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The International Banking Act (IBA) of 1978 sharply restricted the ability of foreign banks to establish offices in more than one state. Yet during the late 1970s and early 1980s barriers to interstate banking with regard to US financial institutions were beginning to fall. The most important fact that contributed to foreign bank involvement in interstate commerce was the grandfather provision, which permitted multistate networks to remain in operation. New interstate banking has been curbed by restrictions on full‐service offices, but it has continued to develop through Edge‐Act Corporations, bank holding companies and the use of non‐bank banks. Interstate banking is likely to benefit the public and will probably continue to expand but at a slower rate and more in line with that of US banks.

This chapter examines the transition in the US banking industry from a community to a national logic, developing a general model to explain how and when shifts in institutional logics occur. Based on qualitative historical evidence and discrete-time event history analysis predicting the introduction of legislation favoring the national logic, this chapter proposes that dramatic exogenous events such as the Great Depression or more gradual processes such as modernization favored the industry's transition to the national logic, but that such exogenous events had a greater influence in areas where strategic actors could capitalize on them. The qualitative evidence presented here suggests that struggles involving organizational identity and “legitimacy politics” played an important role in the shift in logics. Our theorizing focuses on how, when the environment changes in an incremental fashion, actors are primed with new possibilities, which may shift their collective identities, but when environmental changes are discontinuous, they provide actors strategic opportunities to alter the balance of logics in the environment.

Deregulation and other factors permit and encourage financial institutions to become more integrated, both within their own (financial) industries, such as banking and insurance, and across these industries. Financial regulators have responded with like integration. As financial institutions increasingly compete with firms from other industries and areas, financial regulators similarly compete more across borders. The resulting competition in financial regulation enhances innovation, choice, and efficiency. The advent of home-run regulation, which in general allows financial institutions to adhere only to the financial regulations of their home area and is spreading across the US and Europe, may allow numerous regulatory regimes within a given market.

Purpose – This chapter compares the stability of the U.S. Dual Banking system's two bank groups, national and state banks, in light of the current financial crisis. The goal of the chapter is to answer three distinct questions: first, is there a difference in the (balance sheet) fragility between the two groups and, second, to what extent has the balance sheet fragility of both groups changed after the escalation of the financial crisis beginning in August 2007? Building on that, the third question asks to whether or not the respective regulatory agencies of both bank groups are responsible for these changes in balance sheet fragility in light of the financial crisis.

Methodology – To answer these questions the chapter uses U.S. Call Report data containing full quarterly balance sheets and P&Ls of all U.S. commercial banks over the period 2005–2008. Anecdotal evidence as well as univariate and multivariate difference-in-difference methodology focusing on the immediate pre-crisis period Q1/2005–Q3/2007 and the crisis period Q3/2007–Q4/2008 are applied.

Results – Highly significant and robust results show that, ceteris paribus, national banks reduced their potential balance sheet fragility after the escalation of the crisis in August 2007 by reducing lending and liquidity creation stronger than state banks. Anecdotal evidence supports the empirical findings. Although both FDIC and OCC did not anticipate the adverse effects of the crisis, the OCC publicly showed an earlier reaction to liquidity-related problems than the FDIC.

Originality – The chapter is the first of its kind to analyze bank fragility around the escalation of the financial crisis and the role of the regulatory agencies. The chapter holds especially interesting policy implications in the light of the current discussion about the future regulation of the banking markets.

This chapter explores the political economy of banking in Texas at the turn of the last century. The empirical work sheds light on why Texans voted to allow the chartering of banks by the state government. The evidence shows that county-level voting patterns for state-chartered banks were significantly related to business interests, consumer interests, agricultural activity, and the presence of existing national banks. The work also shows that the first counties to receive the new state banks were associated with higher agricultural activity, larger population size, and the presence of existing national banks. By examining the vote and the location of early entrants in state banking, this chapter contributes to the literature exploring the historical development of state-chartered banking and the dual-banking system in the US.

This paper aims to examine the effect of state ownership on bank performance for all banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries during the period 2003 – 2018, for two distinct banking systems: the conventional and the Islamic banking systems.

To achieve the goal of the study, this paper uses a mean t-test to examine the mean difference of the related variables for both banking systems, and a regression test (using the GMM method) to explore the effect of state ownership on bank performance.

The most important result of the analysis is that state ownership has a significantly positive influence on bank performance for conventional banks but not for Islamic banks, in the GCC area.

