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With the surge in public procurement, especially in developing countries, ensuring fair competition in procurement has assumed paramount importance. Academic endeavors in the domain of competition issues have often lacked the views of field-level functionaries. This study aims to involve a large number of expert practitioners in India to identify the significant contemporary competition risks in public procurement from the procurer and supplier sides and develop a model depicting the hierarchy of competition-restrictive actions (CRAs) in procurement based on their mutual interactions.

The significant CRAs along the procurement cycle are identified through literature survey, interactive workshops and expert interviews. A questionnaire survey covering 143 respondents from 12 public organizations is used to evaluate their impact. Considering the complex causal interactions involved, interpretive structural modeling followed by MICMAC (Iimpact matrix cross-reference multiplication applied to a classification analysis is used to develop a hierarchical model of competition risks in procurement.

Tailor-made contracts, splitting of a project below competition thresholds, restrictive selection criteria and awarding the contract on nomination emerge as CRAs with the highest driving power. Horizontal collusion among vendors strongly depends on practices followed in the procuring organization.

The survey data and the experts’ opinions emanate from practitioners in India, which is a limitation. However, with necessary contextual calibrations, the study is of high functional utility to policymakers and practitioners.

The research facilitates a comprehensive understanding to procurement managers/policymakers of the CRAs along the procurement cycle and their interdependencies. It offers valuable insights for improving competition, which is foundational for optimal procurement outcomes.

The study enriches the public procurement domain knowledge by identifying and assessing the significant contemporary CRAs, examining their mutual interactions and developing an interpretive structural model. Although contributing to the body of knowledge, the study is unique in being grounded in field realities.

This paper aims to investigate the prevalence of corruption in Ghana to understand how and why it has turned public procurement into a mere money-making scheme instead of a means to provide needed public goods and services.

The study focuses on Ghana as a case study and mobilizes the monetization of politics lenses. Data are collected via interviews with key officials across the procurement sector (including the government, donors and civil society), documents, documentaries and news articles.

The findings suggest that the increasing costs of elections and political financing coupled with the costs of vote-buying, which has become informally institutionalized, intensify corruption practices and, consequently, turns public procurement into a mere source of cash for political ends. Political appointments and legalized loopholes facilitate this by helping to nullify the safeguard accounting and other control institutions are designed to provide. Likewise, enduring poverty and rising inequality “force” citizens into a vote-buying culture which distorts democratic premises that may drive out unscrupulous politicians; thus, perpetuating capture schemes. Civil society's efforts to remedy these have had little success, and corruption and inequality remain rife.

The main practical implication of the study lies in the need for a gradual demonetization of elections, and the consideration of the fundamental function of public procurement as a policy instrument embedded in economic, social, cultural and environmental plans. Additionally, given the connectedness of the various corruption issues raised, a comprehensive system-based approach in dealing with them would be more effective than a piecemeal approach targeting each issue/problem in isolation.

While extant literature has examined the issue of endemic corruption in developing countries using state capture, few have attempted to explain why it remains enduring, particularly in public procurement. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature on corruption and state capture theoretically and empirically by drawing on monetization of politics from political science to explain why corruption and state capture endure in certain contexts (with Ghana as an illustrative example) which reduce public procurement to a cash-milking scheme.

In this paper, we investigate the process by which social control agents define wrongdoing over time and the principles they employ in drawing the boundary between right and wrong. We empirically examine how Italian state actors sought over four decades to categorize behaviors in the so-called “gray area,” i.e., the conduct of individuals supportive of the mafia organization Cosa Nostra and its criminal aims, but not members of the organization. Based on an archival analysis of texts produced since the 1960s, we reconstruct how state actors started from a preliminary definition of wrongdoing, moved to stigmatize the behaviors in question on moral grounds, and ultimately criminalized them with legal sanctions. We conceptualize the main principles behind this evolving categorization as intentionality of conduct, freedom of choice, and scope of harm. The paper contributes to the debate on the factors and conditions shaping the definition of wrongdoing over time and the contribution that social control agents provide to this aim.

Women are exposed to vulnerabilities that can lead to drug use or hinder recovery. However, there is a dearth of studies on recovery programs for women. This study aims to add to the literature by examining the feasibility of a women-only aftercare program for recovering users in the Philippines.

The study used a mixed-method design with pre and post-program surveys used to measure changes in participants’ recovery capital. Focused group discussions elicited participants’ context, their reactions, perceived outcomes and suggestions on the program.

