Search results

Controlled foreign company (“CFC”) legislation, governed by section 9D of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, serves as anti‐avoidance legislation in South Africa’s residence‐based tax system. Section 9D provides for the calculation of a deemed amount which must be included in the South African resident’s income. This deemed amount is calculated with reference to the net income for the CFC’s foreign tax year. Section 9D(6) provides for this deemed amount, which is denominated in the foreign financial reporting currency, to be translated into South African rand by applying the average exchange rate for that year of assessment. The legislation refers to the South African resident’s year of assessment and not the CFC’s foreign tax year. It is submitted that the average exchange rate for the CFC’s foreign tax year should be used for translation. The author therefore disputes the period to be used in calculating the average exchange rate.

The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service has wide discretionary powers. In this article, the meaning, purpose, types, extent and exercise of these powers are examined. Do these powers promote uncertainty and/or unfairness and inconsistency, and if so, which of these powers do so? The extent of the powers given by some of the discretions not specifically subject to objection and appeal is questioned: no discretionary powers involving liability for tax should be allowed, especially not without the right to objection and appeal. Because of the general administrative relationship between the Commissioner and the taxpayer and because exercising a discretionary power constitutes an administrative action, the constitutionality of this power was examined in terms of taxpayers’ right to just administrative action. Only discretionary powers not specifically made subject to objection and appeal are open for constitutional attack.

Airscrews GENERAL 624. Emission of sound by airscrews. (With diagrams.) March 1919. (4d.).

The purpose of this paper is to propose a systematic and customisable framework, titled the 9D approach, aiming to evaluate the enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems as well as to identify potential socio-technical problems, misfits and deficiencies that can cause ERP failure during the system post-implementation phase.

The proposed 9D ERP evaluation framework includes nine dimensions and 85 evaluation criteria. This theoretical framework is then used in a six-step evaluation process based on a mixed-methods design. A case study involving a large-size private company in China was used as an exemplification to illustrate how the proposed 9D approach can be applied in practices.

The findings of the study clearly demonstrated that after the ERP “go-live” point, companies still experience many challenges and problems in the post-implementation phase. These problems can be located in very diverse organisational, systemic and personnel aspects of the company, as well as across different functional areas and organisational levels. The proposed 9D approach was demonstrated to be an efficient and systematic tool to investigate and explore such ERP problems in an in-depth level within the organisational context.

This study contributes to the theory of IS evaluation in general, and provides valuable insights into the ERP post-implementation evaluation in particular.

The proposed ERP evaluation approach forms a sound base for continuous ERP improvement and contributes to sustain seamless alignment between ERP and its organisational context. The customisable feature of the framework offers flexibility and enables its use by companies of all sizes, any sector, and any country.

To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, this is the most extensive and comprehensive framework for the post-evaluation of ERPs proposed hitherto. The need for this new framework was grounded on the argumentation of the drawbacks of existing ERP measurement and evaluation studies that simply focus on success rather than the more critical failure factors.

Accidents 592. Accidents to certain aeroplanes, with special reference to “Spinning” (communicated by the Accidents Investigation Committee). (With diagrams.) Dec. 1918. (6d.).

Aeroplanes PERFORMANCE OF—GENERAL 1112. On the influence of supercharging on the performance of aeroplanes. (9d).

Kite Balloons and Kites 247. Two models of Caquot kite‐balloons. Tests on. Nov. 1916. (3d.).

