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The international business literature presents an interesting intellectual puzzle regarding the effect of political instability and political risk on foreign direct investment (FDI). Survey evidence shows that multinational executives take into account political instability in making investment decisions, while econometric studies produce conflicting findings. In this paper, I offer a new theory that explains how political violence, an extreme form of political instability, affects FDI. The new theory differs from previous arguments on three points. First, the theory considers how rational expectations and uncertainty on the part of foreign investors affect the ways in which political violence influences investment behaviors. Second, the new theoretical argument argues for the need to investigate separately the effects of different types of political violence (civil war, interstate war, and transnational terrorism). Third, I consider FDI inflows as resulting from two distinct but related decisions, including the investment location choice and the decision on investment amount, and sort out statistically the separate effects of political violence on these two processes. The empirical analysis of FDI inflows covers about 129 countries from 1976 to 1996. The statistical findings largely support my theoretical expectations. My theory helps reconcile the inconsistent econometric findings on the effect of political instability on FDI flows.

This study investigates patterns of violence employed by insurgents killing civilians living in small ethnic enclaves located in Ninewa Province, Iraq from 2003 to 2009. The ethnic minorities in these communities include: (1) Yazidis in Sinjar District, (2) Chaldo-Assyrian Christians in the Ninewa Plains and, (3) the Turkmen enclave of Tal Afar. To date, there has been little investigation into violence directed toward small ethnic enclaves during civil war, though some have suggested that ethnic enclaves might insulate civilians from violence (Kaufmann, 1996). Using fatality data from the Iraq Body Count, this study compares the patterns of insurgent violence directed toward these enclave communities to co-ethnic and mixed-ethnic communities. The experiences of the enclaves were varied – some were largely insulated from attacks – but when attacked, the average number killed was greater and more indiscriminate as compared to communities with significant Arab populations. One possible explanation for these differences is that insurgents did not regard these citizens as being “convertible,” which caused them to employ violence in a more indiscriminate manner. When insurgents did act to secure control of enclave communities, they used indiscriminate forms of violence against civilians, as compared to more selective forms of violence employed when controlling co-ethnic communities.

The deeply embedded perception that human beings are violent by nature is a worldview that becomes instrumental for justifying armed conflict. Prominent authors in multiple scholarly disciplines have challenged the myth of the violent human being. This article approaches the complexity of challenging political violence by identifying common ground among different disciplines and putting scholarly research in dialogue with recent developments in war and peace across the globe. This article describes the cultural, political and institutional dimensions that sustain violence, and suggests a specific approach for addressing these three strands.

Iraqi universities in the aftermath of invasion in 2003 experienced extremely high levels of “post”-war violence and insecurity. The most widely known dimension of this violence is the shocking assassination campaign that killed hundreds of Iraqi academics. This paper provides an analysis of violence and insecurity in post-2003 that takes a broader optic and considers multiple forms of vulnerability to attack including insurgencies, sectarian conflict, and criminal violence. It also considers the various responses to the security dilemma taken by Coalition forces – principally counter-terrorism and stabilization efforts – and by Iraqi policy-makers and higher education communities, including security measures, politicization, ethno-sectarianization, and displacement.

This chapter discusses how private military corporations (PMCs) and their employees have been implicated in discourses and practices of sexual violence. I examine how PMCs have become seemingly permanent fixtures of international relations since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the purpose is to contribute to the ongoing conversations about PMCs and gender. To do this, I examine one instance of sexual violence in the context of PMCs. I argue that, since the legal case was forced into private arbitration, this maneuver reflects critical shifts in the normalizing power of law, away from a model of a social contract toward global neoliberal economics.

Utilizing postmodern feminist theory alongside a Foucauldian discourse analysis, I explore the case of one PMC contractor who alleged rape by multiple coworkers in Iraq. I examine the limitations of standpoint feminism in relation to theories and representations of sexual violence.

I claim that military outsourcing raises serious concerns for feminists theorizing issues of gender and wartime sexual violence. PMC personnel are unaccountable when they are implicated in cases of sexual violence. Feminist critique is urgent given the various ways PMCs have been implicated in reproducing gender inequality and in sexual violence.

This chapter advances feminist knowledge about wartime sexual violence in a context where PMCs now play a significant role in the reproduction of practices that normalize sexual violence in public and private militarized spaces, both “at home” and “abroad.”

The purpose of this paper is to critically review the existing research on the intersection between war and international business (IB) and to map out a future research agenda.

Drawing on corporate examples and extant literature within IB, political science and international relations, the paper provides an introduction to the main concepts of war, a review of the IB research on war and provides a critical future research agenda.

The review of the multiple strands of war-related research in IB generally reveals an understudied area. Among other biases, prior research has focused on inter-state wars and has relatively unexplored foreign direct investment (FDI) and non-FDI within civil wars. Furthermore, previous studies offer little attention to how IB and multinational companies contribute to the emergence and development of wars.

The paper develops an analytical and critical research agenda for future research to examine the relationship between war and IB. This includes a set of questions for each of the three major phases of war: pre-conflict, armed violence and post-conflict. To the best of my knowledge, this has not been done before in the context of IB research.

We examine why some groups use violence while others use nonviolence when they push for major political change. Nonviolence can be less costly, but nonstate actors must mobilize a large number of people for it to be successful. This is less critical for violent rebellion, as successful attacks can be committed by a small number of people. This means that groups that believe that they have the potential to mobilize larger numbers of people are less likely to use violence. This potential is related to the lines along which the group mobilizes. Campaigns mobilized along ethnic or Marxist lines have fewer potential members and are most likely to use violence. Prodemocracy campaigns have a higher number of potential members and are more likely to use nonviolence. For movements against a foreign occupation, campaigns in larger countries are more likely to use nonviolence. These predictions are supported in a multilevel logit model of campaigns from 1945 to 2006. The mechanism is tested by looking at the interactive effect of democratic changes on the likelihood of nonviolence and looking at a subsample of 72 campaigns that explicitly draw from certain ethnic or religious groups.