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This chapter uses data from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure project database, and hand-collected evidence on project performance, to examine how PPPs are applied to infrastructure development in Africa, and how well they have delivered expected benefits. It has two analytical parts: an investment trend analysis and a meta-analysis of project performance and explanatory factors. The analysis shows growth both in number and volume of PPP investments that is weaker than that observed in other developing regions, and more volatile. The performance of PPP contracts appears to be improving over time with an overall cancelation rate of 7% over the assessment period. Although PPPs have contributed to increasing infrastructure stock, they have not completely met their potential, especially with respect to increasing infrastructure access rates. The main determinants of performance include accuracy of costing and allocation of risks, consistency of macro policies with the objectives and functioning of PPPs, coherence of sector policies and plans and local capacity. Contract cancellations are mainly explained by the misalignment of outcomes with government objectives, in particular, access and investment objectives. These findings suggest that PPP application should be well planned to ensure coherence of a wide range of policies, readiness of institutions and capacity of public sector actors. This chapter contributes to closing information gaps on a relatively novel policy instrument, and provides useful evidence to support prudent policy making at the time of considerable growth in PPP application.

This paper describes the experiences and the contentious issues on eight existing PPAs in Nepal with varying type of investment, the key areas where IPPs are treated fairly and the areas where IPPs are discriminated against by the clauses are highlighted. Power Purchase Agreements on IPPs in Nepal are of three types: with foreign investment, local investment and investment in JV with the Utility. A critical issue in designing power purchase agreements is to create a level playing field for the players to secure successful and sustainable IPPs and PPAs. To create this environment, discriminatory clauses or unequal treatment to IPPs in the key issues of the PPAs should be avoided; the key issues being power purchase guarantees, force majeure guarantees, financial and foreign exchange guarantees, operation guarantees, and guarantees concerning insurance and dispute resolution. The analysis shows that discriminatory clauses and unequal treatment are present in the key issues of the agreements.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects that the framing of contractual performance incentives have on supplier’s behavioural and relational responses and on the buyer–supplier relationship.

The authors conducted three in-depth case studies of contractual relationships, which exhibit differences in terms of how performance incentives are framed, i.e., using promotion, prevention and “hybrid” frames, respectively. The study involved 38 semi-structured interviews and content analysis of contract agreements.

First, while promotion-framed incentives lead to positive supplier responses and improved relationships, prevention-framed incentives result in negative responses and deteriorating relations. Second, hybrid-framed incentives can lead to productive supplier responses when positive ex ante expectations are met, although the creation of such positive expectations in the first place depends on the proportionality of bonus and penalty elements. Third, promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives do not by default lead to positive effects, as these are contingent on factors pertaining to contractual clarity. Fourth, the overarching purpose of the contract moderates the effects of contract framing on supplier responses.

The study contributes to contracting research by showing how the framing of performance incentives influences supplier behavioural and relational responses. It also extends the existing literature on contract framing by examining the effects of hybrid-framed incentives, and stressing that contract framing should be considered in joint with the clarity and overall purpose of the contract to elicit desired supplier behaviours.

Managers of buying firms may differentiate their approach to contract framing depending on the type of supplier relationship in focus. Furthermore, effective design of promotion- and hybrid-framed incentives requires attention to: realistic performance targets (on the short, medium and long term); salient bonuses related to these targets; incentive structures that appropriately balance rewards and risks; and: mechanisms that explicate and consider uncontrollable factors in the calculation of bonus–malus payments.

The paper extends the literature stressing the psychological impact of contracts on buyer–supplier relationships by highlighting that contractual clarity and the overarching purpose of the contract moderate the effects of contract framing on supplier behavioural and relational responses.

Transaction cost economics (TCE) has received extensive attention from a variety of disciplines, but it holds a particularly central place in strategic management. The focal issues examined by TCE, vertical integration and interfirm governance (including contract design), are important determinants of firm performance – the central issue in the field of strategy. While several extensive reviews of empirical work in TCE have been undertaken, one key issue has received relatively little attention – construct validity in TCE empirical research. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of the challenges of operationalizing key transaction cost predictions and provide some ideas for better measuring core constructs such as asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency.