Food and Drug cases are notorious for their capacity for providing Courts of Justice with knotty points. An interesting specimen of such a point is disclosed in Query No. 8341 in the issue of “The Sanitary Record” of January 23rd. Section 17 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts, 1875, provides that if an Inspector applies to purchase an article of food exposed for sale, “and shall tender the price for the quantity which he shall require for the purpose of analysis,” and the person exposing the article for sale refuses to sell to the Inspector, such person is liable to a penalty. According to the full and first‐rate report of the case in question in the “Middleton Guardian” of December 18th last, the following appears to have happened:—The defendant was delivering milk at customers' houses from a horse‐drawn cart. The Inspector went up to him and told him that he was an Inspector under the Act, and that he wanted two pints of milk as samples, one from the can in the cart and the other from the can in the defendant's hand. The defendant said, “I refuse to supply you.” The Inspector then offered him a shilling, and said, “I want two pints of milk.” The defendant again refused to supply the samples, giving no reason for his refusal, and at once drove away. On proceedings being taken for the penalty imposed by the above section, the defendant's solicitor took the point that there had been no “legal tender” under the section, the price of the milk being 9d. and the tender being that of a coin of greater value, thus necessitating the giving of change. The Justices dismissed the summons on this ground. Apparently the only answers which occurred to the Clerk to the prosecuting Local Authority were that the Inspector “might not have known what the milk would cost,” and that the case cited by the defendant's solicitor was decided as long ago as 1815. As the Clerk to the Justices observed, people have only too good a reason for bearing in mind the present price of milk, and it is absurd to suggest that an Inspector of Food dues not know the current price of two pints of this commodity. The mere age of a case is also a feeble retort. We are therefore not surprised at the result of the proceedings. The querist also raises an equally untenable argument in support of his prosecution. He says that it is “the custom of ordinary purchasers to tender larger amounts than cover the value of the article purchased,” and that Inspectors “as far as possible act as ordinary purchasers.” The obvious reply to this is that such a custom cannot override the law, and here the law requires “legal tender.” Now a tender, to be legally valid, must be either “for the specific amount,” or “for more than the precise amount without a demand for change,” or “if the creditor; can select his portion without giving change” (Lord Halsbury's “Laws of England,” Vol. 6, at page 462). One of the authorities cited for this proposition is Wade's Case (5 Co. Rep. 114 a). This decision was given in 1601, and is therefore more than 200 years older than the authority to the antiquity of which the Clerk objected. This authority was no doubt that of Robinson v. Cook (1815, 6 Taunt. 336), where the Court held that tender of a larger amount with a demand for change was bad. It appears to us that the Clerk's answer to this technical defence should, in ordinary times, have been that, though there was a tender of more than the 9d., there was no “demand for change,” for the Inspector did not ask for his 3d. Moreover, the defendant drove away without giving the Inspector any opportunity of saying that he might keep the 3d. It does not appear to be necessary, however, for the purchaser to state expressly that he does not demand any change, and if he has no reasonable opportunity for considering whether such a demand shall be made or not, we are of opinion that the tender of more than the sum due is valid. It certainly is not usual for Inspectors to give money away when making their purchases, but if an Inspector does not happen to have upon him the exact sum required, and he has reason to suspect the quality of milk that is in course of delivery, we regard it as his duty to sacrifice any small sum like 3d. in order that he may perform his duty to consumers. But for D.O.R.A., the querist would, in our opinion, have been perfectly justified, in the circumstances of the case to which he has called our attention, in foregoing his change, and there was nothing to show that this may not have been his intention if the defendant had not been in such a hurry to escape from his clutches. The meaning of our reference to “ordinary times” and to D.O.R.A. is this: At the time in question it was illegal for the milkman to sell, and for the Inspector to purchase, milk at a price higher than the maximum fixed by the Regulations. Courts will not presume that persons intend to commit a breach of the law. In this case, therefore, if our point had been taken in, the Justices would have been justified, as there was no direct evidence of any such intention, in refusing to presume that the Inspector intended to pay more than 9d. for the two samples. Furthermore, if in fact the Inspector had said definitely “I do not want any change,” we think that the tender would still not have been legal, because the milkman would have been entitled to reply “D.O.R.A. won't let me sell you two pints for more than 9d., and therefore change is necessary.” We, like the Justices, regret the result of their ruling, and hope that this article may serve as a hint to officers who may find themselves placed in a similar situation when D.O.R.A. has disappeared.— The Sanitary Record.

President, Charles S. Goldman, M.P.; Chairman, Charles Bathurst, M.P.; Vice‐Presidents: Christopher Addison, M.D., M.P., Waldorf Astor, M.P., Charles Bathurst, M.P., Hilaire Belloc, Ralph D. Blumenfeld, Lord Blyth, J.P., Colonel Charles E. Cassal, V.D., F.I.C., the Bishop of Chichester, Sir Arthur H. Church, K.C.V.O., M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S., Sir Wm. Earnshaw Cooper, C.I.E., E. Crawshay‐Williams, M.P., Sir Anderson Critchett, Bart., C.V.O., F.R.C.S.E., William Ewart, M.D., F.R.C.P., Lieut.‐Colonel Sir Joseph Fayrer, Bart., M.A., M.D., Sir Alfred D. Fripp, K.C.V.O., C.B., M.B., M.S., Sir Harold Harmsworth, Bart., Arnold F. Hills, Sir Victor Horsley, M.D., F.R.C.S., F.R.S., O. Gutekunst, Sir H. Seymour King, K.C.I.E., M.A., the Duke of Manchester, P.C., Professor Sir Wm. Osler, Bart., M.D., F.R.S., Sir Gilbert Parker, D.C.L., M.P., Sir Wm. Ramsay, K.C.B., LL.D., M.D., F.R.S., Harrington Sainsbury, M.D., F.R.C.P., W. G. Savage, M.D., B.Sc., R. H. Scanes Spicer, M.D., M.R.C.S., the Hon. Lionel Walrond, M.P., Hugh Walsham, M.D., F.R.C.P., Harvey W. Wiley, M.D., Evelyn Wrench.