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The agricultural sector remains the backbone of several emerging economies, including Kenya, where it contributes 34% to its gross domestic product (GDP). However, access to financing for agricultural activities appears to be very low compared to developed economies. Following this, governments in a number of countries have sought to introduce banking sector regulations to facilitate increased funding to the agricultural sector. Taking motivation of the interest rate capping regulations by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) in 2016, this paper examined the effect of these interest rate ceiling regulations on agri-lending in Kenya.

The paper employs random effects technique to estimate a panel data of 26 commercial banks in Kenya from 2014 to 2018 using the ratio of loans to agricultural sector to gross loans and the natural logarithm of loans to agricultural sector as proxies for agri-lending. Bank size, equity, asset quality, liquidity, revenue concentration and bank concentration are employed as control variables.

The results of the panel regression estimations show that the introduction of the interest cap resulted in increases in the proportion and growth in agri-lending compared with the pre-interest cap period. In addition, large banks and highly capitalised banks were found to be associated with lower agri-lending, with differences in the effects across pre-cap and post-cap periods.

From a policy perspective, the findings highlight the effectiveness of interest rate capping in meeting this objective and supports the calls for strengthening cooperation between the government and key stakeholders in the financial sector. This will allow for the effective enforcement of policies by the regulatory powers in a manner that guarantees sound and dynamic financial systems, particularly within the agricultural sector.

As far as the authors are aware, this the first paper to examine the effect of the interest rate cap regulation on agri-lending in Kenya.

Following the recent global financial crisis, US regulatory agencies issued laws to implement the Basel III accords to ensure the resiliency of the US banking sector. Theories predict that enhanced regulations may alter credit issuance of the regulated banks due to increased capital requirements, but the direction of changes might not be straightforward especially with respect to the agricultural loans. A decrease in credit availability from banks might pose a serious problem for farmers who rely on bank credit especially during economic recessions. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

In this study, the impact of Basel III regulatory framework implementation on agricultural lending in the USA is examined. Using panel data of FDIC-insured banks from 2008 to 2017, the agricultural loan volume and growth rates are examined for agricultural banks and all US banks.

The results show that agricultural loan growth rates have slowed down, but the amount of agricultural loan volume issuance still remained positive. More detailed examination finds that regulated agricultural banks have decreased both the agricultural loan volume and their loan exposure to the agricultural sector, showing a possible sign of credit crunch.

This study examines whether the implementation of the Basel III regulation has resulted in changes in agricultural loan issuance by US banks as predicted by the lending channel theory.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers of bankrupt firms are more or less conditionally conservative in their financial reporting relative to non-bankrupt firms. The study further examines the cross-sectional differences in conditional conservatism among bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.

The study employs a sample of US firms to investigate conditional conservatism in firms that experience financial distress and go bankrupt relative to non-stressed non-bankrupt firms. The study also uses switching regression models to identify the drivers of the cross-sectional difference in conditional conservatism among bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.

Empirical results show that bankrupt firms are timelier in recognizing bad news than good news when compared to non-bankrupt firms. The higher level of conditional conservatism in bankrupt firms is mainly driven by their higher levels of leverage and tax-reduction incentives. The cross-sectional analyses show that these results largely hold for more leveraged firms and firms with higher tax costs. Taken together, these results suggest that the conservative tendency of managers of bankrupt firms can stem from the agency problem between lenders and managers and from tax-decreasing motivations.

The novelty of the authors’ research stands in studying the drivers of the cross-sectional differences in conditional conservatism between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms and specifically, the demonstration that taxation also induces conditional conservatism in the setting of ex post bankrupt firms.