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Transaction cost economics sees a broad spectrum of governance structures spanned by two types of economic adaptation: autonomous and cooperative. Stakeholder theorists have drawn much inspiration from transaction cost economics but have not paid explicit attention to the centrality of the idea of adaptation in this literature. This study aims to address this gap.

The authors develop a novel conceptual framework applying the distinction between the two types of economic adaptation to stakeholder theory.

The authors argue that the idea of cooperative adaptation is particularly useful for describing the firm’s collaboration with primary stakeholders in the joint value creation process. In contrast, autonomous adaptation is more relevant for firms interacting with secondary stakeholders who are not directly engaged in joint value creation and may not have formal contractual relationships with the firm. Accordingly, cooperative adaptation can be seen as vital for resolving team production problems affecting joint value creation, whereas autonomous adaptation addresses how the firm maintains legitimacy within the larger stakeholder environment.

Similar to its significance for transaction cost economics, the distinction between the two types of adaptation equips stakeholder theory with a new systematic understanding of a potentially broad spectrum of firm–stakeholder collaboration forms.

This research provides a new perspective in explaining cardholders' willingness to use debit cards instead of cash by applying the transaction costs economic theory. This study also expands the adaptation of transaction cost economics theory in explaining consumer behaviour by investigating the moderating effects of income and education level on the relationship between perceived transaction costs and willingness to use debit cards.

The conceptual framework was developed primarily from the transaction cost economics theory. An in-depth interview method was employed to further support hypothesis development and the development of measurement scales. A structural equation model linking asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, frequency of payment, perceived monitoring costs, perceived adaptation costs and willingness to use debit cards was tested using data from a sample of 384 Vietnamese debit card holders.

This study's results support the transaction cost economics theory that asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of payment all positively contribute to the perceived transaction costs associated with debit card usage. However, only environmental uncertainty and perceived adaptation costs have significant negative impact on willingness to use debit cards, with the relationship between environmental uncertainty and willingness to use debit cards being totally mediated by perceived adaptation costs. Moreover, the relationship between perceived adaptation costs and willingness to use debit cards becomes less negative among richer and better-educated cardholders.

The research provides insights into the hidden obstacles for developing cashless economies, thereby supporting policy makers in designing more effective and comprehensive strategies to make debit cards more widely used as a true substitute for cash.

This study provides a new lens in explaining customer willingness to use debit cards, while expanding the transaction costs economics theory by incorporating demographic factors as moderators in the relationship between transaction costs and the card-or-cash choice.

The theories of transaction‐cost economics, the resource‐based view and the core competencies approach have been used extensively to justify the rationale behind strategic decisions on outsourcing, but their validity has not been investigated yet in comparative empirical research. Additionally, no study has examined the operational effects of these decisions in‐depth. The purpose of this paper is to fill these two gaps in the academic literature.

A literature review confirms the existence of these gaps and informs hypotheses based on the three theories. Additionally, the model for continuous decision making on outsourcing is used to systematically collect data from five cases studies. The cases – all make‐to‐order or engineering‐to‐order – have been analysed on effects for operational performance and control resulting from strategic decision making on outsourcing.

From this evaluation, it appears that these companies perform weakly on the control of the outsourced activities. Furthermore, it seems that the (manufacturing) strategy is disconnected from outsourcing practices and that outsourcing hardly contributes to competitive advantage. Moreover, from some of the case studies it appears that the decision for strategic outsourcing is irreversible. Finally, traditional criteria and behaviour during decision making prevail, i.e. a cost‐driven perspective, which does not address contemporary challenges.

Despite being explorative and based on only five cases, these findings indicate that strategic decision making on outsourcing based on the three theories insufficiently accounts for operational issues that emerge later during manufacturing; it might be necessary to revise the theoretical base for outsourcing to include management of outsourced manufacturing activities.

The findings imply also that managers in companies, in any case those firms that operate on the basis of make‐to‐order or engineering‐to‐order, should be less “rushed” into strategic decision making on outsourcing that has adverse effects. Rather, outsourcing requires integral decision making in contrast to factual decision making that displayed signs of bounded rationality (particularly expressed through the focus on cost savings).

