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The purpose of the paper is to explore the long-run impact of board governance and bank performance on executive remuneration. More specifically, the study addresses two objectives. First, the authors investigate the long-run relationship between pay and performance hold for the Indian banking industry. Second, the authors explore the moderating role of the board in explaining the relationship between executive pay and performance.

The study uses multivariate panel co-integration approaches, i.e. fully modified and dynamic ordinary least square, to explain the co-integrating relationship between executive pay, governance and performance of Indian banks. The analysis is conducted for the period from 2005 to 2018.

The results of co-integration tests reveal a long-run relationship between executive pay, board governance and bank performance. The long-run estimates produce evidence in favour of the dynamic agency theory, suggesting that the implications of asymmetric information can be mitigated by associating the current executive pay with the bank performance in the previous periods. The finding of this study reveals that improvements in the board quality serve as a monitoring tool to constrain excessive pay and moderate the executives’ pay. Furthermore, the interaction of performance and board governance negatively impacts pay, supporting a substitution approach. It implies that setting optimal pay packages for executives necessitates enhanced and efficient board governance practices.

The study recommends significant policy implications for regulators and the board of directors that executive pay significantly responds to the bank’s performance and good board governance practices in the long run.

This paper provides novel evidence of long-run pay-performance-governance relation using a panel co-integration approach.

The authors investigate how a gender-diverse board, a gender-diverse executive team, or a female chief executive officer (CEO) impact bank balance sheet and equity risk.

Using panel data of U.S. bank holding companies over the period of 1992–2019, the authors conduct panel regressions with bank and year-fixed effects to analyze how female directors, female executives, and female CEOs impact a wide range of bank risk measures, controlling for the bank, board and executive characteristics.

The authors find female directors significantly reduce all types of risk. Female executives reduce some balance sheet risk but have an insignificant effect on bank equity risk. However, the presence of female CEOs does not significantly reduce bank risk-taking. During financial crises, female CEOs even increase equity risk.

The findings are important to shed light on the ongoing debate on how gender quota policy could be efficiently used to balance the need for gender diversity while ensuring corporate performance. It could also improve social welfare by guiding proper public policy to ensure the efficient use of social labor capital and curb banks' excessive risk-taking incentives.

The authors provide the first empirical evidence demonstrating that female directors and female executives in the banking industry have different impacts on bank risk-taking. The authors also provide the first empirical evidence that female leaders have a different impact on two different types of risks: balance sheet and equity risk. The study is also the first to analyze the impact of female executives over multiple financial crises.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between institutional investor ownership and the compensation of executives at US banks during the financial crisis period.

This paper uses a linear regression model to examine the association between institutional ownership and the level of executive compensation at US banks.

Institutional investors influence executive compensation at banks with the impact being most pronounced for the CEO. Ownership by the top five investors is associated with greater total compensation. Active investors have the strongest impact on executive compensation as evidenced by a positive association between active ownership and both equity compensation and total compensation. As well, active ownership is negatively associated with bonus compensation. The paper also finds that passive and grey investors influence compensation but to a less significant extent than active investors.

The results suggest that the monitoring role of active and passive institutional investors is different in the banking industry. As well, institutional investors were likely a driving factor in shaping the compensation packages of the top executive team during the financial crisis period.

Stakeholders at banks should be aware that not all types of institutional investors act as effective monitors over issues such as controlling the amount of executive compensation paid to the highest paid executive, the CEO. Prospective investors should consider the type of institutional investor that owns large blocks of equity when making an investment decision. Namely, the interests of existing institutional investors may differ from their own interests.

This paper provides a new perspective on the monitoring roles played by different types of institutional investors. Furthermore, it provides a more comprehensive analysis by investigating the role of institutional investors in shaping the compensation packages of CEOs and other top executives including chief financial officers (CFOs) who play a vital role in risk management at banks.

This study aims to investigate whether integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices mediates the relationship between executive incentive compensation and the financial performance of Islamic and conventional banks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

This study used multiple regression models to analyze the effectiveness of ESG practices as a mediating variable in explaining the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance between 2015 and 2021. The sample consisted of 57 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the MENA region, and the data were collected from the Thomson Reuters database (Data Stream).

This research paper showed the positive and significant mediating effect of the ESG practice on Banks’ financial performance. Thus, banks’ financial and stock market profitability is influenced by ESG information disclosure. This finding shows that taking ESG into account improves the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance.

The results may interest academic researchers, regulators and policymakers and would support stakeholders and decision-makers who wish to discover how executive incentive compensation affects financial performance in banks.

This study contributes to previous literature by studying the mediating effect of ESG practices on the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance. Indeed, the originality of this research paper is justified by the scarcity of studies and, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, constitutes one of the first attempts to examine this relationship via a mediating variable, i.e. ESG.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of the external environment on the strategic thinking dimensions in Malaysia and Palestine on the banking sector.

This paper focuses on dynamism and complexity in political and economic external environments. This study uses qualitative methodology through a comparative case study method. Purposive sampling was used to collect data from in-depth semistructured interviews with 33 bank executives from Malaysia and 17 from Palestine.

