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This paper attempts to reconcile two opposing views of the strategies and conduct of closely held firms: that of entrepreneurship and that of family business. The former view suggests that these firms tend to be value maximizing organizations that pursue growth strategies and outperform. The latter often argues that these businesses are utility maximizers that pursue conservative harvest strategies and fail to outperform.

In order to reconcile the controversy, this paper examines the literature in an attempt to relate ownership priorities and risk taking preferences to governance distinctions relating to family involvement, ownership, and management.

It concludes that the value‐maximization expectations of the entrepreneurship literature apply only to lone or unrelated founder businesses whose owners, unencumbered by family distractions, embrace growth and outperform. By contrast the utility‐maximization expectations of the family business literature apply when there are multiple family owners or executives. These parties are argued to be harvest‐oriented, mediocre performers, especially after a new generation has entered the firm. This may be because their priorities and loyalties are shared between business and family considerations. However, family and lone founder firm outcomes are argued to be further shaped by owners' levels of control and ownership, their managerial roles, and the breadth of family personal and generational involvement.

The analysis has implications for the effective governance, board composition, and management of these different types of firms.

The paper reconciles two important literatures to derive implications for strategy and performance that must be addressed by agents of corporate governance in family and founder firms.

Analyses the factors influencing South Asian entrepreneurial expansion in Great Britain and the validity of conventional wisdom which attributes its success to cultural factors. It suggests that entrepreneurial growth depends positively on educational attainment, personal savings invested at start‐up, hard work in the initial stages, and the delegation of responsibilities to non‐family members. Further analysis indicates that later entrants into business gained relevant prior work experience and focused on serving non‐Asian customers, which may have contributed towards their success. The pursuit of constant product and technological improvement and employee training have also influenced growth. There is strong evidence that entrepreneurs with larger‐sized businesses have developed international linkages and focused on one key business area.

Looks at the 2000 Employment Research Unit Annual Conference held at the University of Cardiff in Wales on 6/7 September 2000. Spotlights the 76 or so presentations within and shows that these are in many, differing, areas across management research from: retail finance; precarious jobs and decisions; methodological lessons from feminism; call centre experience and disability discrimination. These and all points east and west are covered and laid out in a simple, abstract style, including, where applicable, references, endnotes and bibliography in an easy‐to‐follow manner. Summarizes each paper and also gives conclusions where needed, in a comfortable modern format.

As widely known and well established, strategic decision-making at family firms is an interface between business interests and family considerations. The purpose of this paper is to understand the underlying basis of decision-making in setting corporate strategy and designing chief executive officer (CEO) compensation at founder- vis-à-vis descendant-led family firms in the Indian pharmaceutical sector.

A sample of 106 BSE-listed pharmaceutical companies have been studied over the period 2012–2017 resulting in a total of 636 firm-year observations. Impact of family involvement in business (FIB) on corporate strategy and CEO compensation has been analysed by constructing multivariate panel data regression models. To deal with the problem of endogeneity, Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel data estimation procedure has moreover been conducted.

Supporting stewardship theory, founder-owned and governed firms have been found to favour “growth” strategy and distribute “conservative” executive pay, thereby exerting a positive moderating impact on the strategy-compensation linkage. On the contrary, descendants/second-generation entrepreneurs have put forth a “conservative” stance for growth and innovation, and have rather been observed to favour a “liberal” compensation policy, thereby showcasing the application of behavioural agency theory.

The research is a novel attempt to unravel the interaction between corporate strategy and CEO compensation in a family firm backdrop carried out in the context of an emerging economy. The study, moreover, adopted an all-encompassing definition of FIB (ownership, management and governance).

The purpose of this paper is to mainly investigate what factors drive growth for independent hotel firms on an island.

Two steps were followed. First, to identify hotels demonstrated significant growth; 92 independent hotels in North Cyprus were analyzed via a self-report questionnaire. Second, key growth factors were examined in five hotels showing the growth over years among the independent hotels via in-depth, semi-structured interviews, focus group interviews, and observations.

The study findings revealed 16 important growth factors for hotels, including active risk taking, education, family history, networks of contacts, other business interests, family investing friends, key employee partners, customer concentration, autonomy, innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness, location, desire to succeed, age of founders, and state support where are strong, weak, and interrelated relationships among these factors. These findings allow factors to be categorized into new groups, namely, strategic and tactical factors. The research findings unveil new factors referred to as “political conflict – pursuing different strategy and opportunities,” importance of second generations affect and entrepreneur’s metacognitive strategies, “informal networking.”

More research should also be undertaken for entrepreneurs or managers who formulate and implement strategies to enter new markets or to tackle turbulent and/or unstable environments.

This study reveals that one factor on its own cannot influence the growth of hotels. Rather, successful growth depends on the entrepreneur’s ability to combine all factors in harmony.

Given that there is limited empirical evidence on the growth of independent hotels on islands, this study made an important attempt to contribute to the entrepreneurship literature in the hospitality management and family business fields via micro-level approaches concerning the factors influencing hotels’ growth on an island. This is one of the first studies presenting and discussing empirical findings on growth factors for small hotels on an island, and brings a new perspective by grouping factors as strategic and tactical factors.

