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Economic sanctions imposed by the EU and United States on Russia have brought significant changes into Russian foreign economic policy, in particular leading to deepening cooperation with Asian countries and China in particular. The present contribution aims to shed light on the influence of sanctions on Russian multinational enterprises (MNEs) internationalization toward China using the example of energy and information and communication technology (ICT) industries.

The chapter builds on case study analysis. The choice of sectors allows us to highlight the recent strategic trends in the internationalization of oil and gas industry, dominated by state-owned multinationals, and in ICT by privately owned companies.

Our results provide empirical data for understanding the influence of sanctions on MNEs from the country being under the sanctions. In the case of Russian oil and gas industry and ICTs, research indicates that the shift toward China was not initiated primarily by the sanctions. In both cases, expansion to Asian markets was correlated with business interests in the Chinese market. However, changes in geopolitical and macroeconomic business environment accelerated Russian MNE’s pivot to China, for the purposes of attracting capital and reaching new markets in context of deteriorating relations with western partners. The cases demonstrate a moderating role of the industry in the context of sanctions, helping compensate for the slowdown of economic relations with traditional partners.

The novelty of the chapter is to delineate the consequences of sanctions on MNEs from the country being under sanctions. In this way, it illustrates the role of geopolitical environment in intensifying internationalization of Russian MNEs toward China.

Since the first days of its independence, Kazakhstan has been overwhelmed by security issues involving its neighbors. It also recognized a number of conventional and unconventional security threats that might undermine stability and development in the region, as well as in the republic. One of the first official documents produced by the Kazakhstan government was the Strategy of Establishment and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State, initiated by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in May 1992.³ Although specific security threats in Kazakhstan were obvious (as the direction post-Soviet security, military arrangements and the CIS had yet to be determined), three sections of this document dealt specifically with security issues, albeit in relatively vague form.⁴ In the document, President Nazarbayev highlighted the fact that the national security of Kazakhstan had a regional dimension, and that relations with CIS members and other states with interests in Central Asia were very important.⁵ He stressed particularly that his country needed a military doctrine to “prevent and defend against (external) military threat.”⁶ It took several years for this concept of national security to be clarified and conceptualized in a comprehensive document, the Law on National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan.⁷

As the tragedy in New York and Washington moves further into memory, more and more politicians, officials and experts in various countries question whether or not the world has changed. Would the shock have been as strong, the international reaction as unanimous or the retaliation as decisive and powerful if the catastrophe had occurred in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, or Moscow? Or, is the issue simply that the September 11th terror was executed in the most powerful nation of the world? Perhaps September 11th is significant only because America had been invulnerable until then and in response it defined the scale of retaliation and prompted the creation of a worldwide coalition to support its quest for vengeance? Regardless, September 11th did signify the beginning of a new era in international security largely because its victim was the most powerful nation in the world.

Nonaka (1990) makes the distinction between generic knowledge that can be applied in many similar contexts, and local knowledge that can be best applied in a specific local context. Israel (1987) and Fukuyama (2004) point out that “high specificity” tasks (i.e. with clear objectives, and using well-defined technologies) with low transaction volume are more likely to be performed successfully by organizations across a wide range of cultural contexts. In this spirit, Friedman (2005, pp. 313–323) observes that countries can benefit from the “flat world” through a combination of “reform wholesale” and “reform retail”. The former entails market-centered reforms such as privatization, deregulation, reducing trade barriers, and adopting flexible labor laws. A handful of leaders in each country have pushed through such reforms in a wide range of cultural contexts including the developed OECD countries, plus many others such as Brazil, India, Mexico, Russia, China, and other East Asian “tiger” economies. The latter entails upgrading infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and education and health standards. Unlike the former, the latter reforms cannot be instituted by a handful of leaders, but require broad changes at many levels of society. Although the end results in countries successful at “reform retail” have many similarities (e.g. healthy, well-educated citizens) the steps toward achieving the results are very different, depending on culture and other contextual factors.

This chapter explores the writings of Pakistani sociologist Hamza Alavi, especially on the post-colonial state, ethnicity, peasantry and kinship relations. In contradistinction to most (partial) uptakes of Alavi, I evaluate his work as a whole in order to shed light on its continuities and discontinuities. I demonstrate both the strengths and pitfalls of Alavi's theorisation of the post-colonial state, mode of production and ethnicity by placing him in context of wider Marxist debates at the time. I then suggest that Alavi's other work (e.g. on the peasantry and kinship relations) may serve to complement the weaknesses of the former. Thus, by reading Alavi contra Alavi, I advocate for an ‘integral’ perspective on the relations between civil and political society, arguing for a conjunctural awareness of mediations between the same, and their imbrications with differentiated relations of class, ethnicity and kinship.

India became a NWS (Nuclear Weapons State) most reluctantly in May 1998 despite her demonstration of nuclear weapons capability 24 years earlier in May 1974. Having assumed the new status as the sixth overt nuclear weapons state, India also declared her principled policy governing use of nuclear weapons in the event of a national security threat. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine was called “minimum deterrence” by the BJP-led NDA government, but the Congress-led UPA government in 2004 renamed it as “credible deterrence.”

But the heart of the vibrant Indian nuclear doctrine is its commitment to No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were invented by the United States (U.S.). First-ever use of atom bomb is also made by the Americans and a philosophic foundation for the discussion on NFU was also laid in the U.S. However, having put the NFU in the philosophic parlance, the U.S. in the Cold War International environment professed the doctrine for First Use (FU) of nuclear weapons. It is China that made a first public commitment to the NFU after it became the fifth nuclear weapons state.

This chapter proposes to discuss Indian commitment to NFU as a first step on the long path toward global nuclear disarmament—or No Use (NU) of nuclear weapons. India saw Partial Test Ban treaty of 1963 as a step toward NU and also saw the discussions on NPT as another step toward nuclear disarmament as much as it wanted the big powers to see the CTBT too as a device aimed at putting world into NU bind. West, led by the U.S., was however only interested in using the CTBT to deny nuclear weapons status to threshold states, particularly India.

As a self-declared nuclear weapons state, India has, in nuclear doctrine, committed itself to nuclear disarmament. Can there be an international treaty between the declared nuclear weapons states? Can India and Russia come together on the issue? Can they convince China to join? With three Asian nuclear weapons states committing themselves to NFU, U.S. can see economic sense in an international treaty on NFU. Is it possible to create a global public opinion in favor of NU of nuclear weapons? The questions will be answered based on research conduct on the subject.

The corporate food regime is presented here as a vector of the project of global development. As such, it expresses not only the social and ecological contradictions of capitalism, but also the world-historical conjuncture in which the deployment of price and credit relations are key mechanisms of ‘accumulation through dispossession.’ The global displacement of peasant cultures of provision by dumping, the supermarket revolution, and conversion of land for agro-exports, incubate ‘food sovereignty’ movements expressing alternative relationships to the land, farming and food.