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This chapter offers a critique of the affirmative forms of thought that attempt to ground the ontology of social being through subjective-idealist terms. Some recent examples came in the form of notion of truth grounded in subjects' experience and in rationality of language and discourse. The first part of the chapter demonstrates the perilous implications of such an approach for social theory tasked with ontology and for the conception of truth necessary for its task. The second part scrutinizes the paradigm of society that stems from this subjective-idealist notion of truth and social ontology that adopts discourse, language, and literary metaphors to comprehend social being. As an alternative, the final part of the chapter offers a preliminary sketch of the relation of ontology, normativity, and mediation, as well as the notion of critique necessary for social theory tasked with ontology.

The post-truth moment comes at a time of deference for epistemic authority, which has serious implications for democracy. If democracy implies an epistemology, attempting to live a democratic way of life implies a theory about the nature of knowledge among other theoretical aspects (e.g. political and ethical). At the time of ‘fluid modernity’, the post-truth politics of renouncing truth damages the foundations of democracy, for how could we proceed with a democratic way of life without truth as a common denominator for deliberation? While a defining feature of the post-truth era is its intrinsic relativism, Gellner (2013) warns this could lead to ‘cognitive nihilism’. Thus, it is imperative to (i) find our way back to reasonableness (based on both reason and emotions) based on a Freirean dialogic middle ground, instead of renouncing truth (that is any notion of truth), and (ii) critically discuss possibilities for various approaches to truth-seeking. While it is important to question the foundation and reasonableness of truth, two crucial issues arise: which theory of knowledge and whose theory of knowledge should be accepted as the epistemological basis of truth? Moreover, this chapter will argue that a more plausible notion of truth is neither one that is based on intrinsic objectivity nor intrinsic relativism, but one that is based on the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity; that is a relational (nor relative) and dialectic understanding of truth which does not rule out the existence of facts but questions the political constructs of facts. The final section of the chapter focuses on the application of the understanding of truth as a relational dialogical epistemology. While arguing for a dialogical theory of truth, the chapter also problematizes the predominant view of evidence-based research and policy and offers an in-depth discussion of how our understanding of the relational dialogical notion of truth can be utilized in the analysis of cases involving pro-active discrimination and affirmative action.

This paper aims to examine the relationships between meaning and truth as they may contribute to a constitutive definition of information. The thesis is primarily that “information” cannot be defined unless within the context of meaning and truth, and that any theory based on, or related to, information is not possible without the foundational definition.

A review of related literatures and an arrangement of frameworks forms the design of this conceptual proposal.

While other definitions of information have been presented, the present one integrates meaning and truth in ways that others do not. The thoroughgoing semantic examination provides a starting‐point for a much deeper analysis of the integral role that language plays in the formation of any theory related to information. Truth tends not to be spoken of a great deal in information science; the definitional positioning of truth adds to a more complete definition and basis for theory.

This paper proposes a new definitional and theoretical construct for information.

This study aims to recognize the challenge of identifying deceptive information and provides a framework for thinking about how we as humans negotiate the current media environment filled with misinformation and disinformation.

This study reviews the influence of Wilson’s (2016) General Theory of Information Behavior (IB) in the field of information science (IS) before introducing Levine’s Truth-Default Theory (TDT) as a method of deception detection. By aligning Levine’s findings with published scholarship on IB, this study illustrates the fundamental similarities between TDT and existing research in IS.

This study introduces a modification of Wilson’s work which incorporates truth-default, translating terms to apply this theory to the broader area of IB rather than Levine’s original face-to-face deception detection.

False information, particularly online, continues to be an increasing problem for both individuals and society, yet existing IB models cannot not account for the necessary step of determining the truth or falsehood of consumed information. It is critical to integrate this crucial decision point in this study’s IB models (e.g. Wilson’s model) to acknowledge the human tendency to default to truth and thus providing a basis for studying the twin phenomena of misinformation and disinformation from an IS perspective. Moreover, this updated model for IB contributes the Truth Default Framework for studying how people approach the daunting task of determining truth, reliability and validity in the immense number of news items, social media posts and other sources of information they encounter daily. By understanding and recognizing our human default to truth/trust, we can start to understand more about our vulnerability to misinformation and disinformation and be more prepared to guard against it.