Women in the program shared narratives of pain, trauma and abuse before treatment. Participants reported significant improvements in personal, community and family recovery capital dimensions. The program enabled personal growth in the form of new knowledge, skills and self-confidence. The women-only program also provided a safe space for women, to receive support from other women, community members and family. However, the women continue to face continuing challenges related to stigma and discrimination and a lack of livelihood opportunities.

A limitation of the study was its small sample size and the lack of a control group. Another limitation was the variability in treatment received by the women, which could have affected overall outcomes. Future studies using a randomized control trial and longitudinal designs may provide more robust conclusions on the effectiveness of the program.

Given punitive contexts, gender-sensitive and trauma-informed programs and services for women involved in drug use could potentially mitigate the abuse, stigma and vulnerabilities they experience.

This study contributes to the sparse literature on women-only aftercare, particularly in countries that criminalize drug use.

Nucleic acid testing is an effective method of accurate prevention and control and a key measure to block the spread of the epidemic. However, the fraud in nucleic acid testing occurred frequently during epidemics. This paper aims to provide a viable scheme for the government to strengthen the supervision of nucleic acid testing and to provide a new condition for the punishment for the negative act of the government and the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud.

This paper formulates an evolutionary game model between the government and nucleic acid testing institution under four different mechanisms of reward and punishment to solve the issue of nucleic acid testing supervision. The authors discuss the stability of equilibrium points under the four distinct strategies and conduct simulation experiments.

The authors find that the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty outperforms the strategies of static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. The results reveal the appropriate punishment for the negative act of the government can enhance the positivity of the government's supervision in the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty, while the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud cannot be too high. Otherwise, it will backfire. Another interesting and counterintuitive result is that in the strategy of dynamic reward and dynamic penalty, the upper limit of the penalty for data fraud of nucleic acid testing institution cannot be augmented recklessly. Otherwise, it will diminish the government's positivity for supervision.

Most of the existing evolutionary game researches related to the reward and punishment mechanism and data fraud merely highlight that increasing the intensity of reward and punishment can help improve the government's supervision initiative and can minimize data fraud of nucleic acid institution, but they fall short of the boundary conditions for the punishment and reward mechanism. Previous literature only study the supervision of nucleic acid testing qualitatively and lacks quantitative research. Moreover, they do not depict the problem scenario of testing data fraud of nucleic acid institution regulated by the government via the evolutionary game model. Thus, this study effectively bridges these gaps. This research is universal and can be extended to other industries.

This study draws parallels between the Major and Johnson eras to reclaim a discursive space beyond the media and political battlefields to examine long-term systemic failure of government PR.

As part of a wider study into government communications from 1979 to date, this paper draws on evidence from government archives from the 1990s, as well as contemporary accounts, official documents, media accounts, memoirs and biographies, to examine the PR record of two Conservative administrations divided by three decades.

News management during the Major premiership is worth serious scrutiny, not just as an interlude between two media-friendly Prime Ministers, Thatcher and Blair, but in comparison to Boris Johnson's struggle to contain the news narrative between 2019 and 2022. Both administrations experienced terminal reputational crises during their closing years but their means of managing the news were counter-productive and damaging to public trust (65).

Does this failure in public communication illustrate a systemic dysfunction in government-media relations and, if so, what is the role of government PR in these circumstances?

This article uses a comparison between fixed and moving variables associated with two very different administrations to identify the causes of ongoing systemic failure in government communication.

Understanding the interplay between transparency, accountability and e-procurement and their collective contribution to anti-corruption efforts in public procurement is crucial for developing effective strategies and policies. This research seeks to investigate whether e-procurement plays a significant role in enhancing transparency and accountability and subsequently reducing corruption risks in the public pharmaceutical procurement system.

The study employed a cross-sectional questionnaire survey to gather data from 274 procurement personnel and pharmacists working in 28 government-owned hospitals in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. The collected data were then analysed using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and the Hayes PROCESS macro to test the study hypotheses.

The study findings revealed a negative and significant relationship between transparency and procurement corruption (ß = −0.117, p < 0.008). Moreover, accountability negatively and significantly affects procurement corruption (ß = −0.162, p = 0.006). Furthermore, the findings indicate that, at a high degree of e-procurement system implementation, transparency and accountability have a stronger impact on procurement anti-corruption measures.

