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Motivated by the importance of gaining an understanding of the flow of transactions when assessing the effectiveness of internal controls for Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) compliance, concerns raised by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) of audit firm deficiencies in these areas and auditors’ use of both narratives and flowcharts to document the flow of transactions, this article aims to examine the impact of auditors creating flowcharts versus narratives on auditors’ transaction flow understanding and internal control evaluation performance.

This paper conducts a between-participants experiment examining auditor-created flowcharts versus narratives and different levels of documentation quality on auditors’ understanding of the flow of transactions and internal control evaluation performance.

This paper finds that auditors who create flowcharts gain a better understanding of the clients’ transaction flow and perform better on internal control evaluations than auditors who create narratives. Process results from a moderated-mediation model also show a moderating effect of quality and mediating effect of understanding.

These findings inform PCAOB policy decisions and inspection efforts and audit firms’ quality and process improvement efforts by providing initial support for having auditors create flowcharts to improve their understanding of the flow of transactions and internal control evaluation performance.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of auditor-created flowcharts compared to narratives on auditors’ understanding of the flow of transactions and internal control evaluation performance.

This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay sensitivity to stock volatility, on CEO pay for luck asymmetry. This paper also empirically examines CEO compensation risk as a mediating variable between the regulatory changes and CEO pay for luck asymmetry.

This paper test the proposed two hypothesis that CEO compensation risk is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry; and the pay related regulations implemented around 2006 could mitigate the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry using the fixed-effects regression models.

Consistent with the managerial talent retention hypothesis, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk, as measured by the equity-based pay as a proportion of CEO total compensation and CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility, is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, this paper find that CEO pay for luck asymmetry is significantly reduced by the major regulatory changes on executive compensation implemented around 2006.

This study is among the very few studies exploring the impact of CEO compensation risk on pay for luck asymmetry in the literature. While the major purpose of the widely used stock options is to align executive interests and shareholder values, it also tends to increase the risk level of CEO compensation. So, a well-designed CEO pay package should protect risk-averse CEOs from bad luck for the retention purpose, which is also beneficial to shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, future research on executive compensation needs to examine the issue from various perspectives.

For board of directors who is responsible for the compensation of CEOs, it is necessary to consider a broad range of factors when designing an optimal CEO pay package.

The findings on the impact of regulations on CEO pay for luck asymmetry suggest that the executive-pay-related regulations around 2006 have indeed achieved some of their intended goals to significantly lower pay for nonperformance asymmetry, whereby CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility has been identified as a major mediating variable.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck asymmetry in several perspectives. First, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk has a positive impact on the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. Second, this paper finds that the CEO pay for luck asymmetry has been mitigated after 2006 when various regulatory changes on executive compensation began to be implemented in the USA. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the very few studies investigating these issues in the literature.

This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry.

In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity.

We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect.

Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation.

When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. We find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity tends to increase the degree of CEO pay for luck but reduce the level of asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. These findings partly support the rent extraction theory grounded on the managerial power hypothesis and partly support the optimal contracting theory. Our findings confirm that the optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory are both important for explaining the practices and historical trends of CEO compensation.

This paper examines the effect of restrictions on executive pay and high CEOs’ compensation on bank performance following the “2008 UK bank rescue policy”.

Using the difference-in-difference estimation technique we assess the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance of rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks over the period 1999–2019.

Our main finding indicates that the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance declines in rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks. Further, we document that performance continues to deteriorate in rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks. Our results are robust to different estimation techniques.

This study contributes to the literature that examines the efficacy of government bailouts during the 2008 crisis. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to examine the long-term implications of bank rescue and pay restrictions on executive compensation and performance post–rescue.

This study aims to provide a different view of existing statistics and apply them to a current topic.

This study puts previous literature together in a way that supports a real estate-focused viewpoint.

The build environment can help or hinder diversity in the workplace.

Limitations of this study are that it is so macro that there is no direct study involved. The implications are that if companies want to achieve good “S” in ESG scores, they need to think about their real estate in different ways.

The implications are that if companies want to achieve good “S” in ESG scores, they need to think about their real estate in different ways.