The dominant, one‐sided view of the cost perspectives contributes to the notion that the shareholders' interests for short‐term profitability conflict with long‐term organisational health (apparent through the impact on operational management of outsourcing activities).

Stakeholders involved in strategic decision making might use this research to evaluate fundamentally decisions that cover outsourcing. At the same time, for consultants and practitioners it offers insight that is complementary to the often one‐sided strategic decision making with its focus on cost reductions. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates the limited validity of current theories that underpin strategic decision making on outsourcing and provides an impetus for academics to develop more appropriate theory.

The opinion that the spiritual controls the physical gave rise to this chapter. The spiritual in this chapter was regarded as the philosophical and organisational theories controlling the practical aspect of construction supply chain management (CSCM). It was discovered that there is a significant omission in adopting theories to explain supply chain management's (SCM) adaptation and modelling in the construction industry. Therefore, this chapter reviews theories such as resource-based view theory (RBV), principal agency theory (PAT), resource dependency theory (RDT), transaction cost economics theory (TCE) and game theory. Each of the theories was analysed to uncover how they support the practice and variables for modelling the construction supply chain (CSC). The existing models of the CSC were also examined in this chapter. It was found that most models were developed drawing on the frameworks of the global supply chain forum (GSCF) and supply chain operations reference model (SCOR). Owing to the shortcoming of GSCF, this book adopted the framework and principles of SCOR for modelling the management of CSC in the era of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR). Also, most of the existing CSC models, such as the seamless CSCM model, maturity model and others, were developed using the SCOR framework.

To develop a model in which alternative patterns of management control are confronted with situational and institutional features in the context of transactional relationships. The model could be of use to managers in making rational decisions regarding the boundaries of the organization.

The model is developed by drawing on transaction cost economics extended with systems theoretical notions on trust.

Three patterns of management control are identified: a market pattern, a bureaucratic pattern and a trust pattern. Furthermore, the transactional and institutional factors that determine the choice of a control pattern or elements therein are identified and confronted with the three management control patterns.

An extended transaction cost economics approach is rather static of nature and, therefore, could be criticized for its lack of attention to processes of gradual development. In practice, adoption and design of management control structures are only part of the story; there also is gradual development or evolution in management control. However, the implications of the model are restricted to rational decision making regarding the adoption/design of management control patterns.

The paper provides a relevant and usable model for the adoption and design of management control patterns.

Compared to external audit, internal audit has been charged with having no theory to guide academic research and practice. Suggests that the claims that internal audit has no theory have overlooked the theory of transaction cost economics. A variation of agency theory, transaction cost economics provides a conceptual framework for internal audit. Explains the theory that transaction cost economics provides for internal audit, and tests the theory with an experiment involving the usefulness of internal audit findings for senior executives in government organizations.

Bundled mode of public–private partnership (PPP) procurement has been a widely advocated governance structure of infrastructure delivery. The purpose of this paper is to identify the various aspects of how this bundling phenomenon has to be played out in practice and examines the implications of such decisions.

A longitudinal case study with an Indian municipal solid waste (MSW) PPP project provides the necessary evidence on the identification of constructs which are deemed important in the decision making of bundling in PPP MSW projects. Transaction cost economics theory, agency theory and auction theory informed the development of theoretical constructs. The longitudinal case study used interviews, observations and documents analysis.

This study has highlighted the complexity inherent in bundling decision, arising out of the relatively scanty rationale by which stakeholders first developed. Not only they are very different from the practice, but also many assumptions are proved otherwise. Poor sectoral developments, hindrances arguably caused to innovation, increase in transaction cost and a decrease in the competition along with ex post characteristics such as unfavourable transaction attributes made bundling a too early proposition to Guwahati MSW project. This study suggests that strong liability of the bundling phenomenon was the above the rationale of typical PPP bundling benefits envisaged in the extant literature. It also shows that poor practice and decision making by immature clients would lead to project failure.

