Search results

This study examines to what extent Internet firms have globalized and the key factors that have enabled some firms to globalize more than others. Contrary to arguments that Internet-based firms automatically benefit from a global market, this study shows that most Internet firms serve regional markets, consistent with Rugman's (2000) findings for firms in the FT500. However, there are a few notable exceptions. In these cases a combination of early mover advantages, unique product, technology standards and complementary products and services have created a ‘winner-takes-all’ market in which a few firms dominate markets worldwide. Implications for globalization theories are discussed.

The study aims to analyze factors impacting firms’ success and persistence in a digital platform competition using the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework. The study also includes real-life cases that are beneficial to academicians and practitioners to understand and develop strategies for success and persistence during uncertainty.

A literature review to identify the factors that impact success and persistence in a digital platform competition was conducted following Webster and Watson (2002). Findings were integrated into a SCP framework to examine and understand the identified factors’ relational impact.

While analyzing factors under the SCP framework, all factors were divided into three categories: those impacting positively, those impacting negatively and those with ambiguous impact on the success and persistence in digital platform competition. Digital platform firms can exploit the positively impacting factors to increase market share by being distinctive from other digital platform firms and becoming dominant by withstanding competition. On the other hand, negatively impacting factors increase barriers to entry, intensify competition and reduce the distinctiveness of digital platform firms. Lastly, a few factors may have either a positive or a negative impact depending upon the particular characteristics of the firm/industry.

The study opens the scope for future research on empirically testing the developed conceptual framework and relationships by developing propositions to posit the possible impact of these factors on digital platforms’ success and persistence.

The study contributed to the existing literature by using SCP framework to analyze the factors affecting firm’s success and persistence in a digital platform competition. Also, the study has discussed the relational impact of factors rather than their impact in isolation.

We provide a Bayesian inference for a mixture of two Pareto distributions which is then used to approximate the upper tail of a wage distribution. The model is applied to the data from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group to analyze the recent structure of top wages in the United States from 1992 through 2009. We find an enormous earnings inequality between the very highest wage earners (the “superstars”), and the other high wage earners. These findings are largely in accordance with the alternative explanations combining the model of superstars and the model of tournaments in hierarchical organization structure. The approach can be used to analyze the recent pay gaps among top executives in large firms so as to exhibit the “superstar” effect.

The purpose of this study is to explore the coopetition relationships between platform owners and complementors in complementary product markets. Drawing on the coopetition theory, the authors examined the evolutionary trends of the coopetition relationships between platform owners and complementors and explore the main influence factors.

The authors used Lotka–Volterra model to analyze the coopetition relationship between platform owners and complementors, including the evolutionary trends as well as the results. Considering the feasibility of sample data collection, simulation is used to verify the effects of different factors on the evolution of coopetition relationships.

The results show that there are four possible results of the competition in the complementary products market. That comprises “winner-take-all for platform owners,” “winner-take-all for complementors,” “stable competitive coexistence” and “unstable competitive coexistence,” where “stable competitive coexistence” is the optimal evolutionary state. Moreover, the results of competitive evolution are determined by innovation subjects’ interaction parameters. However, the natural growth rate, the initial market benefits of the two innovators and the overall benefits of the complementary product markets influence the time to reach a steady state.

The study provides new insights into the entry of platform owners into complementary markets, and the findings highlight the fact that in complementary product markets, platform owners and complementors should seek “competitive coexistence” rather than “winner-takes-all.” Moreover, the authors also enrich the coopetition theory by revealing the core factors that influence the evolution of coopetition relationships, which further enhance the analysis of the evolutionary process of coopetition relationships.

With the explosive growth of the Internet, online travel agents (OTAs) have gained an increasing market share in the online booking market. However, OTAs are facing fierce competition from hotels' direct booking channels, as well as competition among themselves. Therefore, there is a need for an understanding of the evolution of the OTA market from a dynamic perspective. The purpose of this study is to investigate the long-term effect of OTAs on the hospitality industry and to find whether an equilibrium of this effect exists in the context of e-commerce.