Drawing on the principal-principal conflict and identity literatures, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the Agency Problem Type II-bis in the context of family business. Specifically, the authors hypothesize that the size of the family owner group is related to firm growth and that this relationship is moderated by the extent to which the family identifies with the firm.

The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 265 medium and large German family firms (FFs) via moderated hierarchical regression analysis.

The main findings suggest that business family identity moderates the inverted U-shaped relationship between the size of the family owner group and firm growth in such a way that FFs with medium-sized family owner groups and high levels of business family identity reach higher firm growth.

In the context of FFs fully owned by one family, family owners might have different strategic preferences, goals, and identities, thus potentially making them subject to the conflict that could arise among the different family owners in relation to growth expectations. Recognizing this problem could help family owners find potential solutions to ensure the well-being of both the family and the business.

The combination of family ownership structure and family ownership dynamics affects firm growth. Challenging the homogeneity of the family owner group, the authors highlight the role of Agency Problem Type II-bis in hindering growth of FFs. A finer-grained view of principal-principal conflicts in FFs is thus discussed.

In the last four years, since Volume I of this Bibliography first appeared, there has been an explosion of literature in all the main functional areas of business. This wealth of material poses problems for the researcher in management studies — and, of course, for the librarian: uncovering what has been written in any one area is not an easy task. This volume aims to help the librarian and the researcher overcome some of the immediate problems of identification of material. It is an annotated bibliography of management, drawing on the wide variety of literature produced by MCB University Press. Over the last four years, MCB University Press has produced an extensive range of books and serial publications covering most of the established and many of the developing areas of management. This volume, in conjunction with Volume I, provides a guide to all the material published so far.

The purpose of this paper is to examine and explore why “Small-Businesses” resist employing outside the immediate family and investigate the employee as an outsider and entrepreneurial resource.

The authors review the literature on barriers to small-business growth concentrating on key empirical and theoretical studies. The authors use empirical data from the Federation of Small Business in which informants commented on growth and employing outside the family.

The findings suggest that small business owners adopt a polemical stance, arguing that a barrage of employment regulations deters them from employing outsiders because doing so brings trouble in terms of costs such as insurance, taxes, paperwork, leave (maternity and paternity) entitlement, etc. They argue that employing from inside the family or ones peer group is much cheaper, convenient and less hassle. This ignores the entrepreneurial employee as a potential ingredient of growth and points to a paradox whereby the very values and emotions characterized by fairness of which of “smallness” and “familialness” is composed compound the issues of discrimination central to the debate.

The paper offer important insights for growth issues among small businesses and challenge the contemporary equilibrium in terms of small “family-orientated” business philosophy relating to employment practices. Ideologically, the entrepreneur is an “outsider” fighting the establishment, yet paradoxically, in a small-business context s/he becomes the establishment by employing outsiders. This results in the fairness vs unfairness paradox.

The paper contributes to the existing knowledge and understanding on growth issues among small businesses by illuminating a paradoxical insider vs outsider tension.

There is a growing consensus that entrepreneurial activity is essentially a collective family endeavour, with some configuration of family involvement in business (FIB) working better than others. This paper aims to examine the effects of FIB on strategy and financial performance (FP), drawing from the institutional theory for the Indian family businesses.

The sample comprises of 105 pharmaceutical companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange for FY2013–2017. A two-way random effects panel model was invoked to examine the relationship between FIB and strategy, as well as the intermediating effect that strategy has on the FIB-FP link.

On average, the family has a high ownership concentration, with the founders predominantly holding the chief executive officer (CEO) and chair positions. The econometric results highlight that the founder’s descendants adopt a conservative strategy. A significant positive moderating effect of strategy on FIB-FP link was observed for the descendants as the largest owners, CEO and board chair. The presence of a professional CEO and independent chair, however, leads to an intervening adverse impact on FP. The ownership-management-governance configurations highlight that some combinations of family and non-FIB leads to better performance than others.

The study provides a plausible explanation for the conflicting evidence on the direct FIB-FP relationship through the strategy intermediation. The institutional perspective emphasizing the identity and role family members play in terms of strategy provides an unconventional epistemological underpinning to the present research.

To examine differences between family and non‐family SMEs in business goals, management practices and performance as they grow.

The study was based on 233 small non‐family and 362 small family firms. Medium firms comprised 305 family and 341 non‐family firms. Chi‐square tests and t‐tests were used to investigate the hypotheses formulated.

Small family firms were less likely to pursue growth compared with similar non‐family firms. Although medium family proprietors desired growth, their actual growth was lower than similar non‐family firms. Management practices were less formal in family firms and the gap between family and non‐family firms in this area widened with growth. Small family firms achieved greater profits than their non‐family counterparts, although this disparity disappeared at the medium level. Exports were low for both firms at the small level. However, medium family firms were less likely than similar non‐family firms to export.

Firms in the various size groups examined were independent of one another. A longitudinal investigation of family and non‐family firms as they progress through various growth stages should complement the findings.

The findings should assist policies makers, advisers, owners and management in designing policies and programs, providing advice and managing the two ownership types. Informal management procedures and the associated flexibility may enhance performance of small family firms but may impede their performance at larger sizes.

The paper demonstrates that the relationship between goals, strategies and performance varies between family and non‐family firms and the variations change with firm size.