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This paper aims to provide a case study of complex conflict management within the arms race on the Korean Peninsula. Exploring the complex nexus of nuclear weapons, asymmetry and a qualitative arms race, the study explains how the arms race between Seoul and Pyongyang has promoted stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Presenting the limits of arguments that the US security guarantee is the factor that saved the two Koreas from going to war again, this paper explores the utility of the inter-Korean arms race as a stabilizer that promotes indirect negotiations. While presenting Korean anomalies, this paper analyzes the three stages of the inter-Korean arms race – especially its nuclear weapons, its asymmetry and the nature of arms races – and provides extant explanations on the causes and consequences of the qualitative arms race. These key elements drive the states’ strategic motives.

Using the case of the inter-Korean qualitative arms race and US extended nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, the study shows the complexities of conflict management today. This paper identifies three contributing factors – US nuclear weapons, asymmetry and the qualitative characteristic of the arms race – to explain the enduring stability on the peninsula despite the arms race’s intensification. The paper finds that although US nuclear-extended deterrence plays a critical role, it does not capture the full context of the ongoing, dynamic inter-Korean arms race; a prolonged arms race between the two Koreas has become a new regularity; the qualitative characteristic of the inter-Korean arms race, which is driven by technological advancement, contributes to stability in the arms race; and as the constant mismatch in priority technologies becomes more severe, the changes to the existing asymmetry could increase instability.

This paper offers a diverse perspective to the literature on conflict management and captures the complexities of 21^st-century conflict management. Through a thorough examination of the inter-Korean arms race, it brings readers’ attention to the nested dynamics within the arms race and shows how an intensifying arms race can promote stability. Furthermore, the paper explains the implications for potential instability – fueled by the comprehensive mix of a dynamic qualitative arms race and the US extended nuclear deterrence – in the Indo-Pacific region.

This research uses rational choice theory to analyze the effects of motivation, premeditation and offender characteristics on offenders' weapons during decision-making processes when they are violent towards on-duty police officers. The paper aims to discuss the aforementioned issues.

The researchers examined 597 cases (n = 597) of violence against the police in the China Judgments Online (CJO) database, and analyzed the data using multinomial logistic regression methods. Rational choice theory was used to explore the offenders' weapons decision-making process.

The research results showed that offenders with premeditation were more likely to use a weapon, and tended to choose sharp weapons; offenders motivated to “escape arrest” were more likely to use a weapon, and tended to choose a vehicle as a weapon; and offenders motivated by “conflict resolution” were more likely to choose a sharp or blunt weapon.

These findings have limited applicability to other countries and must be considered in the local background of violence against police.

Through the rational choice theory analytical framework, this study clarifies how motivation and premeditation influence offenders' weapons decision-making processes.

Also, this study may provide support for frontline police officers' law enforcement.

The research identified some specific connections between offenders' weapon choice preferences, their motivation for the violence and whether or not there was premeditation. The findings provide guidance for police agencies developing preventive policies, and for frontline officers in interpreting and managing the situations they face.

This paper proposes the “fields and weapons of the competition model applied to business networks” – CAC-Redes (in Portuguese, Campos e Armas da Competição – Redes de negócio), an extension of the fields and weapons of the competition model (CAC) – to study the competition and competitiveness of companies operating in business networks in a competitive environment while integrating organizational competencies, interorganizational ties and company positioning to provide competitive advantage.

CAC-Redes is born from the cross-fertilization process of various theoretical perspectives, namely, industrial organization, traditional view of operational activities and resources, relational view, strategic alignment, transaction cost theory and social perspectives in networks, structured according to systems theory and under the mantle of competitive advantage theory. To discover the structure of existing models of competitiveness in networks, a bibliographic search was conducted in the Scopus database. Quali-quantitative empirical research was undertaken in companies from six different economic sectors through structured questionnaires and personal interviews to understand how companies competed and discover the determining factors of their competitive advantage.

Only seven models of competitiveness in network were found, and their structures and characteristics are quite different from those of CAC-Redes. Empirical research confirms all the hypotheses that support CAC-Redes, which, combined with those of CAC, indicate the CAC-Redes corroboration.

CAC-Redes does not apply to networks without intercompany competition, studies on network governance and corporate strategy formulation.

CAC-Redes is effective in studying complex competitiveness phenomena because it considers multiple influences; provides a process based on qualitative and quantitative variables that increase the probability of formulating successful competitive strategies; simplifies the differentiation of skills from core competencies and determines them; proposes a competitive advantage criterion to select suppliers; creates a unifying language to represent the different strategic specificities of companies, competitors, suppliers, customers and the company environment and provides a library containing 181 weapons (resources) and dozens of interorganizational ties that can be used in empirical studies with other methodologies.