To gain a better understanding of the OTA market process, a mathematical framework is constructed on the basis of four assumptions. NetLogo 5.1.0 is used to perform a series of numerical simulations.

The results indicate the following: (1) the development of the OTA market helps to improve net social welfare, but hotels (especially economy hotels) have suffered as a result; (2) clever exploitation of both online and offline channels that are based on hotels' historical data may improve hotels' performance; (3) a scale-priority strategy can be more helpful than a profit-priority strategy for enabling OTAs to maintain their long-term competitiveness; (4) the timing of participation in online-channel competition is a crucial factor in determining whether OTAs can achieve business success.

In this study, it is shown how consumer habits have changed since the development of OTAs. The online channels provided by OTAs create a convenient, low-cost user experience, and they consequently improve the net welfare of customers. OTAs should be encouraged appropriately, although some economy hotels may suffer from the rise of OTAs.

In this empirical study, a mathematical framework is developed to describe the process of evolution in the OTA market, and it uses simulations as a means to validate prior research findings. Unlike previous studies, a dynamic perspective is used in this investigation to interpret the emergence of OTAs and to analyze their enormous impact on the hospitality industry. Thus, the findings of this study capture the competitive characteristics of online and offline channels in a network context and indicate potential strategies for the development of OTAs and which hotels may use OTAs to achieve better performance. In addition, the study findings could be easily extended to explain many of the classical economic phenomena regarding firms with intangible products.

The Internet and social media have fundamentally transformed the ways in which individuals find jobs. Relatively little is known about how demand-side market actors use online information and the implications for social stratification and mobility. This study provides an in-depth exploration of the online recruitment strategies pursued by human resource (HR) professionals. Qualitative interviews with 61 HR recruiters in two southern US metro areas reveal two distinct patterns in how they use Internet resources to fill jobs. For low and general skill work, they post advertisements to online job boards (e.g., Monster and CareerBuilder) with massive audiences of job seekers. By contrast, for high-skill or supervisory positions, they use LinkedIn to target passive candidates – employed individuals who are not looking for work but might be willing to change jobs. Although there are some intermediate practices, the overall picture is one of an increasingly bifurcated “winner-take-all” labor market in which recruiters focus their efforts on poaching specialized superstar talent (“purple squirrels”) from the ranks of the currently employed, while active job seekers are relegated to the hyper-competitive and impersonal “black hole” of the online job boards.

Switching cost is an important concept in the study of consumer loyalty which has implications for organizational business strategy and regulatory policies. Much research has already examined the formation and influence of switching costs on the consumers' repeated purchase intentions, but little research has focused on quantitative measurement of the switching cost itself. This paper aims to address this issue.

By game theory, a complete Nash‐Bertrand model is proposed to accurately estimate consumer switching costs considering price compensation and transport costs in a duopoly. The relationship between switching costs and market structure is then analyzed by using the example of Hong Kong's wireless telecommunication market. From the observed data of China's wireless telecommunication industry, the model calculates switching costs per year of China Mobile and China Unicom's users respectively, as well as other variables.

The results demonstrate that reducing consumer switching costs will benefit small operators and increase competition in a winner‐take‐all market.

The model is valuable in calculating unseen switching costs and studying the impact of switching costs on market structure, especially for a duopoly in telecommunication.

Boeing and Airbus are contemplating entry into very-large-aircraft (VLA) markets. Both firms are convinced the market cannot support two players due to the extremely high R&D costs and the limited (and highly uncertain) state of demand. The key strategic issue is the uncertainty surrounding Boeing's development cost: to what extent would Boeing's experience with the 747 help it reduce the R&D cost of a new VLA prototype? The main point is that Boeing's strategic moves signal its private information, and that this eliminates any first-mover advantage Boeing might have had in this market.

To introduce some of the strategic issues arising in natural monopoly industries in which the winner takes all, and focus on the issues of credible preemption and signaling.