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As there is inclusive evidence on relationship between board characteristics and firm performance in the Thai context, and mixed findings of this relationship are usually reported from previous studies, this study tries to clarify a reason for the mixed finding by determining the impact of board structures on different quantile levels of firm performance. Building on extant literature and using a developed econometric technique, the Quantile Analysis, on a sample of 446 listed firms in Thailand for a 15-year period ranging from 2000 to 2014, empirical evidence is provided which is consistent with prior studies that some characteristics of the board as the core mechanisms of corporate governance, i.e., board independence, board size, board meeting frequency, and dual role leadership on board, have significant influence on performance of Thai firms. In particular, when considering different quantile levels of firm performance, board structures are found to have different effects across quantile of performance distribution. Board independence and dual role leadership on board are found to have a significant influence on only moderate-performing firms, while board size and board meeting frequency are revealed as having significant impact on only firms with high-performance which need more effectiveness of the board in overseeing and supervising decision-making of the executives. Thus, these findings indicate that considering different quantile levels of firm performance for the board structures and performance relationship should be a reason of previous mixed findings. Moreover, the findings should be important information in encouraging better understanding an optimal governance system in Thailand for related stakeholders such as policymakers, corporate firms, and investors.

The existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the increasing importance of controlling shareholders, it remains disputable whether they are playing the “tunneling” roles or the “governance” roles. Therefore, more research is needed on what roles controlling shareholders are playing and how they play their roles. Previous empirical studies document a common phenomenon that directors play dual roles both on the board and in the top management team. Because of information asymmetry, the board of directors may not be able to perform its supervisory and strategic decision-making functions. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether controlling shareholders participate in firm management by appointing the executive directors and examine the economic consequences of controlling shareholder involvement.

In the empirical tests, the authors use the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment. Using the data from Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2015 and difference-in-differences analysis, the authors examine the impact of the split share structure reform on the executive directors of controlling shareholders and the governance effect of controlling shareholders’ appointing executive directors to the management.

The authors find that controlling shareholders get involved in firm management by appointing executive directors to strengthen the supervision and incentives of managers. The authors also find that firms exhibit a lower level of earnings management and enhance and higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling shareholders appoint executive directors to the top management team.

As the natural experiment of the split share structure reform enables us to mitigate endogeneity, the authors investigate the channels through, which controlling shareholders get involved in firm management from the unique perspective of executive director appointment. The study expands the literature on corporate governance and board functions. The findings provide new insights to the effect of controlling shareholder governance and casts light on a new way for controlling shareholders of Chinese firms to participate in firm management – by appointing executive directors.

This study aims to investigate the determinants of the extent and quality of corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) in Jordan. The study examines a number of factors that influence the extent and quality of CSR disclosure, such as corporate characteristics, corporate governance and ownership structure.

A quantitative approach and a content analysis technique is used to measure the extent and quality of CSRD from annual reports. The sample is drawn from the annual reports of 118 Jordanian companies between 2010 and 2015. A CSRD index is constructed, which includes the disclosures of the following categories: environmental, human resources, product and consumers, and community involvement. This is the first study that presents a new measurement for CSR disclosure quality by using images and charts in a seven-point scale measurement.

The result reveals that the extent of CSRD is higher than quality in Jordan. Regarding the determinants of CSR disclosures, the following factors were found to have a significant relationship with both the extent and quality of CSRD: board size, non-executive directors, age of firm, foreign members on the board, number of boards meetings, the presence of audit committees, big 4, government ownership, size of firm and industry type. Non-executive directors was found to have a significant correlation with the extent of CSRD.

The current study has some limitations; first, the study findings are limited to the Jordanian environment. Second, the study adopted a purely quantitative method, and future research could include interviews and questionnaires to gather data from financial managers and chief executive officers (CEOs). Third, the potential influences on the level and quality of CSR are not limited to the variables tested in this study. Future research can be done on new determinants, such as CEO interlocking and profitability. Finally, the sample included companies from two main sectors – the services and industrial sectors; thus, this limited the results to these two main sectors.

