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Demonstrates the implications of imperfect substitutability between domestic and imported final goods for the determination of second‐best nominal and effective tariffs in a general equilibrium setting. The analysis of second‐best interventions for given policy distortions extends that by Ruffin and Casas on homogeneous goods to the case where there is product heterogeneity. The second‐best optimal effective rate of protection for given policy distortions is shown to depend upon the nature of the policy distortion and the degree of substitutability between imported and domestic varieties. Although imperfect substitution reduces the extent to which effective protection can be determined from the structure of protection, it increases the extent to which second best tariffs can be determined in a qualitative sense at least when compared with the traditional, perfect substitution case.

Regional comprehensive economic partnership (RCEP) is understood as the world's largest trading bloc given its contribution to the world output (30%). The mega trade bloc brings together 15 countries of East Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers in goods and services trade. The study suggests the importance of sector specific reforms for Malaysia to strengthen domestic capability.

The analytical framework constructs upon the partial equilibrium analysis and uses WITS SMART simulations.

The study finds that Malaysia's elimination of tariffs under the RCEP will cause a surge in imports from developed member countries of RCEP like Australia, South Korea and Japan. The study also finds a trade diversion in countries such as India. The empirical results establishes that RCEP would further strengthen intra-ASEAN trade.

The study explores select sectors of the manufacturing industry in Malaysia.

The implementation of RCEP would impact the manufacturing sector immensely, especially in sectors like electrical machinery and equipment and inorganic chemicals, which are two of the major trading commodities of the Malaysian economy.

Any trade agreement has a larger impact on the society. It may raise income, boost the consumer preferences and create or erode consumer welfare. The study reports the consumer welfare effect of the implementation of RCEP in Malaysia.

The study is the first attempt to do a partial equilibrium analysis for the electrical machinery and equipment sector and inorganic chemicals sector of Malaysia using both aggregated and disaggregated data at HS two-digit and HS six-digit level.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the interdependencies between trade and environment policies, as they get jointly determined in a political‐economy model of a small open economy. In theoretical literature, government is usually modeled as benevolent. In real economies, however, it is not a pure social welfare maximizer. Lobbies have stakes in the specific policies, and they negotiate with/bribe the government over the latter's policy stance. The influence of industry lobbying on both trade and the environment policies at the political equilibrium is the focus of the paper.

Concepts from non‐cooperative game theory are used to incorporate a Nash‐bargaining game between the industry lobby and government. Government is not benevolent. Campaign contributions help win elections and provide incentive to distort policies to attract lobby contributions. Several situations are modeled. Given a politically set environment policy, tariffs may be zero in view of the free trade agreements. Or, a sequential game is modeled where environment policy is set to maximize social welfare, given a politically determined trade policy. Alternatively, in the full political equilibrium, government and lobby bargain simultaneously over tariff and the environmental tax.

Lobbying implies that government may trade‐off one policy for another. When only environment policy is politically manipulable by the lobby, pollution tax is lower than the Pigouvian tax. If, instead, the lobby can influence trade policy only, government provides protection to domestic import‐competing sector. In a sequential game, the trade policy outcome does not change, but pollution tax is always higher than the Pigouvian level, even with the environmental lobby absent. With both the policies political, the government “concedes” and offers positive tariff protection, but, not on environment policy; that is, imposes a pollution tax higher than the Pigouvian level.

The paper provides useful insights into how, under the influence of special‐interest politics, and bargaining between the government and lobbies, the trade and environment policies interact with each other. In comparison with the existing literature on this issue, it derives several stronger and (apparently) counter‐intuitive conclusions.

The purpose of the paper is to investigate the quantitative effect of import liberalization on tariff revenue in Ghana.

In an attempt to achieve the objective of the paper, a robust decomposition analytical approach was used to examine how different components of the sources of change in import tax contribute to changes in import tax revenue in Ghana.

The paper concludes that Ghana suffered some revenue loss from the liberalization by reducing the level of average official duty rates, but gained in revenue as a result of real currency depreciation.

It has been suggested that public policy should aim at determining and targeting the optimum level of the average official import duty rates, focus on the identification of the major sources of duty revenue leakage, and substitute sales taxes for tariffs to improve tax revenue sufficiently.

This paper makes explicit the contribution of alternative import policy features to changes in import tax revenue in Ghana.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate and contrast the welfare effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) on member and non‐member countries when tariffs of both members and non‐members are endogenously determined. It also aims to provide sufficient conditions under which both types of preferential trade agreement (PTA) are likely to lower tariffs on non‐members relative to that under most favored nation (MFN).

The paper employs a three country Cournot oligopoly model of trade with segmented markets.

It is shown that under symmetry CU members enjoy higher welfare relative to that under an FTA or MFN. Furthermore, the non‐member country gains from the formation of a PTA so long as the PTA's external tariff falls below a certain threshold. However, for FTA members to necessarily gain, their external tariff needs to be greater than this threshold but smaller than twice their MFN tariffs. Outside this tariff range, welfare effects of FTAs are ambiguous in the absence of further assumptions. The paper also isolates sufficient conditions under which a PTA member is less likely to impose a positive tariff on the non‐member relative to that under MFN.