People should understand that there are inherent barriers to success built into the system, and value their employer's efforts to ameliorate them accordingly.

To my knowledge, no one has approached this issue in this way before. The focus is typically micro, and while there is a lot of research out there focusing on the micro effects or impacts, they are without understanding how the built environment impacts these outcomes.

This study aims to analyze the risk profile of banks whose managers sit on Federal Reserve district bank boards in 2023. In particular, to analyze the impact tha Federal Reserve bank directors have on their own banks.

Use a matched sample approach to perform univariate analysis and multiple regression methodology to study whether banks whose managers sit on Federal Reserve Bank boards differ in risk profile from banks whose managers do not sit on Federal Reserve district boards.

There is limited evidence that banks managed by Fed directors have different capital ratios and leverage ratios relative to non-Fed director banks. There does appear to be a slight difference in the growth of Held-to-Maturity (HTM) Securities between the two samples. Specifically, banks managed by a Fed director saw their HTM portfolio grow over the study period, while banks managed by non-Fed directors reduced their HTM securities. Overall, the results suggest that bank directors on Federal Reserve district boards do so with no apparent detriment to the banks that they manage.

Results of this study suggest that stakeholder director relationships are not associated with higher risk-taking at director banks. This study is unique in that, rather than looking at how director ties might influence the firm that they are on the board of, the focus here is how the firm (the Fed district, in this case) might influence director affiliations. Limitations include a small sample size (70 banks, including the matched sample), and data over a short time horizon. Additional measures of risk can also be analyzed in future research.

While there has been much speculation in the industry and in the press regarding the conflict of interest involving bank directors on Fed district boards, this research suggests there is little evidence of any risk differential involving these directors and their specialties to the Fed.

This study involves a unique approach to corporate governance analysis, whereby any conflict of interest that might exist between directors and the firm is studied from an alternate angle – in particular, whether the association with a regulator’s board impacts the director firm’s risk. Furthermore, with the recent events in the banking industry involving the collapse of several banks, including Silicon Valley, the notion that bank management participating on the boards of directors of their own regulator seemed a worthwhile question as to whether this diminished the safety and soundness of the banks that they run.

This study aims to examine the literature from the Web of Science database published on board committees between 2002 and 2023 and outline the quantitative summary, journey of board committees’ research and suggest future research directions.

This study examines bibliometric-content analysis combined with a systematic literature review of articles on board committees to document the summary of the field. The authors used co-citation, co-occurrence and cluster analysis under bibliometric-content analysis to present the field summary.

Board committee composition, such as their gender, independence and expertise, as well as factors affecting corporate governance, such as reporting quality, earnings management and board monitoring, all have a significant impact on board committee literature. The field is getting growing attention from authors, journals and countries. Nevertheless, there is a need for further exploration in areas like expertise, member age and tenure, the economic crisis and the nomination and remuneration committee, which have not yet received sufficient attention.

This paper has both theoretical and practical contributions. From a theoretical perspective, this study substantiates the prevalence of agency theory within board committee literature, reinforcing the foundational role of agency theory in shaping discussions about board committees. On practical ground, the comprehensive overview of board committee literature offers scholars a road map for navigating this field and directing their future research journey. The identification of research gaps in certain areas serves as a catalyst for scholars to explore untapped dimensions, enabling them to strengthen the essence of the committees’ performance.

Exploiting a novel measure of hostile takeover exposure primarily based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, we explore a crucial, albeit largely overlooked, aspect of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, we investigate CSR inequality, which is the inequality across different CSR categories. Higher inequality suggests a less balanced, more lopsided, CSR policy.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, we perform several robustness checks including propensity score matching, entropy balancing and an instrumental-variable analysis.

Our results show that more takeover exposure exacerbates CSR inequality. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in an increase in CSR inequality by 4.53–5.40%. The findings support the managerial myopia hypothesis, where myopic managers promote some CSR activities that are useful to them in the short run more than others, leading to higher CSR inequality.

Our study is the first to exploit a unique measure of takeover vulnerability to investigate the impact of takeover threats on CSR inequality, which is an important aspect of CSR that is largely overlooked in the literature. We aptly fill this void in the literature.