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Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

This research provides a new perspective in explaining cardholders' willingness to use debit cards instead of cash by applying the transaction costs economic theory. This study also expands the adaptation of transaction cost economics theory in explaining consumer behaviour by investigating the moderating effects of income and education level on the relationship between perceived transaction costs and willingness to use debit cards.

The conceptual framework was developed primarily from the transaction cost economics theory. An in-depth interview method was employed to further support hypothesis development and the development of measurement scales. A structural equation model linking asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, frequency of payment, perceived monitoring costs, perceived adaptation costs and willingness to use debit cards was tested using data from a sample of 384 Vietnamese debit card holders.

This study's results support the transaction cost economics theory that asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of payment all positively contribute to the perceived transaction costs associated with debit card usage. However, only environmental uncertainty and perceived adaptation costs have significant negative impact on willingness to use debit cards, with the relationship between environmental uncertainty and willingness to use debit cards being totally mediated by perceived adaptation costs. Moreover, the relationship between perceived adaptation costs and willingness to use debit cards becomes less negative among richer and better-educated cardholders.

The research provides insights into the hidden obstacles for developing cashless economies, thereby supporting policy makers in designing more effective and comprehensive strategies to make debit cards more widely used as a true substitute for cash.

This study provides a new lens in explaining customer willingness to use debit cards, while expanding the transaction costs economics theory by incorporating demographic factors as moderators in the relationship between transaction costs and the card-or-cash choice.

The process of managing the design and construction of a project on behalf of a client may be analysed using project management theory based on a contingency approach. The analysis provided by this approach, whilst useful for understanding the interaction of the parts of the system, the functions of project management and the effectiveness of the organization structure, may be limited by not incorporating an economic explanation of how a project organization structure is chosen. The transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization may provide a theoretical basis for such an explanation. This approach holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations as it determines whether functions are provided by the market or by hierarchy. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between these two powerful approaches in explaining the structuring and management of project organizations on behalf of clients and to explain the benefits of combining these approaches in furthering construction project management theory.

Transaction cost economics is an important anchor for analyzing a wide range of economic and organizational issues and is complemented by various theories, resulting in a perception shift of transaction governance structure from a polar classification toward a continuum (John & Reve, 1982; Heide & Miner, 1992; Hennart, 1993). Despite conceptual framework developments, empirical studies based on the continuum are scarce. This research is an initial effort toward TGS dimensionalization and operationalization and reviews theoretical developments since 1930, surveys empirical studies from 1982 to 2004, presents Williamson’s framework (1991), and proposes a set of items for instrument design.

Observes that supply chain management is a rapidly‐evolving subject which offers many insights into how industries are organized and into the efficiency gains which can be made under different organizational structures, pointing out that it is an interdisciplinary concept, drawing on aspects of marketing, economics, logistics, organizational behaviour, etc. Presents a framework from the economics literature which may be useful for those interested in understanding and exploring the concept of supply chain management. Describes the origins and development of transaction cost analysis and explains the key concepts of the framework. Discusses the potential effects of transaction costs on vertical co‐ordination within an industry and, hence, on supply chain management. Finally, suggests methods for empiricizing transaction cost analysis, resulting in recommendations for closer co‐operation between researchers and business managers.

Two major advances in the theory of the firm and (micro)economics more generally are arguably transaction costs economics (TCE) and the theory of firm resources. TCE has originally been applied to the theory of the firm, but found applications in virtually all fields of economic inquiry. The theory of firm resources currently spans much of the industrial organisation (IO) and strategic management literature. In some fields, e.g. diversification, it has already acquired dominant status. Despite significant progress in TCE there still seem to remain significant unresolved issues. Indeed we claim that transaction cost economics fail to supply convincing answers to the issues of the nature of the firm (why do firms exist?), and their essence (running a business). It offers a partial explanation of the “nature” and little on the “essence”. The resource value view complements the nature side and goes far beyond on the essence issue. It provides a fruitful starting point for an integrative framework. This, we suggest, should be based on the resource value perspective story and craft (dynamic) transaction costs in the ensuing evolutionary tale.

Uncertainty means that transaction costs have to be incurred by organisations whenever they make an agreement. These costs include time and money spent searching, drawing up and enforcing contracts and in dealing with contingencies. The concept of transaction costs is traced from its originator, economist Ronald Coase, to its more recent development by David Kreps. Good reputations, themselves a product of successful corporate communications activities, tend to reduce internal and external transaction costs. Given a competitive environment those firms with lower transaction costs, as a result of high reputations, will tend to survive better than those with weak ones.