Unlike existing literature, we do no assume demand linearity to obtain our main welfare results and use this assumption only for illustrative purposes. Another contribution of the paper is to provide sufficient conditions under which a PTA member is less likely to impose a positive tariff on the non‐member relative to that under MFN.

Provides marketers with both a broad‐based and an industry‐specific understanding of the marketing implications of GATT. First presents background information regarding GATT, followed by an overview of the key provisions of the agreement. Provides an analysis of a number of consumer product industries to help assess the potential industry‐specific impact of GATT on the “offensive” and “defensive” marketing strategies which are described in the study.

International roaming (IR) makes it possible to conveniently use mobile communication services (MCS) such as MI access abroad without switching providers, devices or subscriber identity module (SIM) cards. To increase the intensity of competition in the intra-European Union market for IR services, customers will be enabled to buy IR voice and MI access services separately from their existing domestic MCS, as of July, 2014. Specifically, for separated international MI services providers can choose from three different charge types (use-dependent, flat and combination of flat and use-dependent). The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine customer preferences regarding these tariff types for separated international MI services.

Six research questions concerning antecedents of tariff type preferences for separated international MI access services are derived from a literature review. They are empirically addressed by analyzing survey responses obtained for a sample of 496 German-speaking MCS users.

Customers who actively seek for IR price information, consider IR services to be useful, exhibit high use intensities of MI services, do not restrict their MI usage when travelling abroad and tend to prefer flat rates to other pricing schemes. In contrast to these rather “active users”, customers favoring strictly use-dependent tariff plans exhibit significantly lower IR price information seeking efforts and comparatively low use intensities of MI services. Pricing schemes with MI allowances are especially liked by customers who are well-informed regarding and satisfied with IR prices, report above average use intensities of MI services, restrict their MI use abroad, are more likely to switch providers and use MCS mainly for job-related purposes.

The study is based on a German-speaking sample, which deviates from the German adult population. Additionally, the analysis is limited to stated instead of behaviorally revealed preferences for cross-border MI tariff types. Price thresholds influencing whether a cross-border MI tariff is entered into a consumer’s relevant set of offerings are not examined.

The research suggests that mobile network operators are well-advised to offer a clearly structured menu of a limited number of tariffs directed to the three profiled customer segments. Notwithstanding the advantages of such a set of rate plans, international MI tariff schemes with a data volume allowance appear to be generally beneficial both from a provider and an end-customer perspective.

To date, little is known about customer preferences concerning the three rate plan categories and on antecedents of such preferences in the field of MI access abroad. The present study takes a first step to narrowing this knowledge gap.

The purpose of this paper is to devise a simple but practical model to assist decision makers in evaluating the tariff stability of concession schemes.

To develop such a model necessitates the identification of parameters that could contribute to an increase or decline in investment return. With that a Monte‐Carlo‐based simulation model is devised to determine the probability that the tariff regime remains unchanged even when the identified risks do occur at the operational stage. Sensitivity analysis is performed to identify the most influential factors to investment return and tariff stability.

The results of the scenario indicate that the internal rate of return could be profoundly influenced by the risk factors which reaffirm the needs for a more comprehensive model for tariff stability evaluation.

Through the simulation model, a tariff stability indicator is derived and when integrated with the results of sensitivity analysis this could generate a weighted indicator for alternative tariff regimes for use in decision support systems.

With the aid of simulation techniques, decision makers can predict the impact of a range of possible market conditions and/or levels of demand on the investment return and hence the stability of the tariff regime.

The model could be extended to other types of public‐private partnerships schemes upon suitable adjustment

This article examines the impact of the US Offshore Assembly Provisions (OAP) on the effective tariff rates of the United States. The effects of OAP are incorporated theoretically into the effective rate calculation and the resulting algorithm is then applied to the 245 affected categories in 1974. The results indicate that, with the presence of OAP, ordinary effective rate calculations overstate the protection afforded to value added in US industries. Although the OAP effect was small, greater usage of the available concessions by importers could alter considerably the level and relative industry impact of the US tariff.

Many firms are now undertaking their final analysis of the effects on their businesses of Britain's entry into the E.E.C. New opportunities in Europe and new threats at home are being anticipated and planned for. One obvious fact that is being focussed upon by many is the phased elimination over the next five years of tariff barriers between Britain and the six present member countries. This leads firms to examine their pricing policies for Europe, if they are already operating there, and ponder such questions as whether the tariff saving is to be passed on to the consumer in the form of a price reduction, or retained by the firm. Alternatively, if firms are not already operating in Europe then the tariff reductions are seen as an opportunity for them to consider marketing there. We attempt here to explore the effects of Britain's entry on the overall marketing strategies of British firms in Europe and to put the tariff reduction question into its broad commercial perspective.