A cognitive map emerged from the study on the failure of Guwahati project. An empirical generalisation can be attempted using multiple contrasting case studies to make the theory more acceptable.

The case illustrated why naïve clients should not try PPPs in a bundled model. Accordingly, the developed framework would help the governments to create the right projects catalysing the bundling benefits and harness the full potential of private sector participation in future PPP projects.

The current study would be novel in advancing the theory of bundling in PPP projects. This would be of interest to academia and to industrial practice and policy.

Utilizing transaction cost economics (TCE) theory as the theoretical underpinning, this article aims to describe the costs of interpersonal helping and governing mechanisms that individuals may use to alleviate helping costs.

A theoretical analysis was performed by drawing upon TCE and related research.

Through the lens of TCE, the authors propose the following: First, as the costs of helping increase, interpersonal helping shifts from being triggered by an autonomous motivation to being regulated by contextual contingencies. Second, the helper is likely to utilize reciprocity to mitigate helping costs by acquiring specific assets possessed by the recipient when asset specificity is high. Third, the helper is likely to utilize organizationally sanctioned procedures and rules to mitigate helping costs by eliminating unwanted resource consumptions when outcome uncertainty is high. Finally, the helper is likely to utilize group norms to mitigate helping costs by involving others in helping or discouraging requests for recurrent help when the frequency of helping is high.

From a theoretical standpoint, this article complements previous research that focuses on the dark side of interpersonal helping. Practically, the authors offer several implications that help managers minimize the costs of helping in the organization.

Third-party logistics providers (3PLs) have significantly evolved during the last decades, yet their role within a supply chain triad has been overlooked; this study examines empirically the 3PLs' role using four established theories: resource-based view, social capital perspective, agency theory and transaction cost economics.

This study examines the role of 3PLs in four supply chain triads, using the case study approach. Sources of evidence include interviews and secondary data.

The 3PL had different roles in multi-demand triads as service developer, customer adaptor and customer developer. The 3PL, by offering advanced services, became a service developer. The 3PL as a customer adaptor offered customised services and gain the client's trust. As a customer developer, the 3PL acted on behalf of its client in expanding its operations and meeting competitive needs.

The results of the case study methodology can only be generalised to similar types of 3PL. Supply chain triads are an emerging research field; theories like the resource-based view and transaction cost economics are established in the dyadic context and require further elaboration when applied in triadic contexts.

The findings provide practical insights into the role that 3PL can play in supply chain triads, how they can upgrade their role by long-range planning and extending their services to create supply chain efficiency.

Understanding the 3PL's role in triads can improve how companies and economies respond to crises like the recent pandemic outbreak.

It uncovers three different 3PL roles in supply chain triads by using four established theories.

Finance and accounting (FA) offshore outsourcing is a growing trend involving a relocation of business processes to Asia but only few studies focus on understanding the issues that underlie the relocation of FA services. This paper aims to provide understanding of transaction costs economics (TCE) issues in FA offshore outsourcing using a case study of the Malaysia outsourcing industry which is growing and experiencing significant change.

This study uses a qualitative case study approach. Interviews cover several foreign firms, which are based in Malaysia and involved in FA offshore outsourcing services worldwide. Interviews also include related regulatory bodies in Malaysia.

Using TCE and management control theoretical framework, findings indicate issues and challenges faced by the firms and the need for contract management skills to mitigate the issues.

This study is limited to a broad discussion of FA offshore outsourcing, TCE and contract management but it could be a basis for future studies on specific issues of managing attrition in FA offshore outsourcing. This study contributes to prior works in TCE and FA offshore outsourcing by establishing controls to minimise costs at contact, contract and control stage. Specifically, this study emphasises contract management such as negotiating contract and using long‐term contractual arrangement.

This study not only identifies TCE issues in offshore FA outsourcing, but also provides suggestions for minimising transaction costs. For example, firms should consider the type of transaction costs involved and plan for appropriate contract management to mitigate the costs.

There is no study yet that discusses in‐depth the issues of TCE in FA offshore outsourcing especially in Malaysia and the need for contract management in mitigating such issues.