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Two major advances in the theory of the firm and (micro)economics more generally are arguably transaction costs economics (TCE) and the theory of firm resources. TCE has originally been applied to the theory of the firm, but found applications in virtually all fields of economic inquiry. The theory of firm resources currently spans much of the industrial organisation (IO) and strategic management literature. In some fields, e.g. diversification, it has already acquired dominant status. Despite significant progress in TCE there still seem to remain significant unresolved issues. Indeed we claim that transaction cost economics fail to supply convincing answers to the issues of the nature of the firm (why do firms exist?), and their essence (running a business). It offers a partial explanation of the “nature” and little on the “essence”. The resource value view complements the nature side and goes far beyond on the essence issue. It provides a fruitful starting point for an integrative framework. This, we suggest, should be based on the resource value perspective story and craft (dynamic) transaction costs in the ensuing evolutionary tale.

This paper aims to present an in‐depth review on the latest state of empirical research in transaction cost economics (TCE), focusing on single‐industry studies. The intensely discussed subject of operationalization of transaction costs is critically assessed, and a concept of how to increase the quality of findings in empirical studies is presented.

The sample was obtained by a literature research and review in high‐class media and submitted to in‐depth quantitative and qualitative analysis such as content analysis.

The findings are in part unexpected and substantially contribute to research: applicability of TCE to a broad range of industries is found, the majority being large industries with important markets. Most studies support TCE statements, some suggesting theory extension by complementary aspects. Operationalization of transaction costs remains a field requiring further research.

First, this article is condensed and therefore limited to single‐industry studies within TCE, understanding “industry” as a specialized field of activity. The question of industry boundaries may be a base for future research. Second, the subject of operationalization of transaction costs still requires further research.

Decision makers can continue to use TCE for various applications such as strategic alliance, vertical integration, governance choice, make‐or‐buy or contract choice questions. A shortcoming in most articles reviewed is the presentation of the industry's characteristics. Authors need to consider them in order to increase the qualitative level of single‐industry studies.

This paper provides significant insight into the field of single‐industry TCE studies. As a result of penetrating research in high‐class media and in‐depth analysis, the paper provides highly structured and intensely examined statements on existing literature and related findings, which support TCE statements and will lead current disputes in the literature to a further stage.

Transaction cost economics is an important anchor for analyzing a wide range of economic and organizational issues and is complemented by various theories, resulting in a perception shift of transaction governance structure from a polar classification toward a continuum (John & Reve, 1982; Heide & Miner, 1992; Hennart, 1993). Despite conceptual framework developments, empirical studies based on the continuum are scarce. This research is an initial effort toward TGS dimensionalization and operationalization and reviews theoretical developments since 1930, surveys empirical studies from 1982 to 2004, presents Williamson’s framework (1991), and proposes a set of items for instrument design.

Transfer pricing stands at the heart of a MNE management control system. We review the theories of TCE and RBV and develop antecedents and consequences of transfer prices based on these theories. We propose viewing transfer pricing decisions through a TCE and RBV value chain framework. We review a sample of transfer pricing literature based on this theoretical perspective and show how it fits within our framework. Our framework suggests that setting transfer pricing policy is indeed a complex problem that includes many factors and has many consequences, some of which may be at odds with each other. We give some suggestions for future research based on this framework.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to analyse what theories assume about multinational enterprises (MNEs) when they claim these are superior and to discuss possible explanations for why MNE superiority seems to be dominant in the international business (IB) research field.

A common theme in mainstream IB theories is that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are superior in terms of cost efficiency and innovativeness compared with other types of organizations. A closer look at transaction cost economics (TCE)/internalization theory, evolutionary theory and dynamic capability theory reveal a bias toward MNE supremacy because of how MNEs are conceptualized as firms and therefore fail to explain the essence of “multinational advantage”. These revelations and the strong dependence on the benevolence to provide unbiased data means that MNE supremacy posited by mainstream IB theories is as much a rationalized myth as an empirical fact.

Although mainstream theories differ when it comes to the building blocks that constitute MNE supremacy, they have one attribute in common: they are silent as to why MNEs are superior compared with, for example, domestic firms or other types of economic agents. Irrespective of whether the focus is the strength of the hierarchy, the skill of managers or a common identity, nothing in the theories tells us that these factors are more pronounced in MNEs than in other types of economic actors.

The paper deals with the issue of multinational advantage. It claims that mainstream theories of MNEs tend to assume, explicitly or implicitly, that MNEs are superior in terms of cost efficiency and innovativeness compared with other types of economic agents. The analysis demonstrates that this tendency is a consequence of how MNEs are conceptualized as firms in the different theories as well as of the strong dependence in IB research on the benevolence of MNEs to provide unbiased data. It is concluded that MNE supremacy posited by mainstream IB theories is as much a rationalized myth as an empirical fact.

This paper specifically seeks to explore the contribution of extended TCE‐reasoning to our understanding of intended change in management control in interfirm transactional relationships.

The approach is theoretical of nature. After having outlined the essentials of TCE‐reasoning and having critically reviewed the extant TCE‐contribution to research in management control, this paper extends TCE‐reasoning by incorporating the notion of trust into the analysis. Different sources of trust as well as the management control related impacts of trust are explored.

