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Economic integration is an agreement among countries in a geographical region or unification of economic policies between different states aiming to reduce and ultimately remove tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade. The fruit of globalization is the tremendous rise of economic integration as globalization loosens barriers among the nations through reduction in cross-border duties and eases trade policies. Trumponomics is defined as the economic policies of US President Donald Trump that prefers high import tariff to bring “America First.” There is a debate among the researchers about the choice between free trade and protection or imposition of tariff. Some of them prefer free trade because during the start of the great depression, the world economy experienced a huge shift toward protectionism. Choice between no-tariff and tariff represents a prisoner’s dilemma situation whereby each player’s best response is to employ tariffs. This results in a sub-optimal outcome for all where the total volume of world trade falls, which is a Nash solution. The present chapter deals with theoretical discussions on trade war and throws light on the developing country’s choice between non-protectionism supported by globalization and Trump’s protectionism.

This analysis of the Japanese textile sector illustrates how intra-industry cleavages are becoming an integral feature of Japanese trade policymaking. In the past, a pattern of cross-sectoral variation in trade policy could be observed, as the government protected declining industries at home and sought to open foreign markets for the competitive export sector. The internationalization of Japanese firms, however, has radically affected the articulation of corporate trade policy preferences. There is an ongoing breakdown in solidarity among industry members based on their degree of multinationality and/or their reverse importing strategies. These clashes put contradictory pressures on the Japanese government, making it more difficult to predict the course of trade liberalization in Japan.

The fight between two nations on each other’s exportable on the basis of tariff is known as tariff war. Although an economic policy, very ­often ­motivated by nationalism and politics, a nation imposes tariff on the ­exports of another nation which, in retaliation, again imposes tariff on the exports of its trading partner. The prime cause of such war is certainly to enhance employment opportunities in the home nation. But politics and nationalism provoke the opposite nation to follow the same policy. Effects of such tariff war, whether beneficial or harmful, are yet to be seen. In this context, we have adopted a general equilibrium model to illustrate the probable effect of the above-stated trade war in a structure consisting both H–O nugget and export sector dualism. The effect of imposition of tariff on multinational corporation (MNC) that has its own origin nation and production activities in other nation as well where it faces the war of tariff is considered. But it gets relief in the form of tax reduction in its origin nation. Under such a scenario, the study has shown the effect of tariff in the presence of full employment in the economy as well as in the presence of unemployment. It is seen that the MNC will continue its production procedure in both nations and enjoy profit, under some conditions. Further, in the presence of unemployment it is seen that if rate of tax on the MNC rises, unemployment may fall and welfare can increase under certain conditions.

A populist backlash has seized a number of Western democracies. Two broad sets of explanations have emerged to address the sources of this backlash, with credible empirical evidence for each. The first focuses on economic drivers, and specifically on global economic integration, and exposure to trade competition. The second turns instead to cultural explanations, arguing that the shifting political winds are due to strictly nonmaterial considerations, like status threat and racial beliefs. How might we reconcile two apparently conflicting conclusions in the scholarly work examining this backlash? The question comes down to the particular interplay of these factors. I argue that the most promising approach may lie in tweaking our ideas about the relevant group that individuals use to make assessments about general welfare and the role of political entrepreneurs in manipulating these relevant groups. This, in turn, might explain why right-wing political parties appear to consistently gain from the ongoing backlash. I end with a consideration of the policy means that governments have to curb the political effects of economic grievances, and what explains the success or failure of such efforts. An economic recipe for backlash suggests the existence of an antidote.

In Austria the 1930s constituted the final period of success and failure of the Austrian school, ending with its emigration to the United States. This chapter focuses on this period, when the Austrian economy was hardest hit by the Great Depression, and it examines the ways and means by which the Austrian economists attempted to influence economic policy. In particular, from 1932 to 1934 in a concerted effort Austrian economists like Ludwig Mises, Fritz Machlup, and especially Oskar Morgenstern tried to “educate” the Austrian public and policy-makers in the benefits of a liberal approach towards the crisis. This effort included the advocacy of the policies typically associated with the gold standard, that is, stable money, balanced budgets, the absence of exchange restrictions, and free trade. In the actual situation the outcome of these endeavors was futile, if not harmful, insofar as indeed Austrian economic policy slowly converted to the implied deflationary stance of monetary and fiscal policy. Yet, under the regime of the so-called corporate state the necessary complement of such policies, namely the flexibility of prices and the furthering of competition, could not be accomplished. This eventual failure of the liberal cause may be ascribed to the fact that it had to rely on shifting coalitions and fragile personal relations, which in the end turned out too weak for sustaining the policies envisioned by the Austrian economists.

Many multinational firms attempt to cope with trade policy uncertainties by developing the option of manufacturing their goods in multiple production facilities in different countries. In this chapter, we explore how such “production switching” options affect the vulnerability of a country’s exports to foreign protectionism. We present a theoretical model of such behavior and show that production switching increases the elasticity of a country’s export with respect to tariffs. The magnitude of the elasticity depends on a country’s position in the value chain. We use the model’s predictions to provide new insights into the vulnerability of China’s exports during the current Sino–US trade war.

This chapter aims to critically analyse the implications that the national protectionist policies have on the global supply and value chains and the relocation of production. The analysis is based on the assumptions that the global economy is facing the possibility of decoupling of many trade connections, and this trend favours de-globalisation processes that have long been promoted by populism, nationalism and economic protectionism. It is concluded that global supply, production and value chains although being economically efficient are no longer any more secure under national protectionist policies, and therefore, the relocation of production processes is mainly due to the increase in the level of income and wages of the developing countries that are the destination and which reduce the advantages to relocate.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a new analytic perspective on the strategic use of trade policy. It argues that a firm level of analysis utilizing the value chain concept provides new insights into business-government relations on trade and protection. The paper identifies three patterns in which product market competition and positioning spill over into the political “market” for protection. It discusses how, when industry conditions permit, both U.S. and foreign firms attempt to use the technical track of import protection in the United States not simply to gain shelter from foreign exporters, but also as an extension of their overall business strategy. The incentive for making strategic use of protection arises when firms adopt different configurations in arranging their operating activities along the larger domestic and international value-added chain of production and distribution. These circumstances make it unlikely that protection will have an equivalent impact on all producers, and seeking protection therefore can be an effective competitive tactic.