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This chapter restores the concepts of freedom, consciousness, and choice to our understanding of “economic laws,” so we may discuss how to respond to economic crisis. These are absent from orthodox economics that presents “globalization” or “the markets” as the outcome of unstoppable forces outside human control.

They were integral to the emancipatory political economy of Karl Marx but have been lost to Marxism, which appears as the inspiration for mechanical, fatalistic determinism. This confusion arises from Marxism's absorption of the idea, originating in French positivism, that social laws are automatic and inevitable.

The chapter contests the organizing principle of this view: that economic laws are predictive, telling us what must happen. Marx's laws are relational, not predictive, laying bare the connection between two apparently distinct forms of appearance of the same thing, such as labor and price. Such laws open the door to democracy and choice, but do not unambiguously predict the future because what happens depends on our actions.

The commodity form conceals these laws, disguising the true social and class relations of society. Accumulation, however, undermines the circumstances that permit the commodity to play this role. The result is crisis, defined in this chapter as the point when the blind laws of the commodity form are suspended and open political forces come into play.

In past crises, capitalism has restored the rate of profit through such destructive interventions as imperialism, war, and fascism. Economic laws, properly defined, offer society the real choice of alternative outcomes from crisis.

The law of value performs its regulatory function in the capitalist system where the private ownership of means of production and commodity production prevail. Under the centrally directed system of socialism, the economic process must be determined by plans and valuations of the central authority to maintain the consistency of the system′s internal co‐ordinating mechanism. In theory, the process of building socialism is a process of the withering away of the operation of the law of value. Recognition of the law of value as a permanent feature of the socialist economic system means conceding either a lack of understanding of the fundamental differences between capitalism and socialism, or the failure of the Marxist‐Leninist dogma. It also acknowledges that the Soviet system of socialism was exposed to increasing contamination by elements incompatible with socialism and was gradually transformed into its opposite – a form of centrally regulated exchange economy where a new ruling class, grown from the Party, was (and temporarily still is) in control of public ownership of means of production, as well as of all markets. The evolution of Soviet socialism from the October Revolution to its disintegration can be characterized by its passage through distinct “official” attitudes towards the role of the law of value. Its denial under the totally centralized economy of War Communism was followed by its temporary reintroduction under the New Economic Policy, then the recognition of its restricted functioning during the transitory phase from socialism to communism, then its recognition as a permanent feature of socialism, and finally its abandonment together with the rest of the Marxist‐Leninist dogma following both the doctrinal and economic crises in the 1990s.

While the concept of legal culture has been receiving a growing attention from scholars, this research often overemphasizes the similarity of the opinions held by different segments of population. Furthermore, the relationship of migration and the change of legal-cultural attitudes has not received particular attention. Drawing on 70 in-depth interviews with the immigrants of the early 1990s from the former Soviet Union to Israel and the secular Israeli Jews, this chapter provides a comprehensive account of the various aspects of legal culture of these groups. The second important finding is the persistence of the legal-cultural attitudes and perceptions over time.

Henryk Grossman was the first person to systematically explore Marx’s explanation of capitalist crises in terms of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall and to place it in the context of the distinction between use and exchange value. His “The Law of Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist System” remains an important reference point in the Marxist literature on economic crises. That literature has been plagued by distortions of Grossman’s position which derive from early hostile reviews of his book. These accused Grossman of a mechanical approach to the end of capitalism and of neglecting factors which boost profit rates. Grossman, in fact, contributed a complementary economic element to the recovery of Marxism undertaken by Lenin (particularly in the area of Marxist politics) and Lukács (in philosophy). In both published and unpublished work, Grossman also dealt with and even anticipated criticisms of his methodology and treatment of countertendencies to the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Far from being mechanical, his economic analysis can still assist the struggle for working class self-emancipation.

This study aims to analyze the interplay between male and female board members’ beliefs about women’s competence to fill board positions (valence), the perceived benefits of a greater gender-balanced boardroom (value) and the significance attributed to the gender quota law as a relevant instrument in eliciting change in board composition.

