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The aim of this chapter is to compare the content of two essays: Oskar Lange's 1931 ‘Crisis of Socialism’ and Tadeusz Kowalik's 1996 ‘August – the Bourgeois Revolution of the Epigones’ in order to try to determine the extent to which Lange's paper influenced Kowalik's ideas. We find that Lange's article was possibly Kowalik's only source of theoretical knowledge about bourgeois revolutions and their course when he wrote his 1996 piece. What probably struck Kowalik most in ‘Crisis of Socialism’ in the context of Polish transformations was the similarity (real or apparent) between the situation in Poland in 1905–1918 and that in 1980–1989 (or even 1980–1992), that is, the possibility of constructing a ‘bourgeois class state’ only through a workers revolution immediately preceding such a construction. On the basis of this analogy, in ‘August…’ Kowalik, as we argue, introduced a novelty into his reflections: he fortified his earlier, more lax analyses with the concept of ‘bourgeois revolution.’

Industrial feudalism is a socioeconomic formation that the Polish Marxists Ludwik Krzywicki and Oskar Lange associated with monopoly finance capital. Industrial feudalism arises in a socially static capitalism where mobility between hierarchically defined social strata is restricted. Krzywicki's account predates Hilferding's Finance Capital and outlines the functioning of the capital market-based finance capital that has become more common in capitalism. Seemingly unaware of Krzywicki's pioneering articles, Oskar Lange then presented his own account of monopoly finance capital in the United States with similar social consequences in the early 1940s with state support for monopolies. Krzywicki's work on monopoly finance capital was discovered in the 1950s by Tadeusz Kowalik.

Lange's rejection of bureaucratic socialism can be traced throughout his works, from the very beginning to the end. Planners and economic agents have to act under mandatory rules provided by economic theory to avoid the risk of an autocratic regime detached from the people's needs. Drawing upon this premise, Walrasian theory played a pivotal role to introduce rules to tie the hands of socialist bureaucrats based on scientific, economic theory. In this sense, Lange's anti-bureaucratism and Walrasianism descended from a similar political premise. However, the coexistence of conflicting views into the same theory (such as Marxian and Walrasian theories) also implied potential risks, mainly when socialist democracy is conceived in technocratic terms and Marxian theory assimilates to natural sciences.

This paper surveys the intellectual trajectory of the Polish political economist Włodzimierz Brus, who took up the arguments for use of the ‘price mechanism’ in socialism from the pre-War work of Oskar Lange. Brus advanced the idea that a ‘Law of Value’ applied under socialism, which would allow prices and appropriate material incentives to bring the socialist economy into equilibrium. Kalecki, however, opposed the use of cost-minimising incentives, and Brus never fully resolved the problem of how investment is to be guided in a decentralised way. A lively discussion of ‘market socialism’ did not survive the 1960s. In exile from 1972, Brus participated in China's post-Mao discussions on economic reform. But his interest in prices and markets under socialism ceased effectively with the fall of Communism at the end of the 1980s.

Industrial feudalism is a socio-economic formation of advanced capitalist countries in which society becomes stratified into closed, hierarchically-defined social groups. In the writings of Ludwik Krzywicki and Oskar Lange, industrial feudalism is associated with the dominance of monopoly finance capital. The chapter extends this analysis of twenty-first century capitalism in which social groups are differentiated by the kind of property that they own and hence the kind of credit to which they have access to prevent becoming déclassé. However asset inflation then inhibits upward social mobility, confining households to their inherited social class. This inhibits labour mobility. But the availability of credit for the propertied classes also defines attitudes towards state welfare provision.

Attempts to specify and to explicate some of the most important reasons for the failure of communism or state socialism. Analyses the general case of Eastern Europe, then applies the analysis to the specific case of Hungary. Second, deduces a model of market socialism from the theories of Fred M. Taylor and Oskar Lange. Argues that the Taylor‐Lange model of market socialism certainly could be and probably would be a completely valid and viable economic system. Proposes, moreover, that this system of market socialism may prove a better alternative economic system than capitalism for the Eastern European nations that have abandoned communism.

Analyses the economics of socialism within the Marxian tradition. The ideas of Marx and Engels are included, as are those of the theorists of the Second International. The debate on market socialism associated with Oskar Lange also receives attention. The evolution of Mises′s and Hayek′s responses is traced, and there is an outline of how economists in Eastern Europe have come to similar conclusions to these Austrians. Concludes with an assessment of the economics of socialism in the work of contemporary theorists.

For almost half a decade, after World War II, capitalism and socialism coexisted on the European continent. Some believed that these systems would converge, with state intervention stabilising capitalism in the west and socialism became more democratic in the east. Michał Kalecki, in his last published article, co-written with Tadeusz Kowalik, wrote about how governments had implemented a crucial reform in the developed capitalist economies. State investment had filled the demand gap, which could potentially result in the long-term mitigation of capitalism's slumps and crises. Tadeusz Kowalik later extended this notion of the crucial reform, to the troubled socialist systems in Eastern Europe during the 1980s. He argued that previous economic reforms had failed in the socialist countries as they had not been accompanied by sufficient democratic political reforms, which needed to be extended in order to fully revitalise the socialist economies. Ultimately the proposals for a crucial reform of capitalism and socialism were not realised and these systems did not converge economically or politically. This chapter examines the theses of Kalecki and Kowalik within the historical and intellectual tradition of Polish socialist and Marxist thought.

The Nationalökonomische Gesellschaft (Austrian Economic Association, NOeG) provides a prominent example of the Viennese economic circles and associations that more than academic economics dominated scientific discourse in the interwar years. For the first time this chapter gives a thorough account of its history, from its foundation in 1918 until the demise of its long-time president, Hans Mayer, 1955, based on official documents and archival material. The topics treated include its predecessor and rival, the Gesellschaft österreichischer Volkswirte, its foundation in 1918 soon to be followed by years of inactivity, the relaunch by Mayer and Mises, the survival under the NS-regime and the expulsion of its Jewish members and the slow restoration after 1945. In particular, an attempt is made to provide a list of the papers presented to the NOeG, as complete as possible, for the period 1918–1938.