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This paper aims to highlight the lacunae in international trade law concerning unilateral economic sanctions that impact food security.

This paper adopts a literature review to establish that unilateral economic sanctions impact food security and a descriptive assessment of a few such sanctions. Thereafter, it adopts doctrinal analysis of such sanctions under World Trade Organization law and identifies the gaps to address the specific situation of unilateral economic sanctions that impact food security.

Unilateral economic sanctions are not effectively regulated under international law. Unilateral economic sanctions are known to impact food security not just in the targeted country but also in third countries. Under international trade law, the security exception under Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not currently require an assessment of necessity and proportionality of measure. However, there is scope for such an assessment in the future depending on the circumstances, particularly if a measure impacts the rights and interests of third countries by impacting global food security.

The paper conducts a literature review of the impact of unilateral economic sanctions on food security. It highlights the gap in the interpretation of GATT Article XXI when assessing such sanctions that adversely impact the food security of third countries. The paper may be helpful for academics, policymakers, international organizations, non-governmental organisations, etc.

The use of economic sanctions has grown dramatically in recent decades. Nevertheless, many arguments are presented in the public policy space regarding their effects on target populations. The author presents the first systematic analysis of the effects of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey and assessment of the literature on the effects of economic sanctions on living standards in target countries. The author identifies 31 studies that apply quantitative econometric or calibration methods to cross-country and national data to assess the impact of economic sanctions on indicators of human and economic development. The author provides in-depth discussions of three sanctions episodes—Iran, Afghanistan and Venezuela—that illustrate the channels through which sanctions affect living conditions in target countries.

Of the 31 studies, 30 find that sanctions have negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality and human rights. The author provides new results showing that 54 countries—27% of all countries and 29% of the world economy— are sanctioned today, up from only 4% of countries in the 1960s. In the three cases discussed, sanctions that restricted the access of governments to foreign exchange limited the ability of states to provide essential public goods and services and generated substantial negative spillovers on private sector and nongovernmental actors.

This is the first literature survey that systematically assesses the quantitative evidence on the effect of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

Those parties who do become caught up in the sanctions and are blacklisted face a daunting situation. Their property and accounts are often blocked, and dealings with US parties, and frequently their overseas affiliates as well, are essentially cut off with little or no warning by virtue of decisions made by a relatively small and obscure office within the Treasury Department. US as well as foreign parties can be blacklisted, and these restrictions can even extend to a firm's employees. The practical consequence of being touched by one of the Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) economic sanctions programmes may be the economic equivalent of capital punishment. By virtue of the restrictions, the blacklisted business may cease to exist as a viable entity.

The purpose of this paper is to review the prosecution by US authorities of Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE) Corporation for its violation of sanctions against the sale of systems to Iran and North Korea; the violation of the plea agreement; and, following presidential intervention, the imposition of a further fine and restructuring of its management.

An analysis of the materials used in court proceedings and speeches by officials in the case against ZTE

The US president intervened in a quasi-judicial matter in which a foreign firm had violated US sanctions that he had supported to lessen the penalties it faced. The firm had also violated its plea agreement. This personal intervention weakened enforcement of US sanctions on human rights and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, it revealed the excessive reliance of Chinese manufacturers on US-domiciled suppliers of semiconductors and software.

Neither was access to Chinese documents possible nor would it have been practicable to interview managers at ZTE.

Enforcement of US sanctions on the sale of telecommunications equipment have now been moved from strict enforcement on matters of human rights and WMD into political, trade and even personal negotiations with the US president.

A first analysis of a telecommunications sanctions case.

The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act was enacted on 3rd December, 1999, as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. The Kingpin Act calls for the imposition of a series of US economic and financial sanctions — with a worldwide reach — on ‘foreign narcotics traffickers’, their related ‘organisations’, and those ‘foreign persons’ who support their activities, enforced by penalties ranging up to fines of $10m and imprisonment for ten years. In passing this legislation, Congress specifically looked to the example provided by an earlier set of economic sanctions that prohibited dealings with Colombian narco‐traffickers or entities which they controlled, established by the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC). The controls established by the Kingpin Act, and the associated Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations (FNKSR), accordingly, are neither a unique nor an isolated programme. Rather, they represent the latest step in the evolution of a series of distinct, but related, economic sanctions programmes administered by OFAC.

India and Iran historically share centuries-old strong socio-cultural and trade relations since ancient times. The chapter explores emerging opportunities and challenges in trade and investment in the present era. While Iran is one of the leading producers and exporters of oil, India, a major market for hydrocarbons, is heavily dependent on imports to meet its domestic requirements. This offers trade complementarities between the two countries as India is a secure market for Iran’s oil whereas Iran facilitates India to decrease its over-dependence for oil on Saudi Arabia. This chapter discusses the mutually beneficial trade relationship as well as potential for further deepening the existing economic ties between these two ancient civilizations that could offer a win-win situation for both countries.

The study aims to examine the geoeconomic significance of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to China’s global geopolitical ends. In this vein, the paper also seeks to explore the interplay between China’s grand geoeconomic strategy and China’s geopolitical ends from a realist perspective.

The study uses the realism theory to explore the interplay between China’s geoeconomic presence in the GCC countries and its geopolitical global ends.

The study concludes that China under President Xi Jinping has geopolitical ends, and they are the regional and global leadership. To achieve them, President Xi has formulated a grand geoeconomic strategy consisting of four strategies: going out strategy, periphery strategy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. These strategies will maximize China’s economic power and presence around the world. From a realist perspective, this presence and its evolving consequences such as the balance of dependence will enable China to achieve its geopolitical ends. In this vein, China’s geoeconomic strategy in the GCC countries has largely maximized China’s economic presence in the Gulf. This presence highly serving China’s geopolitical global ends for two reasons: the economic weight of the GCC countries and their strategic location within BRI.

The study can prove the realistic dimension of geoeconomics in the neoliberal era on the application to China’s geoeconomic strategy.

China has showed its eagerness in using its economic strength in the very recent years. Is China going to be a major sanctioning state like the United States or the European Union? This chapter argues that although there have been an increasing number of economic sanctions imposed by China with its expanding national interests and growing diplomatic problems, China will still keep a low profile in using economic sanctions because of the restraining factors such as the WTO rules, inherent problems in its economy, the pursuit of a good reputation and its strategy of peaceful development. Thus the frequency and tactics of using economic sanctions may vary according to its rising economy and changing international situation, but that will go in a very limited way.