and actual data on all the questions addressed.

Much caution should be taken in comparing HR practices, and transferring them, because E&T systems have historic roots and depend on the economic characteristics of the country in question. The EU should increase and improve its role in the command of HR policies in Europe.

An original study on the way of looking at the EU's HR policy framework and on the way of dealing with the question of the “Americanization” of the world, namely in the HR field.

Many attempts have been made to justify punishment by invoking the moral autonomy and dignity of those who are subject to it. Yet the most refined of these attempts have been informed by an awareness of paradox. For the practice of punishment, so closely linked to concepts of individual freedom, tends to degrade those subjected to it. And as a form of state action predicated on claims of moral or social solidarity, it often prevents inquiry into the ways that individual culpability coexists within broader political forms of responsibility. This essay explores the ways in which college in prison programs like the Bard Prison Initiative may intervene in this paradox of punishment.

Due to mounting fiscal pressures, the federal government as well as many state and municipal governments in the USA have had to re-examine their transportation policies. Tax increases and/or spending cuts which aim to trim budget deficits are preoccupations of most policy makers and legislative bodies nowadays. With regard to the task of building new or rehabilitating old bridges, highways, and toll gates, cost-benefit analysis and economic impact studies are often undertaken by various government entities to rank and prioritize spending in the hopes of maximizing fiscal efficiency and road usage benefits. Since most highway construction and maintenance expenditures are absorbed by state governments, it is mostly up to state policy makers to decide transportation priorities. Not much research to date has been conducted to evaluate the comparative efficiency of state road provision to commuters and shippers. Such research would be useful to a state government’s budgetary allocation, road planning, and spending plans. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This paper uses data envelopment analysis under both constant and variable returns-to-scale and then to explain variations in efficiency ratings by using Tobit regression analysis.

The authors discovered that the greater the level of state resident income and/or the warmer the weather, the higher the road or mass transit provision efficiency on average. The authors also found that greater urbanization in a state had little to do with efficiencies with respect to road provision.

This paper is one of the first to assess and evaluate the comparative efficiency of road provision across 50 states in the USA and then set a benchmark for utilizing state financial resources to improve road infrastructure. More importantly, this paper helps transportation planners and public policy makers better allocate their limited financial resources to public goods in time of budget cutbacks and shortfalls.

This conceptual paper examines and evaluates patronage and clientage as a system of interrelated dyadic exchanges between unequals through which goods and services circulate, flowing both up and down through stratified societies. The parties involved may be in different places socially and geographically.

Data are presented for Brazil from the period of the Old Republic beginning in the 1890s, through the end of the Military Dictatorship in mid-1980s, and finally to the present, ending with today’s conditional cash transfer programs. The data are examined against the background of a 15th century book, O Livro da Virtuosa Bemfeituria (The Book of the Virtuous Benefits), written by a Portuguese Prince influential in the expansion and discoveries as a guide for princes and great lords that is used in the paper very much in the way that Adam Smith’s writings are used for most economic behavior today.

There are striking parallels over this long historical period in the behaviors referred to as patronage and clientage that may be conceptualized as an older (traditional) way of ordering the flow of goods and services (distributing them), alternative and parallel to market mechanisms that have, and continue to operate in Brazilian society.

Patronage and clientage are often-misunderstood behaviors, sometimes referred to as corrupt, that alternatively may be explained and understood as part of a still viable and operational socio-cultural system that goes back to a period before the colonization of Brazil.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.