The findings revealed that the banking sector in both Malaysia and Palestine shared five common strategic thinking dimensions, including vision, creativity, conceptual thinking, futurism and opportunity. However, a sixth dimension, intent-focused, was unique to Palestinian bank executives. This study indicates that Palestine’s financial strategic thinking environment is more dynamic and complex than Malaysia’s. Additionally, the study highlights the significant influence of both microenvironments (such as types of banks) and the macroenvironment (such as political and economic situations). These findings hold important implications for decision-makers in the banking sector of both countries.

As with many studies, this study has some limitations. First, the analysis examines only the turbulent and stable environment in the two countries by using a qualitative approach which enables the analysis of thoughts and actions and exposes the beliefs, perceptions, mental maps and structures of belief in their perceptions (Cavana et al., 2001). As such, the results are limited to a particular time, date and geographical location; thus, opinions and perceptions might be altered due to changes in the external political and economic environment. The second limitation of this work is that the case study might not be appropriate for generalization (Stake, 1978). Finally, the limited number of female participants in Palestine shows a high level of inequality compared to Malaysian participants.

This study explores the implication of uncertain environments at the national level on executives’ cognition and actions, links the micro- and macro-environment of the banking industry to a theoretical perspective and develops a conceptual circular model to show the effect of macro environments on bank performance. The findings offer practical contributions to the current literature, providing insights for executives to navigate a dynamic and complex banking industry.

This study fills the literature gap by exploring how strategic thinking dimensions triggered by macro- and micro-environments impact banking sector performance in Malaysia and Palestine.

This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011.

The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions.

The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation.

The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.).

This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.

Banks in Pacific‐rim countries have widely and aggressively used retail banking and branch networking to provide services. However, it is widely believed that Machiavellianism is counter to conservative banking practices. This paper reports the research findings of the Machiavellian orientation of retail banking executives in Hong Kong and the relationship between Machiavellianism and job satisfaction in the banking sector. The results indicate that a relation between Machiavellianism and job satisfaction, but not career satisfaction, exists in retail banking executives.

The purpose of this paper is to study bank executive compensation and securitization, two important strategic developments in finance that are central to the debate on the cause of the crisis.

We study the relationship between securitization and executive pay in a sample of US banks from 2001 to 2010, using a series of multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses.

Bank Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay exhibits a positive pay-for-performance relationship. Since the crisis, this relationship is weakened. For banks that securitize, we find that prior to the crisis, higher securitization activity led to higher CEO compensation levels. While we do not find that securitization is related to bank CEO pay gap (the difference between CEO and the next-highest paid bank executive), we do see that bank ratings are a factor in pay gap and compensation level.

Bank regulatory ratings influence the relationship between compensation and securitization. Also, the relationship differs pre- and post-crisis.

Our study is unique for several reasons. First, we look at the relationship between compensation and securitization over a time period that includes the recent financial crisis. Second, we include an analysis of pay gap. Third, we include bank regulatory ratings, which are proprietary and therefore not available for use in many banking studies.

The paper aims to revisit the topic of relative performance evaluation (RPE) of top management using a large panel of community banks.

The empirical tests for RPE utilized a two‐stage approach in a unique dataset of community banks executive turnover over a ten‐year period. This allowed the authors to better estimate the benchmark performance relative to which bank executives should be evaluated under RPE. Moreover, bank regulatory evaluations allowed the authors to control for the impact of poor governance.

The paper shows that penalizing executives for poor performance arising from economic downturns is not necessarily inconsistent with the theory. The empirical results indicate that weak downturn‐linked performance is strongly related to increased executive turnover. Furthermore, this relationship is more pronounced in better‐governed banks, which are more likely to engage in value‐enhancing disciplinary actions.

The analysis suggests that executive dismissals during adverse economic conditions are not necessarily a result of bad luck; rather, the analysis implies that bad times are informative about management quality.

The main practical implication is that both relative and absolute performance should be incorporated in the incentive structure of bank executives.

The paper shows that the assumptions used in prior RPE studies may not be applicable to top executives which could explain the inconsistency between the theory and the empirical evidence. Further, the finding that better governed firms are more likely to penalize management for bad exogenously driven performance is unique and strengthens the case that disciplinary actions amid adverse economic times may not be due to bad luck.

This paper aims to explore the awareness of terminology related to intellectual capital (IC) among executives of Indian banks and the sources in which they mostly find IC-related terminology. The paper also explores relative and specific contributions of each selected source of information in creating IC awareness among bank executives in India and determines difference among the executives from the public and private sector.

This research paper follows a survey-based approach to capture the perceptions of Indian bank managers working middle and top management across different banks. Regression analysis and ANOVA were applied to data from 166 responses.

The study finds that IC awareness among Indian banking executives is reasonably high and is equally spread across the three sub-categories of capital (external capital, human capital and internal capital), though the relative awareness of external capital is on the higher side. However, the sources of awareness of IC terminology differ among executives from the public- and private-sector banks.

The sample was limited to middle and top managers in the Indian banking industry and suffers from the usual limitations of survey-based research such as the design of the survey instrument and the personal biases of the respondents. Some limitations may also have arisen because of the definitions of IC elements adopted by this study.

This research adds a new dimension to the IC research by exploring the practical application and awareness of IC that deviates from traditional annual report-based disclosure and valuation studies. No existing literature has examined the survey-based awareness study, particularly on the banking industry. This paper provides a foundation for future studies that examine the operational awareness and application of IC in the service industries.