Mixed methods research can provide a fruitful line of inquiry for educational leadership, program evaluation, and policy analysis; however, mixed methods research requires a metatheory that allows for mixing what have traditionally been considered incompatible qualitative and quantitative inquiry. The purpose of this paper is to apply Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action as that metatheoretical justification.

After reviewing the traditional quantitative/qualitative divide based on incompatible ontologies, the author argues for a pragmatist stance toward educational leadership inquiry. Such a stance allows for mixing methods because it privileges methodology and epistemology in social inquiry, rather than ontological theories of reality. Using Habermas’s metatheory, the author shows how truth claims are linguistically mediated; how they make reference to objective, subjective, and normative formal worlds; and how they are always fallible and revisable.

The author argues that Habermas’s metatheory allows (and requires) integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches to fully understand social phenomena. Such integration is possible if researchers attempt to make methodological decisions explicit by linking methodology (and thus methodical decisions) to all three formal worlds, and articulating the rationale for doing so. The author also argues that making the entire corpus of claims bound within a line of social inquiry subject to critical examination promotes the validity of inquiry.

This paper contributes to the discussion on mixed methods research by applying a particular strand of pragmatism. This is an advance in the extant literature, which argues for a pragmatist stance on mixed methods research, but has not yet conceptualized a metatheoretical position supporting this stance.

This article explicates the notion of using a “theoretical lens” to interpret research data, which has grown increasingly common in recent decades, often without a second thought about the implications of use of a mere metaphor in the pursuit of truth. Poets may not question that metaphors reveal truths, but should social scientists accept that?

It looks first at what theory means, then – and in greater detail – what the metaphor of a lens entails.

Drawing on the base analogy in optics, it identifies four mechanisms through which theory might act as a lens – adjustment, correction, distortion and augmentation-suppression, with examples based on theories of business strategy and organisation studies.

These four mechanisms involve two different ways of seeing – better and differently. With adjustment and correction see better what is, or perhaps what was. With distortion and especially augmentation-suppression, we see differently, which helps us imagine what might be, or what we might have overlooked. They help us escape narrow silos of thinking. Researchers and students alike need to be aware of all four lenses of theory and be ready to experiment.

It argues that if some theories try to help us see better, others push us to see differently, with implications for the practice and teaching of research methods.

The current exploration and inclusion of spirituality across disciplines has, up to this point, focused largely on defining spirituality and creating practice and assessment tools. Little has been done in building the foundational structures at the level of paradigm, theory, methods, measures and research methodology. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This paper presents a section of findings resulting from a comprehensive qualitative research program using the process of meta-triangulation, which explored spiritual perspectives from paradigm to practice.

The results of this research begin to address gaps at these levels through the articulation of spiritual ways of knowing and the methods and measures that stem from them. Once articulated, it was possible to explore the parallels and differences between spiritual and physical ways of knowing, their methods and measures.

It is acknowledged that such research may be resisted by some factions as they attempt to maintain positions of power and privilege. Thus, this paper presents the research within this contested and turbulent landscape.

The study of the diffusion of innovations into libraries has become a cottage industry of sorts, as libraries have always provided a fascinating test-bed of nonprofit institutions attempting improvement through the use of new policies, practices, and assorted apparatus (Malinconico, 1997). For example, Paul Sturges (1996) has focused on the evolution of public library services over the course of 70 years across England, while Verna Pungitore (1995) presented the development of standardization of library planning policies in contemporary America. For the past several decades, however, the study of diffusion in libraries has tended to focus on the implementation of information technologies (e.g., Clayton, 1997; Tran, 2005; White, 2001) and their associated competencies (e.g., Marshall, 1990; Wildemuth, 1992), the improvements in performance associated with their use (e.g., Damanpour, 1985, 1988; Damanpour & Evan, 1984), and ways to manage resistance to technological changes within the library environment (e.g., Weiner, 2003).

Organizational researchers live in two worlds. The first demands and rewards speculations about how to improve performance. The second demands and rewards adherence to rigorous standards of scholarship (March & Sutton, 1997, p. 698).Those of us who study organizations and are professors of management work on the front lines, so to speak, where the beliefs we have about how to improve managerial performance get passed directly on to practitioners. The question is, What right do we have to put our beliefs in a privileged position? Beliefs, by definition, are supposed to be true. According to Webster’s (1996) a belief is a conviction about the truth of some statement and/or reality of some phenomenon, especially when based on examination of evidence. Are all of our lectures based on consensually agreed upon evidentiary standards? What are these standards and who should maintain them?