Looking through the lens of expectancy-value theory, the authors investigate whether the perceived benefits of a gender quota law mediate the path between the beliefs about women’s competence to become board members and the perceived benefits of a greater gender-balanced representation in the boardroom. In addition, the authors investigate whether female and male board members share the same beliefs about a gender-balanced representation.

The results show that there are differences in beliefs about women’s competencies to become board members and the perceived benefits of a greater gender-balanced boardroom. Female board members hold stronger beliefs on the competence of women to fill board positions and, thus, assign greater importance to the gender quota law, which, in turn, impacts the greater significance attributed to equal representation of women in the boardroom.

The findings shed new light on the debate concerning gender quotas aimed at promoting gender-balanced boardrooms by pointing out that differences in value expectations between male and female board members may prevent intraboard gender-equal dynamics.

The study contributes to the literature by adding new insights on how male and female board members perceive the value of legally bound gender quotas, in association with their beliefs about women’s competence to fill board positions (valence) and their expectations in terms of the beneficial outcomes of a more gender-balanced board composition.

This chapter offers the first full translation from Russian to English of the Balance of the National Economy of the USSR, 1924–26’s first chapter. Involving 12 authors and composed of 21 chapters, the Balance is a collective work published in June 1926 in Moscow by the Soviet Central Statistical Administration under the scientific supervision of its former director, Pavel Illich Popov (1872–1950). In this first chapter, titled ‘Studying the Balance of the National Economy: An Introduction’, Popov set the theoretical foundations of what might be considered as the first modern national accounting system and paved the way to multisector macroeconometric modelling.

Modern scholars of the history of economic thought recognise that John Bates Clark’s earlier works bear far less formal abstraction and, instead, fervently appeal for economic reforms that are inspired by Protestant ethics and German Historicism. After the violent Haymarket incident in Chicago in 1886, Clark is assumed to have entirely dismissed his preoccupation with social reforms and ethics. We provide a counterpoint to this common understanding by finding out that Clark’s originally ethical impetus persists throughout his writings beyond Haymarket. The striking parallelism of his earlier ideas on moral progress and the role of Protestant ethics herein and his later model of natural evolution and entrepreneurial change allow us to characterise Clark’s economics as persistently reformative in character. Further, his application of marginalism must not be understood as purely deductive analysis. Instead, it shows the ideal of an economy that performs analogously to a coherent organism. Clark’s theory of value and distribution is found to build substantially on his reformative claim that the American economy should be founded on a principle of equal and voluntary exchange. This republican idea of the economy is integrated into an ontological reflection of the very preconditions of social wealth.

When Stalin, in 1936, declared socialism achieved in the Soviet Union, he opened the door for the codification of the political economy of socialism beyond Marx’s political economy of capitalism. Indeed, at the same time as he executed the tyrannical policies he is known for, he led a series of private conversations with economists about a textbook on the political economy of socialism that spanned nearly 20 years. In these conversations, Stalin repeatedly argued for an open debate and against dogmatism. Most notably, he accepted the existence of the so-called law of value in socialism, which appears to subject the state to scientific authority. Reconstructing these conversations, we show that his claim to a pluralist scientific debate helped paper over his tyranny, first by diverting attention from the real issues, second by establishing his personal authority as an intellectual, and third by creating conflicts that would exclude his opponents.

This paper surveys the intellectual trajectory of the Polish political economist Włodzimierz Brus, who took up the arguments for use of the ‘price mechanism’ in socialism from the pre-War work of Oskar Lange. Brus advanced the idea that a ‘Law of Value’ applied under socialism, which would allow prices and appropriate material incentives to bring the socialist economy into equilibrium. Kalecki, however, opposed the use of cost-minimising incentives, and Brus never fully resolved the problem of how investment is to be guided in a decentralised way. A lively discussion of ‘market socialism’ did not survive the 1960s. In exile from 1972, Brus participated in China's post-Mao discussions on economic reform. But his interest in prices and markets under socialism ceased effectively with the fall of Communism at the end of the 1980s.