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Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 404) requires auditors to attest to, and report on, management's assessment and effectiveness of the company's internal control systems. This paper aims to examine investor reaction to companies' announcements of new information technology (IT) or improved existing IT to satisfy requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002.

Using a sample of 124 SOX‐related IT announcements from 2003 to 2007, an event study measuring market reactions using average cumulative abnormal return is undertaken. Additionally, the cross‐sectional variation in the marketplace is analyzed to test the effect of firm‐specific factors on market responses.

The empirical results suggest that the stock market reacts favorably to corporations that invest in SOX 404‐related IT. The reaction is more favorable toward companies without prior reported internal control deficiencies/weaknesses. Additionally, the results marginally support the notion that firms with higher risk and poorer financial reporting quality can demonstrate their commitment to improve internal control over financial reporting by investing in IT for SOX 404 compliance.

The findings will influence companies' IT investment decisions, particularly IT decisions that are SOX Section 404‐related. Potential benefits of SOX 404 IT investments include favorable market returns. Additionally, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of SOX for standard‐setting and regulation bodies examining past rulings and preparing for future regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the corporate governance and financial characteristics of firms under the new Sarbanes‐Oxley (SOX) accounting regime.

The paper first compares a comprehensive set of characteristics across firms in two states of SOX Section 404 status–Compliance and Violation. It then tests for determinants of SOX compliance in a logistic regression setting.

Several differences between compliance groups in terms of equity ownership, board structure, and executive compensation schemes are reported. However, it appears that firms found to be in violation of SOX are not systematically worse when it comes to common measures of corporate governance. The financial structure and soundness of the groups of firms are very similar. The strongest determinant of Section 404 compliance is firm size.

This result supported anecdotal evidence that compliance with SOX is achieved primarily by firms that can afford it. Further, the paper highlights an important policy issue: Is SOX really differentiating firms in terms of corporate governance or in terms of size?

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the efficiency of the internal control reporting (ICR) requirements imposed by Sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The lessons learned are then applied to the current financial crisis.

The Coase Theorem is applied to the events leading up to the collapse of Enron and the enactment of SOX. The paper then analyzes the efficacy of the various examples of ICR regulation, both pre‐ and post‐SOX, noting the ways in which they effectively mitigate transaction costs and the ways in which they over‐regulate.

US investors continue to invest in foreign markets despite the fact that those markets maintain less demanding ICR requirements than those required by Section 404. Moreover, investors do not respond negatively to Section 404 disclosures. The research demonstrates that Section 404 does not provide useful information in the minds of investors. Considering Section 404's ineffectiveness and the burdensome costs it imposes on reporting companies, it is clear that Section 404 is an example of over‐regulation and should be repealed.

The transaction costs that caused the collapse of Enron and the enactment of SOX bear strong similarities to those causing the more recent subprime mortgage crisis. The lessons learned from the enactment of SOX Section 404 are directly applicable to the current financial crisis and should be noted moving forward.

By utilizing a law and economics perspective, the paper more clearly demonstrates how Section 404 is an example of over‐regulation and draws links to the current economic crisis.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the compliance of US‐traded foreign firms with Sarbanes‐Oxley section 404 (SOX 404) by examining recent changes in their material internal control weakness (ICW) disclosures. This study also seeks to explore as a result of compliance, whether large firms can improve their internal controls than small and mid‐sized businesses (SMBs) can.

This study uses a logit regression model to test the data collected from Compustat and AuditAnalytics databases.

Both US firms and US‐traded foreign firms from developed countries experienced a significant descending trend of material ICW disclosures from 2004 to 2006. US SMBs, like large US companies, improved internal controls.

Prior studies asserted that the environment of corporate governance is more favourable for firms in developed countries. This study documents that US‐traded foreign firms from developed countries adjust to SOX 404 more quickly than do those from developing countries, resulting in fewer material ICW disclosures.

Although SOX 404 imposes vast costs on US‐traded foreign firms, investors can benefit from the improved internal control over financial reporting, as the Securities and Exchange Commission asserts. This paper contributes to the literature that US‐traded foreign firms from developed countries adjust to SOX 404 more quickly than those from developing countries. Although the significant fixed cost of implementing SOX 404 impacts SMBs disproportionately, US SMBs, like larger firms, still show an improvement in their internal control systems over time.

This paper aims to investigate whether the Section 404 of Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX 404) changed the way banks use accounting information to price corporate loans.

The study uses a sample of 1,173 US-listed firms that issued syndicated loans both before and after their compliance with SOX 404 to analyze the changes in loan spread’s sensitivity to some key accounting metrics such as ROA, interest coverage, leverage and net worth.

The study finds that the interest spread’s sensitivity to key accounting metrics, most noticeably for ROA, declined following the borrower’s compliance with the requirements of SOX 404. The decline was not explainable by borrowers that disclosed internal control weaknesses but concentrated among borrowers suspected of real earnings management (REM).

By examining the effects of SOX 404 on banks’ pricing process, this study augments the literature on SOX’s economic consequences. The findings suggest that lenders perceive little new information from SOX 404 disclosures of internal control deficiencies and are cautious about the accounting information provided by REM borrowers. It also extends the research on the use of accounting information in debt contracting. By examining loan interest’s sensitivity to accounting metrics, it broadens the concept of debt contracting value of accounting information to include accounting’s usefulness for assessing credit risk at loan inception.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the rationale for the failure of management and auditors to identify material internal control weaknesses (ICWs) in their initial Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 404 reviews, resulting in subsequent restatement of their opinions.