This paper aims to take a step in this direction and use the high dimensional fixed effects and quantile regression discontinuity design to test the managerial Coase theorem, which provides an institutional perspective for us to gauge the impact of private property rights on firm performance and the effect of management costs on intermediate inputs.

This study first uses high dimensional regression discontinuity designs to examine the impact of privatization on firm performance in China between 1998 and 2013.

Results indicate that privatization effects increase average outputs of the firm by around 10% given lower management costs, and management costs increase intermediate inputs by more than 50% points. Using data from annual surveys to test managerial Coase theorem, the authors show that management costs negatively affect the marginal effect of privatization on the average outputs of the firm. The positive impact on the investment in intermediate goods and services is larger in magnitude under higher management costs.

The authors develop the managerial Coase theorem. Today, given lower management costs, private property rights provide an incentive structure for a firm to maximize the value of the assets and expand the boundaries.

This study aims to explore the reasons behind the lengthy delays in completing a single public-private partnership (PPP) project in Indonesia and investigates how the transaction costs play a significant role in hindering the project’s success.

To broaden insight into the transaction cost theory, the authors used a single case study approach to provide a more in-depth analysis of a context whose complexity can be fully explored. As the primary data sources, 16 face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with the stakeholders directly involved in the project’s initiation, design and execution.

This case study demonstrates that transaction cost issues, both political and economic, play a significant role. This study has identified four main problems associated with transaction costs hindering project success, namely, executing agencies’ lack of knowledge and experience, lack of coordination for such a complex governance structure that links too many stakeholders and the financial and political risk that increase the uncertainty and public distrust.

This study contributes mainly to the PPP and transaction costs economics literature, providing empirical evidence on why major PPP projects may fail to be procured. The Greater Bandung waste to energy (WTE) Project case demonstrates that transaction costs, both political and economic, have played a significant role in the lengthy delay of the PPP project.

As the project involves many transaction cost issues, mapping the failure factors at the project sites can significantly contribute to the practitioners/stakeholders involved in the PPP WTE projects. Therefore, this study provides a lesson to the policymakers at all levels interested in PPPs to consider the issues of transaction costs related to the PPP projects. It can be used as guidance as well as a reference for future PPP WTE projects in Indonesia.

Mapping the failure factors also signifying the response of the public in the PPP WTE projects undertaken. As the citizens become more rule-conscious and rights-conscious, they demand the opportunity to participate in creating rules and project plans. If the project failed to consult with affected communities and undermined democratic accountability, the angry citizens will confront the government to cancel the project. Therefore, political and economic influences for public attitude play significant roles in making the PPP WTE projects successful.

This study provides insight into the transaction cost issues that have hindered the completion of Indonesia’s PPP WTE project over the past 15 years. Additionally, the project feasibility analysis should include an understanding of transaction costs for partnering in PPP.

Further understanding of structural hierarchy is critically needed to assess the usefulness of different alliance structures. This study goes beyond transaction cost reasoning and incorporates social exchange theoretic perspective with the aim of capturing the concurrent relationships of alliance type and specific alliance experience with hierarchy of alliance structure.

Logistic regression analysis of data on 402 strategic alliances is used to test the two hypotheses advanced in the paper.

The social‐exchange‐based hypothesis is supported – specific alliance experience is negatively related to hierarchy of alliance structure. The transaction‐cost‐based hypothesis is not supported – hierarchy of alliance structure is not greater in horizontal alliances than in vertical alliances.

Strategic alliances with different purposes, such as R&D, supply procurement, marketing, co‐production, and co‐development, may have different industry norms of structuring alliances. This study does not account for these underlying differences within strategic alliances.

The social exchange theory‐based variable (i.e. specific alliance experience) has a more salient influence on alliance structure than does the transaction cost‐based variable (i.e. alliance type). The findings signal the relative importance of communal harmony compared to competitive rivalry.

The paper shows that results suggest that high bureaucratic costs of more hierarchical structures diminish the transaction cost economizing benefits of such structures. This is especially the case when alliances are not expected to experience very high levels of relational hazards (usually in vertical alliances). It appears that partnering firms' concerns with high bureaucratic costs may at times exceed the marginal benefits of control and coordination of exceedingly hierarchical alliance structures.