CAC-Redes, due to its originality and peculiarities, theoretically contributes to theory of resources because it dispenses with the assumption, “unique resource, source of competitive advantage”; to relational view because it considers interorganizational relationships as a competence and treats it quali-quantitatively and to core competencies because if the strategy changes, different core competencies will be needed. Furthermore, it is an alternative to the dynamic capabilities perspective, and it transforms the five manufacturing performance objectives into nine for the entire company.

CAC-Redes is an original model because its structure and characteristics comparatively differ from those of existing models, and 14 singularities are detected.

The conclusion of the Cold War's U.S.‐Soviet superpower rivalry may have ended the threat of a global nuclear military confrontation involving these powers. It did not, however, result in the termination of international regional conflicts or of military threats to U.S. national security. The collapse of a world political and strategic system ostensibly polarized between two ideologically contrasting superpowers has resulted in the emergence of numerous threats to regional and global order.

Analyzes policies from 96 law enforcement agencies on their use of less‐than‐lethal force. Includes a review of several topics: policy purpose, definitions of lethal and less‐than‐lethal force, provisions for authorized and unauthorized weapons, training requirements, avoiding excessive force, medical aid and report requirements. Concludes that most policies are deficient in one or more topic areas. Provides recommendations on how to improve these policies.

Foreign military sales agreements amounted to over 19.5 billion dollars in fiscal year 1982, while the US actually delivered $9 billion in weapons. The US and the Soviet Union are the largest arms suppliers in the world, with about 75 per cent of the global export market. France, and then Great Britain, follow with 12 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. Italy and Israel also export significant dollar amounts of weapons. There is considerable public debate over the wisdom of US participation in this market. Of particular concern is the increased availability of highly sophisticated weapons systems in third world nations.

Weapon use is recognised as a key crime concern in England and Wales but has received relatively little focused research. The purpose of this paper is to examine weapon use by sexual offenders to develop new insights relevant for a police audience. Specifically, to examine the prevalence of weapons within sexual offenders and explore the differences between weapon and non-weapon enabled offenders on a range of characteristics.

A sample of 1,618 single, stranger, solved, serious sexual assaults were provided by the Serious Crime Analysis Section of the Serious Organised Crime Agency. In all, 20 per cent of offenders were weapon enabled.

There were almost no demographic differences between weapon enabled and non-weapon enabled offenders. In terms of the offence itself, there were many significant differences between the groups in terms of precautions used, victim involvement, injury, attack behaviours, victim approach and attack location. Further multivariate analysis revealed aspects of the offence that were associated with weapon use; these are broadly discussed within themes of violence and evidence of planning.

The authors argue that an examination of weapon use is valuable in illustrating how offenders differ in their offence and provide insights for the investigation of such crime.

To provide a comprehensive picture of the wide range of technical, operational, and management issues that must be considered when developing, acquiring or using less lethal weapons for law enforcement agencies.

The source of the insights provided in this paper come from a careful reading and critique of the less lethal technology literature and the organization of and participation in many less lethal weapon technology conferences, technical working groups, and peer review panels.

The essential attributes of less lethal weapons for law enforcement applications are described as well as the many practical considerations that must be made when acquiring and using them.

This review should help law enforcement and corrections agencies make more informed decisions on the acquisition and deployment of less lethal weapons and should also be a useful starting point for weapon developers.

Scientists and engineers seeking to develop new or improved less lethal weapons for law enforcement will benefit from having in one source a basic insight into the complexities and challenges of producing a successful less lethal weapon. Non‐technical professionals will gain a greater understanding of the difficulty in producing less lethal weapons that are both very effective and very safe, but also affordable and practical.

The growing defence budget has generated renewed public debate over the high cost of military weapon systems. This debate centres on the problem of obtaining some “maximum defence” given a somewhat flexible budget constraint. One of the basic tenets in this debate was stated by Gansler:

The Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, is a treaty of three main agreements concerning both nuclear weapons states and non‐nuclear weapons states, with the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. A number of safeguards and inspections conducted by the IAEA have been set up to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and until about the time of the Persian Gulf War, the monitoring and inspection regime had been successful. Since the beginning of the 1990s however, the system has been seriously shaken with the non‐compliance of a number of countries and the relevance and effectiveness of the NPT are greatly put into question. A number of tools, however, are at the disposal of the international community to deal with arms control; it is a question of cooperation, effective use of these tools and choice of direction.