Practitioners, as firms, should develop new strategies and ensure that CSR is included in their reports. Thus, companies can achieve legitimacy for their products and activities. Policymakers must consider introducing new laws that mandate CSRDs since it has many advantages for companies and society. In addition, this research suggests amending the law to require companies to have 33% of their directors be non-executives since this will remove the negative effect on CSR disclosure. Investors must pay attention to the social activities of the companies they invest in, as CSR could have a positive effect on their market value.

The study has indicated that Jordanian companies became increasingly more involved in CSR activities, as this growth in CSRD is linked with global increases in CSR. Moreover, the study has revealed that the highest category of CSR disclosures is related to products or services and employee information. On the other hand, the lowest category of CSR disclosures is related to community and other disclosures (extent) and environmental disclosures (quality). Furthermore, the results show that the services sector was found to have more disclosures regarding employees and community, whereas the industrial sector was more concerned about environmental and product information.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that presents a new measurement for CSR disclosure quality by using images and charts in a seven-point scale measurement. This new seven-point scale will be adopted to distinguish between poor and excellent disclosures. In addition, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study in Jordan which examines the determinants of the extent and the quality of CSR for three categories, namely, corporate characteristics, corporate governance and ownership structure.

This paper empirically explores the relationship between the identity and concentration of different block holders and firm value for 89 industrial and service firms listed at the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) over the period 1998–2001. The paper examines the role of block holders (institutional investors who are not on the board of directors, the institutional investors who are on the board of directors, the ownership of the board of directors, and the financial policy of the firm, such as the capital structure) in controlling the managerial actions which leads, on average, to better firm valuation in the emerging market of Jordan. The paper employs a piecewise regression specification methodology. The results of the piecewise regression analysis indicate a positive and significant relationship between the ownership of securities above 25% by the board of directors, institutional investors on the board of directors, the institutional investors not on the board of directors and firm value. There is no significant relationship between the above-mentioned ownership and firm value for ownership below 25%. The results also indicate a significant and negative relationship between ownership by the CEO below 5% and firm value. Leverage is significantly and positively related to firm value when we relate ownership by institutional investors not on the board of directors and firm value. This might imply that creditors work as complementary monitors of value along with institutional investors who are not on the board of directors. The paper concludes that block holders are important monitors of firm value especially if they own large amounts of securities to justify the high cost of monitoring.

The phenomenon of “broken rungs” has prevented most women from attaining managerial positions relative to men. Despite this gender disparity in management, female executives are more likely to enhance shareholder trust due to higher ethical standards, which can be hypothesized to mitigate the negative impact of family ownership on firm value. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the moderating role of female ownership and female directors in mitigating the unfavorable effects of family ownership on firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q and the Market Value of Equity (MVE).

Multiple linear regression is applied to examine the proposed hypotheses, as well as other vital factors, such as board independence (BI), the dual chief executive officer (CEO)–chairman role (CEO duality) and control variables (i.e. firm size, firm age, leverage and investment ratio).

The results revealed that female directors could buffer the negative impact caused by family ownership, leading to higher firm value, when given a sufficient level of female ownership or the appointment of more female directors, regardless of female ownership levels. Otherwise, female ownership cannot help overcome the negative effects of family ownership in Thai-listed firms. This study also sheds light on corporate governance elements that impact firm value. CEO duality reduces the value of Thai-listed companies, whereas board independence increases firm value.

The managerial roles for women should be promoted in Thai-listed enterprises. The government can support new laws, policies and programs for embracing a cross-cutting gender perspective. Female network initiatives enable women to advance in their managerial careers.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study intends to fill the research gap by investigating how female directors and owners can moderate family ownership’s influence on the value of firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), which is one of the emerging capital markets.

