The future of interfirm contract research: Opportunities based on prior research and nontraditional tools
Economic Institutions of Strategy
ISBN: 978-1-84855-486-3, eISBN: 978-1-84855-487-0
Publication date: 22 September 2009
Abstract
The goal of interfirm contract research is to examine how formal contracts impact transaction success, firm relationships, and ultimately individual and collaborative firm performance when two or more firms interact. Most contract literature uses an economic lens to examine contracts: the property rights perspective, agency theory, and TCE. Property rights-based contract research (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Cheung, 1969) examines how efficient property rights assignment mitigates ex ante hazards. Similarly, agency theory-based contract research (e.g., Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 1979) investigates how incentive alignment between the principal and agent leads to the mitigation of ex ante hazards. In contrast, TCE-based research (Williamson, 1975, 1985) examines contractual safeguards to mitigate both ex ante and ex post hazards (e.g., Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1990; Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). Because the three economic perspectives dominate, most research addresses how contracts are used to mitigate ex ante or ex post hazards. Therefore, many topics still need to be investigated to enhance our understanding of interfirm contracting.
Citation
Weber, L., Mayer, K.J. and Wu, R. (2009), "The future of interfirm contract research: Opportunities based on prior research and nontraditional tools", Nickerson, J.A. and Silverman, B.S. (Ed.) Economic Institutions of Strategy (Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 26), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 123-145. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0742-3322(2009)0000026007
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2009, Emerald Group Publishing Limited