The paper develops propositions that, in the context of an interfirm transactional relationship, confront choices for alternative management control patterns with situational and institutional features.

The paper particularly covers the overt instrumental level of management control in interfirm transactional relationships. Although the paper covers relational aspects, it does not provide a strong theory of the working of “soft controls”.

An explanation of intended change could help practitioners to improve decision making at the level of their organizations.

The paper contributes to the extant knowledge by exploring the scope of TCE with regard to choices in the (re)design of management control patterns in interfirm transactional relationships.

Finance and accounting (FA) offshore outsourcing is a growing trend involving a relocation of business processes to Asia but only few studies focus on understanding the issues that underlie the relocation of FA services. This paper aims to provide understanding of transaction costs economics (TCE) issues in FA offshore outsourcing using a case study of the Malaysia outsourcing industry which is growing and experiencing significant change.

This study uses a qualitative case study approach. Interviews cover several foreign firms, which are based in Malaysia and involved in FA offshore outsourcing services worldwide. Interviews also include related regulatory bodies in Malaysia.

Using TCE and management control theoretical framework, findings indicate issues and challenges faced by the firms and the need for contract management skills to mitigate the issues.

This study is limited to a broad discussion of FA offshore outsourcing, TCE and contract management but it could be a basis for future studies on specific issues of managing attrition in FA offshore outsourcing. This study contributes to prior works in TCE and FA offshore outsourcing by establishing controls to minimise costs at contact, contract and control stage. Specifically, this study emphasises contract management such as negotiating contract and using long‐term contractual arrangement.

This study not only identifies TCE issues in offshore FA outsourcing, but also provides suggestions for minimising transaction costs. For example, firms should consider the type of transaction costs involved and plan for appropriate contract management to mitigate the costs.

There is no study yet that discusses in‐depth the issues of TCE in FA offshore outsourcing especially in Malaysia and the need for contract management in mitigating such issues.

There has been a steady increase in the amount of research and theorising in the area of interorganisational research, especially with regard to buyer‐seller arrangements in marketing channels (Andersen and Narus 1990, Bergen et.al., 1992, Boyle et.al., 1992). Alternative interorganisational governance models, such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, and sole‐sourcing are the reality of modern business management (Borys and Jemison 1989, Buckley and Casson 1988), and so interfirm governance has become a strategic management issue. The much‐cited work of Porter (1985, 1991) has focused on the optimal linkage of interfirm activities, and regards the planning and governance of interfirm relations as an important competitive strategic issue, a point reiterated by Heide (1994). The issue of channel relationships has been one of concern for both practitioners and academics, and theories such as those of transaction cost analysis (TCA), agency theory, and relational norms have on the one hand shed much light on the problems, and on the other provided a fruitful backdrop to much empirical research. Less attention has been given to the effects of time on these notions, both in the literature and in empirical research. In this article we provide an overview of the theories, and attempt an integration. The purpose of this article is to focus on transaction cost economics (TCE) and relational exchange theory to provide an overview of the areas of interorganisational research where relationships play a role. A number of areas where the theories diverge and converge are outlined. More importantly, we endeavour to bring the effects of time into consideration, and to develop propositions for further research.

The performance of public–private partnership (PPP) projects depends on how the project has been structured. The traditional PPP option analysis for structuring project scope and size relating to the bundling of functions concerning a single component of the value chain will need to be extended to handle multi-component sectors such as municipal solid waste (MSW) in formulating the project scope. This analysis is currently missing in the extant literature. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Through a comprehensive literature review as the methodological backbone, this study develops a testable holistic framework for the procurement of MSW PPP projects that examines how various factors of bundling affect the performance of the PPP projects.

Using transaction cost economics, agency and auction theories, the review identifies that innovation, maturity, quality specifiability, scope, competition, information asymmetries and transaction attributes have a significant influence on the performance and success of the PPP projects.

Alternative supply chain management possibilities and firm-level organisational ways can be predicted using this framework to strategize the solutions for the municipal infrastructure. Based on this contribution, future research can test the framework to increase the knowledge of bundling theory about how to structure network infrastructure PPP projects.

Studies on how to bundle/unbundle the projects having components of the value chain are in a nascent stage. The present study attempts to extend the body of knowledge on PPP to the complexity of bundling both the functions and components of the value chain in structuring the PPP project scope.

Utilizing transaction cost economics (TCE) theory as the theoretical underpinning, this article aims to describe the costs of interpersonal helping and governing mechanisms that individuals may use to alleviate helping costs.

A theoretical analysis was performed by drawing upon TCE and related research.

Through the lens of TCE, the authors propose the following: First, as the costs of helping increase, interpersonal helping shifts from being triggered by an autonomous motivation to being regulated by contextual contingencies. Second, the helper is likely to utilize reciprocity to mitigate helping costs by acquiring specific assets possessed by the recipient when asset specificity is high. Third, the helper is likely to utilize organizationally sanctioned procedures and rules to mitigate helping costs by eliminating unwanted resource consumptions when outcome uncertainty is high. Finally, the helper is likely to utilize group norms to mitigate helping costs by involving others in helping or discouraging requests for recurrent help when the frequency of helping is high.

From a theoretical standpoint, this article complements previous research that focuses on the dark side of interpersonal helping. Practically, the authors offer several implications that help managers minimize the costs of helping in the organization.