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The purpose of this paper is to examine the motivations for and variations in terms of stock option modifications under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123(R). Stock options are used to motivate and retain employees. Unfortunately, when stock prices decline, existing options lose their incentive value. In response, firms look for ways to re-incentivize their employees. Their choices include issuing additional options and/or modifying existing grants.

We investigate the economic determinants of stock option modification post SFAS 123(R), such as financial reporting cost, shareholder/political cost and employee incentive and retention. Our analysis is based on 67 sample firms that modify their stock option plans from 2005 to 2008 and 67 control firms constructed based on size, industry, year and stock price performance for the prior five years.

The results show that loss firms are more likely to modify their options, which supports the argument that financial reporting costs influence the decision to modify. We find support for the shareholder/political costs hypothesis, as the overhang ratio is positively associated with the decision to modify. However, we find no evidence that modifications substitute for additional option grants. We find that politically sensitive larger firms are more likely to incorporate more shareholder friendly measures such as excluding executives from modification or providing shareholders the opportunity to vote on modification.

This is the first paper examining the economic determinants of stock option modification under SFAS 123(R). Our findings provide some insights regarding economic determinants of SFAS 123(R) for accounting policy-makers and investors.

This exercise exposes students to the accounting for stock option modifications and option service and performance conditions, requiring research in the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification and the use of the Black-Scholes option pricing model.

Students identify and apply accounting standards to account for stock option plans, stock option modifications, acquired stock option plans, and service and performance conditions that relate to stock option plans. Indirect student feedback suggests that students view the exercise as valuable. Comments include that the exercise reinforces and expands their knowledge of real-world stock compensation plans. Direct assessment data using grading rubrics finds that most students meet instructor expectations.

The exercise enhances critical thinking skills, increases professional research practice, and improves written skills. It introduces students to common real-world events and reinforces their learning related to stock compensation.

Empirical evidence on the shareholder wealth effects of changes in executive compensation agreements is provided by a body of research which examines common stock returns around the time that pay packages are modified. Most studies report significantly positive excess stock returns contemporaneous with the compensation event. Despite this, numerous methodological issues prevent researchers from ascribing a causal relation between the compensation change and the observed stock price behavior. This paper critically reviews the accumulated evidence from studies in this literature and suggests directions for future research.

This paper seeks to investigate whether executive wealth sensitivity to stock price fluctuations serves as an incentive for earnings management.

Using a sample of 475 chief executive officers (CEOs) from 410 randomly selected Standard and Poor's (S&P) 1500 firms, the relation between executive stock‐based compensation, corporate governance, and earnings management is empirically examined.

CEO wealth sensitivity is positively associated with abnormal accrual usage and the relation is consistent with income‐smoothing. Also find that governance does not significantly influence the association between CEO stock‐based wealth sensitivity and earnings smoothing.

This study has several limitations. First, it is assumed that the accruals models used provide accurate measures of abnormal accruals. Several recent studies question the reliability of these models. Second, the wealth sensitivity measures in this paper are based on Black Scholes option pricing. A number of the assumptions underlying Black Scholes do not hold for executive options. Finally, governance factors that influence the examined relations may not be effectively captured by the measures in this paper.

The findings have implications for compensation design. Unintended consequences of high CEO exposure to firm‐specific risk may not be effectively mitigated by governance. These results also have potential policy implications. In the wake of recent accounting scandals regulators tightened governance standards for corporate. The findings suggest that reliance on these standards as deterrents to earnings management may not be warranted.

The study contributes to both the earnings management and corporate governance literatures. The results of this study suggest that CEO stock‐based wealth sensitivity is an earnings management incentive.

The purpose of this study is to examine the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and the chief executive officer (CEO) stock options compensation and to analyze whether the impact of financial constraints on the CEO stock options compensation changes at certain level of financial constraints or not.

This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2019. To deal with the non-linearity, the authors use a panel threshold method.

Using different measures of financial constraints [KZ index (Baker et al., 2003), SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) and FCP index (Schauer et al., 2019)], the results reveal that the impact of the financial constraints (SA index and FCP index) is positive below the threshold value and it becomes negative above.

The non-linearity between financial constraints and CEO stock options shows that the level of financial constraints can be a major determinant of the CEO compensation structure. More specifically, this study sheds light on the key role played by the level of financial constraints and how this latter influence management decisions.

This paper is the first to the best of the authors' knowledge to examine the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and the CEO stock options compensation using a panel threshold model.

In an effort to better respond to heterogeneous customer needs, an increasing number of companies in different sectors deal with the combination of high variety and frequent product changes/modifications. This entails planning, designing, purchasing and manufacturing activities and exacerbates the alignment of Sales, Production Planning and Engineering goals. This paper aims to suggest a way of improving coordination between such functional areas in contexts characterised by high variety and frequent product changes. Based on the data from an action Research study, a method for taking the contrasting requests of Sales, Production Planning and Engineering into account simultaneously and to facilitate the coordination of their activities is developed. It leverages Modular Bills and product modularity to improve inter‐functional coordination. Initial indications are promising. However, given the specific nature of the studied case, further research is required to evaluate the generalizability of the findings.

Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) limits tax deductibility of executive compensation to $1 million per covered executive, with an exception for performance-based compensation. Both stock options and annual bonuses can qualify as performance-based, but they vary in the difficulty of qualification and the degree of additional compensation risk that qualification imposes on the executive. Most stock-option grants easily qualify with little change in risk, but qualification increases the risk associated with annual bonus compensation relative to what it was prior. The results of this study show that the propensity to issue stock options has increased for affected executives as a percentage of total compensation. Additional analysis suggests that this increase in stock-option compensation is substituting for lower increases in salary for affected executives, but not for annual cash bonuses. In fact, the results suggest that bonus compensation is also increasing as a percentage of total compensation. In summary, the results indicate that firms and their executives are acting in a way consistent with the incentives provided by section 162(m).

More than 80 percent of S&P 500 firms that issue ESOs use the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model and substitute the estimated average term for the contractual expiration to calculate ESO expense. This simplification systematically overprices ESOs, which worsens as the stock's volatility increases. The purpose of this paper is to present a modification of the BSM model to explicitly incorporate the rates of forfeiture pre- and post-vesting and the rate of early exercise.

The paper demonstrates the model's usefulness by employing historical exercise and forfeiture data for 127 separate ESO grants and 1.31 billion ESOs to calculate the exercise and forfeiture parameters and value ESOs for nine firms.

The modified BSM model is just as accurate but easier to use than the more computationally intensive utility maximization and trinomial lattice models, and it avoids the ASC 718 BSM model's overpricing bias.

If firms prefer the BSM model over more mathematically elegant alternatives, they should at least use a BSM model that is free of overpricing bias.