The Nature of Business Policy Business policy — or general management — is concerned with the following six major functions:

This study aims to examine the determinants of the female representations on Chinese listed firm’s boards. This study also investigates the effect of gender diversity on corporate social responsibility activities.

The Tobit regression model is used because the data is censored and using ordinary least square regression can give spurious results. For robust check, the authors also used Heckman’s (1979) two-stage self-selection model to remove the sample self-selection bias.

The authors find that the female representations on the corporate board are positively associated with firm age, firm performance, corporate governance, family ownership, institutional ownership and managerial ownership while negatively related to firm size and state ownership. This study also incorporates predictors of the critical mass of women on the Chinese listed firm’s board. The study also tests the female-led hypothesis and concludes that the female representation increases in firms with female chief executive officer (CEO) or female chairpersons. The Chinese listed firms with gender-diverse board are socially responsible.

The importance of diversity in corporate boards has been demonstrated in light of the agency theory and the resource dependence framework. The results contribute to the previous literature by documenting the determinants of female representations on board, robust by alternative measures of gender diversity, firm size, corporate governance and estimation techniques.

The economic significance of gender diversity stirred the firms to increase female representation. The policymakers can understand the reasons for female underrepresentation in Chinese boards and can reform the regulation to enhance governance quality, non-state ownership and risk aversion among the listed firms.

This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the key predictor of the world’s largest emerging economy, specifically the study focuses on the firm specific determinants, different governance attributes, ownership structure and firm risk measures. This study also seeks to answer if the presence of a female in the Chairperson or CEO position encourages the firms to hire more female directors or not?

This study aims to investigate the effects of corporate board and audit committee characteristics and ownership structures on market-based financial performance of listed firms in Thailand.

It applies system GMM (generalized method of moments) as the baseline estimator approach, and ordinary least squares and fixed effects for robustness checks on a sample of 452 firms listed on the Thai Stock Exchange for the period 2000-2016.

Relying mainly on the system GMM estimator, the empirical results indicate some emerging trends in the Thai economy. Contrary to expectations for an emerging market and prior research findings, ownership structures, particularly ownership concentration and family ownership, appear to have no significant influence on market-based firm performance, while managerial ownership exerts a positive effect on performance. Moreover, as expected, board structure variables such as board independence; size; meeting and dual role; and audit committee meeting show significant explanatory power on market-based firm performance in Thai firms.

These findings are important for policymakers in constructing an appropriate set of governance mechanisms in an emerging market context, and for corporate entities and investors in shaping their understanding of corporate governance in the Thai institutional context.

Unlike previous literature on the Thai market, this study is the first to use the more advanced econometric method known as system GMM estimator for addressing causality/endogeneity issues in governance–performance relationships. The findings indicate new trends in the explanatory power of ownership structure variables on market-based firm performance in Thai-listed firms.

This paper aims to combine the agency theory and efficiency wage theory to explore the effects of relative compensation for executive directors with marketing experience on two marketing outcomes (marketing efficiency and market share) and the moderating roles of ownership type (private vs state-owned enterprises) and market concentration in this process.

A total of 2,753 firm-year observations from Chinese listed companies (from 2010 to 2014) were retrieved from China Stock Market and Accounting Research database and analyzed using firm random-effects with industry, year and region fixed effects.

Relative compensation has a positive effect on both marketing efficiency and market share, and these effects are moderated by ownership type and market concentration. Specifically, the positive effect of relative compensation on marketing efficiency and market share are stronger for central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compared to local SOEs and private-owned enterprises but the results are mixed for market concentration.

This study shows that paying higher compensation to the executive directors with marketing experience can enhance marketing performance, but the data does not allow identification of the actual actions taken by these directors for this.

This study highlights the importance of appropriate compensation for directors with marketing experience to motivate them to make better marketing decisions to overcome the challenges posed by market concentration and agency conflicts.

This paper points out the importance of having directors with marketing experience and paying them suitable compensation to motivate them to be more effective.