The goal of interfirm contract research is to examine how formal contracts impact transaction success, firm relationships, and ultimately individual and collaborative firm performance when two or more firms interact. Most contract literature uses an economic lens to examine contracts: the property rights perspective, agency theory, and TCE. Property rights-based contract research (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Cheung, 1969) examines how efficient property rights assignment mitigates ex ante hazards. Similarly, agency theory-based contract research (e.g., Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 1979) investigates how incentive alignment between the principal and agent leads to the mitigation of ex ante hazards. In contrast, TCE-based research (Williamson, 1975, 1985) examines contractual safeguards to mitigate both ex ante and ex post hazards (e.g., Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1990; Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). Because the three economic perspectives dominate, most research addresses how contracts are used to mitigate ex ante or ex post hazards. Therefore, many topics still need to be investigated to enhance our understanding of interfirm contracting.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the continuing justification for linking the prices of European gas to those oil products.

The paper uses an analytic‐deductive approach supported by relevant analysis of data over a period of two decades.

Statistical analysis of the end‐uses of gas and oil products over the past two decades reveal that, with few exceptions, use of oil is increasing confined to transportation while gas is a utility fuel used to generate heat and power. The ability of end‐users to substitute oil products for gas – the principal justification for price linkage – has substantially diminished over the past two decades, and this trend is continuing. The implication of these findings is that nearly 20 percent of Europe's energy supplies are priced inappropriately with reference to a fuel which has little relevance to the supply/demand dynamics of natural gas. At levels of oil prices seen since 2003, this has significantly negative consequences for consumers. An important qualification to these findings is that in markets where prices have been set by gas to gas competition for many years – the UK and North America – a long‐term “natural correlation” between gas and oil prices has been observed.

The paper raises the important question facing European gas stakeholders and asks whether to remain with oil‐linked prices or move to spot market prices created at hubs in North West Europe.

Vertical integration is often one of the first diversification strategies that firms consider. To choose the right strategy, companies must assess the four different types of possible integration and weigh the merits of each.

There is a tension between the literatures on incomplete contracting and transactions cost economics regarding the importance of ex post governance and the extent to which formal theories of incomplete contracting capture salient aspects of exchange relations. In this paper, we empirically examine how firms structure joint R&D agreements to illuminate how contracts can be incomplete and how governance can matter. We employ a dataset of 96 contracts to construct a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms firms use in organizing collaborative R&D, and indicate how groups of mechanisms line up with various types of contracting hazards. The results suggest that the allocation of property rights over innovations at the time of contracting between R&D partners is an important aspect of contract design. But they also suggest that weak property rights admit scope for other dimensions of contract. In particular, the research indicates that while knowledge spillovers may give rise to appropriability hazards, efforts to contain or channel knowledge spillovers may enable joint venture members to strategically block other members’ follow-on commercialization or research. Firms design joint R&D governance mechanisms to balance spillover hazards and strategic blocking.

Outsourcing is gaining considerable popularity in the field of business services and management. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the practice of outsourcing human resource management (HRM) functions, such as training, staffing, rewards and restructuring, in Greece.

The analysis draws upon both primary and secondary data. The findings of the 1999 CRANET survey and a study on the companies that offer HRM services in Greece are used to set the frame of analysis. A series of in‐depth interviews with HR managers and senior HRM consultants are used to support the quantitative data.

The analysis suggests that the Greek market of HRM services is still at an initial stage of development, with limited credibility, while the customers lack the experience of managing outsourcing relations and are reluctant to establish a partnership‐ type HRM outsourcing agreement. Considerable differences are identified between the Greek market for HRM services and those of more developed markets.

The description of the Greek market of HRM services can be useful to vendors and users of HRM services, as well as researchers dealing with outsourcing in small markets.