The paper focuses on the factors associated with the failure of management and auditor to identify material internal controls weaknesses in their initial SOX 404 reports. Logistic regression is run on a sample of 56 firms that reported material internal controls weaknesses in their amended internal control reports and a control group of 344 firms that reported material internal controls weaknesses (i.e. ineffective internal controls) in their initial internal control reports for 2004.

The results show that firm size, the use of a Big 4 auditor, the ratio of non‐audit to total fees, and the need for accounting restatements are positively associated with the probability to file an amended internal control report. The number of ICWs and the number of audit committee meetings are negatively associated with the probability to file an amended internal control report.

The paper's findings suggest that regulators and corporate boards should consider providing more guidelines on audit committee practices in addition to the audit committee structure. For example, more guidance by the board is needed to ensure that the audit committee is active in overseeing the company's auditor–client relationship and its internal audit function.

Empirical findings on factors associated with the failure of management and auditor to identify material ICWs in their SOX 404 review can contribute to an understanding of factors affecting the efficiency of the SOX 404 review by attributing such failure to either inherent factors such as operational complexity and industry membership or to managerial choices in auditor‐client relationship and corporate governance issues. An understanding of these factors can help companies and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission in their efforts to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of the current SOX 404 process.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 required companies to report on the effectiveness of their internal controls over financial reporting. Auditors also must attest to, and report on, the assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting made by the management of the company being audited. The purpose of this paper is to provide analyses of audit fee costs and material weaknesses reported for companies of different sizes after the effective date of Section 404 and suggest approaches to reduce SOX 404 compliance costs.

Quantitative analysis and deductive reasoning are used to evaluate audit costs associated with Section 404.

Audit fees have been increased substantially, particularly during the first year a company complied with Section 404, and have not been dropped substantially after the first year of compliance. Companies with sales of less than $1 billion reported significantly more material weaknesses than larger companies.

This paper documents audit costs after the SOX Section 404 effective date, the typical types of material weaknesses reported, the proportion of companies of different sizes reporting material weaknesses, and describes approaches to reduce compliance costs.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act requires management to include in the annual report a report on the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting. This assessment must be supported by evidential matter, including documentation, regarding both the design of internal controls and the testing process. Understandably, many executives are seeking the assistance from their internal auditors in satisfying the Section 404 requirements, leaving internal auditors with the important task of ensuring that the corporation's internal control system is properly documented and tested. This paper discusses how nine leading internal auditors of large publicly listed corporations are assisting their respective companies in implementing the Section 404 requirements. Further discusses some of the significant issues that these auditors are addressing and their prediction on the expected future impact of Section 404.

The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 exempts small, non-accelerated filers from compliance with Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) Section 404b internal control audits. However, these firms are required to comply with other internal control regulations, namely, SOX Sections 302 and 404a, starting in 2002 and 2007, respectively. A small number of these firms also voluntarily adopted (and sometimes dropped) Section 404b during 2004-2010. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of a series of internal control regulations introduced by SOX on the financial reporting quality of small firms.

The research design for this study is empirical. Using unsigned and signed discretionary accruals as measures of financial reporting quality, the authors compare the financial reporting quality for adopters and non-adopters across four regulation regimes over the period 2000-2010: PRESOX, SOX 302, SOX 404a and SOX 404b.

The results indicate that most of the adopters and non-adopters benefited from SOX 302 and 404a compared with the PRESOX period. However, only the non-adopters gained incrementally when moving from SOX 302 to SOX 404a. Also, Section 404b benefited firms with material weaknesses, as well as firms without material weaknesses that had the lowest reporting quality, in the PRESOX period.

This study helps inform the important policy debate on whether to increase the threshold that is used for the SOX 404b exemption. It shows incremental benefits for firms that adopted Section 404b audits, even when they were complying with Section 302 and Section 404a. Consequently, extending the exemption to more companies would result in a loss of the reporting quality benefit of 404b.

This study contributes to the literature by focusing exclusively on non-accelerated filers and by examining differences across four regulation regimes over a long window compared to prior studies. It provides evidence that the financial reporting benefit of SOX 404b is not transitional, but rather extends for a few years even after some firms discontinued the 404b audits.

Central to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was a requirement that every company have an audit of its internal control over financial reporting. However, there were concerns that this requirement was overly burdensome, from a financial perspective, for small businesses. This concern promoted several delays in enforcing the law for small companies and ultimately caused congress to permanently exempt small businesses. Yet, there are some small companies that voluntarily elect to comply with the law. The purpose of this paper is to explore why these companies elect to incur these costly audits.

Using a sample of 5,834 non-accelerator US firms, this paper uses a robust logistic regression model to examine why some firms comply voluntary with SOX Section 404(b).

This study shows that small companies getting audits of internal controls may be doing so to restore investor confidence after reporting failures, to appear credible prior to raising funds, as a response to organizational changes, or in anticipation of being required to comply.

This study provides regulators with an improved understanding of when it is necessary to implement mandatory rather than voluntary guidance.

This study is the first to document why a client would voluntarily comply with SOX Section 404 (b).