Search results

Product intervention power is introduced under the markets in financial instruments regulation (MiFIR) and packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) Regulation for all EU Member States and gives National Competent Authorities (NCAs), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European Banking Authority (EBA) powers to monitor financial products (and services) under their supervision and to “temporarily” prohibit or restrict the marketing, distribution, or sale of certain financial instruments, or to intervene in relation to certain financial activities or practice. This extends the supervisory measures defined in MiFID II to any PRIIPs (including insurance-based investment products “IBI products”) that would not otherwise fall under the scope of MiFID II. Product intervention power is given to the NCAs, and in order to use power, it requires to take the specifics of the individual case into account and a series of conditions, criteria, and factors to fulfill. Moreover, ESMA and the EBA have a type of control function and ability to override national regulators on product. The aim of product intervention powers is to ensure strengthening of investor protection, but given the potential significant impact of this power, calls into question of possibility to delay innovation and slow down product developments on the capital market.

This paper provided an overview of supervisory measures on product intervention, that is, scope of the product intervention power, criteria, factors, and risks which have to be taken into consideration when using this regulator’s tool.

Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are one of the most innovative financial products listed on exchanges. As reflected by the size of the market, they have become popular among both retail and institutional investors. The original ETFs were simple and easy to understand; however, recent products, such as leveraged, inverse, and synthetic ETFs, are more complex and have additional dimensions of risk. The additional risks, complexity, and reduced transparency have resulted in heightened attention by regulators. This chapter aims to increase understanding of how ETFs function in the market and can potentially impact financial stability and market volatility.

We discuss the evolution of ETFs, growing regulatory concerns, and the various responses to these concerns.

We find that concerns related to systemic risk and excess volatility, suitability for retail investors, lack of transparency and liquidity, securities lending and counterparty exposure are being addressed by both market participants and policy makers. There has been a shift toward multiple counterparties, overcollateralization, disclosure of collateral holdings and index holdings.

The analysis contained in this chapter provides an understanding of the role of ETFs in the financial markets and the global economy that should be valuable to market participants, investors, and policy makers.

In December 2008, as the financial and economic crisis continued on its devastating course, a new scandal erupted. After the 1998s failure of Long-Term Capital Management, Madoff's fraud once again discredits the hedge funds industry. This scandal is, however, of a different kind. Indeed, Madoff's firm is not a standard hedge fund but a developed Ponzi scheme. By explaining Madoff's system and exploring the reasons for its collapse, this paper draws risk management lessons from this fraud, especially for operational risk management, due diligence processes, and the use of quantitative replication, regulatory, and standardizing approaches of the hedge fund industry.

The world of ‘responsible’ ethical and social investment is more substantial than it might seem. At the end of 2007, holdings in ‘responsible’ funds amounted to 20 billion, against the 5 billion three years earlier. Although these ‘responsible’ holdings tend to be ‘best-in-class’ funds (Fig. 9.1), the significant rise in ‘sustainable funding’ in this area is clear.

The hefty fines levied on credit institutions in recent years for cases of misconduct, including poor behavioural standards, operational control deficiencies and regulatory breaches more broadly, has been defined by regulatory authorities and the financial sector more broadly as ‘conduct risk’. There is no official definition of conduct risk, as conduct risk profiles are unique to each firm and, therefore, there can never be a one-size-fits-all framework in place. Conceptually, conduct risk is a broad notion that touches every part of an enterprise framework, including culture, customer contact, corporate governance, ethics and integrity, conflicts of interest and compliance, amongst others. As a result, credit institutions tend to associate conduct risk with regulatory censure, financial detriment, poor customer outcomes, and, importantly, reputational damage. In light of the significant consequences of misconduct, recent regulatory measures have sought to specifically target these drivers. In this chapter the author discussed the regulatory spotlight on conduct risk, which continues to top the regulators’ agenda in view of its seriousness and considered the role of the board in managing conduct risk, whilst elaborating on the importance of board evaluations in this respect.

Current trends in financial services are characterised by two intertwined developments. First, increasing digitalisation provides opportunities to invest or raise money through channels that have not been available with more traditional financial services. Crowd-investing and social-trading platforms act as new intermediaries. Similarly, automated advice (robo-advice) is attracting increased attention. Second, the financial crisis of 2007–2010 is associated with a considerable decline in trust in financial institutions, even more so in Iceland, which had experienced a complete collapse of its banking system. Despite the evaporation of trust in their banking system, Icelandic consumers were largely bound to use Icelandic financial institutions because capital controls were in place since the financial crisis until 2017, which limited investors’ opportunities to, for example, diversify their portfolios internationally. As financial decisions are inherently risky and since financial services have the characteristics of credence goods, those who wish to use financial services need to trust financial intermediaries or the immediate contractual partner. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of trust in the context of increased digitalisation, and to discuss steps to establish trust in digitalised financial services. Among other items, we discuss the information requirements accompanying financial products and financial institutions, data protection and liability in the context of emerging digitalisation. Our work holds implications for individuals, financial service providers, policy makers and supervisory authorities.

In the previous chapters of this part, we considered voter turnout, ownership concentration and voting behaviour of shareholders. In this chapter, we take a closer look at the types of shareholders that are present in our data set. We define five different types of shareholders and evaluate their stakes. Afterwards, we consider outsider shareholder voting behaviour and find that, when only considering these shareholders, dissent rates are significantly higher. These findings imply that it may be desirable for continental European countries to consider a rule like UK Listing Rules 9.2.2AR to ER.