This study adds to the scarce related literature comparative empirical results with respect to the impact of ownership on the performance of two different banking systems: the conventional system and the Islamic banking system in the GCC area. This study is likely to have implications for policymakers in terms of developing rules relevant to the governance of GCC’s two banking systems that can help to support the stability of the whole banking sector.

Using state-level data, the purpose of this paper is to examine state banking-industry specific as well as region economic determinants of real estate lending of commercial banks across all 51 states spanning the period 1966-2014.

Using both fixed-effects and dynamic-generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation techniques the study compares the sensitivity of different categories of real estate loans to regional banking and economic conditions. Finally, it provides a comparative perspective by comparing the results for real estate loans with other categories of loans given out by banks.

Greater capitalization, liquidity and overhead costs reduce real estate lending, while banks diversification and the size of the banking industry in each state increase such lending. Moreover, real estate loans are found to be procyclical to state economic cycles with a rise in state real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, increase in state housing price index (HPI) and decline in both inflation and unemployment rates, increasing real estate loans. Within disaggregated loan types, construction and land development and single-family residential loans are most responsive to state banking and economic conditions.

The recent financial turmoil is to a large extent attributable to excessive risk-taking by banks, particularly in terms of real estate lending. Hence, it is of paramount importance to empirically address the various determinants of real estate lending. With most banks restricting their operations in either one or a few states only, real estate lending in any given state may be more sensitive to regional banking and economic conditions than national aggregates. The present study is the first of its type to perform such an analysis.

Many transition economies are former socialist planned economies and have undergone market reforms of their financial sector to signal their transition towards democracy. However, governments in these countries have been reluctant to relinquish the pre-existing controls on economy and have adopted nuanced and sophisticated approaches to retain control. In such context, scholars may find it challenging to investigate the role played by the state in the success or failure of attempted market reforms. This work investigates the different forms of state-induced accounting controls that may preserve the status quo within the economy during transition, using Myanmar as an example.

The authors adopted a longitudinal qualitative research method aiming to reveal the very processes and mechanisms used by the banks and their evolution over time. This method is in accordance with the historical institutionalist perspective that they have applied within this research.

The authors found that the Myanmar government embarked on the privatisation of their financial sector from 1990 to 2016 as a major public sector reform initiative. Under the guise of market reforms, it used both state-led and market-led controls to emulate and retain the socialist banking model where banks are used to fund the immediate government's budget deficits. This created a series of intended and unintended consequences, resulting in the ultimate failure of the government's market reforms.

Previously, research on public sector management accounting in emerging economies was not relying consistently on using theory. The relative limited theorisation led to gaps when attempting to understand and explain the opaque forms of state control mechanisms in transition economies. By applying historical institutionalist perspective, and a more theory-driven, reflective approach to the interpretation of the data collected, the authors have provided a deeper insight and understanding on how different forms of state controls can emerge, adapt and persist in transition economies such as Myanmar.

The authors demonstrated that though the state may have implemented market reforms to signal regimes change, this does not necessarily mean that the government has relinquished their control on the economy. The state could take a more sophisticated, covert approach towards state controls leading to both intended and unintended consequences. Thus, even if the state's preferences change, the decisions cannot be easily reversed, as path-dependent state controls may have become pervasive affecting any further institutional and policy developments. Thus, the authors suggest that governments in both transition and developed economies should be cautious when enacting regulations on corporate control.

In this paper, the authors have applied a historical institutional perspective in their analysis instead of the more widely used sociological, institutionalist approach. This allowed authors to harness rich longitudinal data indicating that market reforms and their success or failure should be examined as an ongoing process rather than a completed action. This is especially important in transition economies where the state may be unwilling to renounce the existing controls on the industry and may resort to more opaque forms of state control, eventually obstructing the intended reforms.

Many states still limit or prohibit commercial bank branching. In addition, the McFadden Act prevents banks from branching across state lines. It has been suggested that anti‐branching laws inhibit competition in the banking industry. This follows from the notion that bank markets are localized, and that anti‐branching laws prevent banks from penetrating local markets adjacent to their main offices. Two interesting hypotheses arise from this conjecture. First, do banks operating in unit‐banking states have a profit advantage over their counterparts in states that allow state‐wide branching? And second, is there any significant difference in profitability between banks in limited‐branching states and banks in state‐branching states? In other words, are there diminishing returns to branching deregulation? Research reported in this paper answers these questions.