Policymakers and decision-makers should implement robust mechanisms that enhance transparency, accountability and anti-corruption efforts. These may include providing clear and accessible information on procurement processes, efficient mechanisms for monitoring and reporting procurement irregularities and continuous improvement of e-procurement systems. By incorporating these measures and nurturing collaboration amongst procurement stakeholders, it becomes possible to foster a procurement environment characterised by integrity, fairness, accountability and reduced corruption.

Whilst previous studies delved into exploring the effect of transparency and accountability on procurement anti-corruption, the novelty of this study is the inclusion of e-procurement as a moderating variable in the relationship between transparency, accountability and anti-corruption. By so doing, this study adds to the existing body of knowledge regarding anti-corruption measures and offers valuable practical insights for policymakers and professionals aiming to enhance transparency, accountability and ethical conduct within the public pharmaceutical procurement system.

As the foundation for understanding the dynamics of the construction sector's corruption, this study examines building contractors' experiences of the stifling of moral, communal and cultural values in the name of modern social and religious principles.

This study's objective was accomplished in two phases. First, a theoretical model was constructed. The theory is then tested using structural equation modeling in the second section. The theory suggests that, based on social norm and institutional theories, social disquietude and religious manipulation influence the interaction and types of corruption in the Nigerian construction sector. From this theory, it was deduced that social malaise (hypothesis 1) and religious manipulations (hypothesis 2) mediate the processes and forms of corruption in the construction sector. To validate the hypotheses, a structural equation model (SEM) was developed and tested.

Native intelligence, new values, social quests and poverty are the social malaises that are profoundly responsible for corruption manifestations in the construction industry. The findings confirmed that construction stakeholders are heavily influenced financially and spiritually by religious organizations. Construction stakeholders engage in corrupt activities as a result of the ravenousness and self-interest bestowed on them by religious manipulation and the significant contribution of social malaise. The study admits that social engineering is required to integrate local wisdom and values into Nigerian society in order to mitigate the negative consequences of social unrest and religious manipulations.

This study has contributed to a branch of the literature on corruption in the construction industry that aims to identify the hidden factors that drive the sector's corruption dynamics. It has shown how many different problems in society and religious beliefs can make building contractors more likely to be dishonest. In order to improve project delivery, this study emphasized the importance of investigating the relationship between religious affiliations, religious doctrines and domination and religious competition on corruption in the construction industry.

Following the findings of this study, the majority of construction stakeholders place their trust in unmerited favor, “spirit money,” prosperity gospels and the payment of offerings and “seed money” to win contracts. This implies that construction stakeholders will most likely be deceptive in their dealings, increasing the quantity of certified work, increasing variation claims and engaging in collusion. This is because their faith in inconceivable favors and the exchange of offerings for blessings would lead them to perceive fraudulent practices as a favor.

This study is unique in that it sought to determine whether construction stakeholders' corrupt tendencies stem from religious manipulations and complex social systems.

The construction industry has long been criticized for unethical conduct. The owner usually manages the contractor's opportunistic behaviors by employing a professional supervisor, but there is a risk of covert collusion between the supervisor and contractor. Based on the principal–agent theory and collusion theory, this paper aims to investigate optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts.

This paper presents a game-theoretic framework comprising an owner, supervisor and contractor, who interact and pursue maximized self-profits. Built upon the fixed-price incentive contract, cost-reimbursement contract, and revenue-sharing contract, different collusion-proof incentive contracts are investigated. A real project case is used to validate the developed model and derived results.

This paper shows that the presence of unethical collusion undermines the owner's interests. Especially, the possibility of agent collusion may induce the owner to abandon extracting quality information from the supervisor. Furthermore, information asymmetry significantly affects the construction contract selection, and the application conditions for different incentive contracts are provided.

This study still has some limitations that deserve further exploration. First, this study explores contractor–supervisor collusion but ignores the possibility of the supervisor abusing authority to extort the contractor. Second, to focus on collusion, this paper ignores the supervision costs. What's the optimal supervision effort that the owner should induce the supervisor to exert? Finally, this paper assumes that the colluders involved always keep their promises. However, what if the colluders may break their promises?

Several collusion-proof incentive contracts are explored in a project management setting. The proposed incentive contracts can provide the project owner with effective and practical tools to inhibit covert collusion in construction management and thus safeguard construction project quality.

This study expands the organization collusion theory to the field of construction management and investigates the optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts. In addition, this study is the first to investigate the effects of information asymmetry on contract selection.