Search results

This paper aims to examine the effects of subjective and financial literacy, big five personality traits and emotions (fear, anger, hope and sadness) on risk aversion, risky investment intention and investment choices were investigated. Interactions of these three variables (risk aversion, risky investment intention and investment choices) were also examined.

For this purpose, in January-February 2019, collected data on 446 subjects from Turkey using the internet (341) and face-to-face (105) survey instruments. The authors exploited IBM SPSS Statistics for analysis. ANOVA, t-test and discriminant analysis were performed.

As a result of the analyzes, two personality traits (neuroticism and openness) and two emotions (fear and sadness) were determined as predictors of risk aversion. For risky investment intention, risk aversion, two personality traits (neuroticism and openness) and one of the same and other one different two emotions (fear and anger) were found.

Investment choices can be estimated by objective financial literature, risk aversion and risky investment intention. In addition, individuals’ risk averse or risk taking characteristics differ according to their level of sadness with agreeableness, conscientiousness and neuroticism personality traits. Similarly, have a risky investment intention or have not risky investment intention also differs according to sadness emotions with conscientiousness and openness. Finally, the choice of stocks or bank deposits varies according to subjective financial literacy and extraversion personality trait.

The author presents new estimates of the probability weighting functions found in rank-dependent theories of choice under risk. These estimates are unusual in two senses. First, they are free of functional form assumptions about both utility and weighting functions, and they are entirely based on binary discrete choices and not on matching or valuation tasks, though they depend on assumptions concerning the nature of probabilistic choice under risk. Second, estimated weighting functions contradict widely held priors of an inverse-s shape with fixed point well in the interior of the (0,1) interval: Instead the author usually finds populations dominated by “optimists” who uniformly overweight best outcomes in risky options. The choice pairs used here mostly do not provoke similarity-based simplifications. In a third experiment, the author shows that the presence of choice pairs that provoke similarity-based computational shortcuts does indeed flatten estimated probability weighting functions.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how social comparison and motivation to compete account for elevated risk-taking in fund management corroborated by asset market experiments when performance depends on rank-based incentives.

In two laboratory experiments, university students (n1 = 240/n2 = 120) make choices between risky and certain outcomes of hypothetical sums of money. Both experiments investigate in which direction risky choices in an individual condition (individual risk preference) are shifted when participants compare their performance to another participant's performance (social comparison), being instructed or not to outperform the other (incentive to compete).

In the absence of incentives to compete, participants tend to minimize the differences between expected outcomes to themselves and to the other, but when provided with incentives to compete, they tend to maximize these differences. An independent additional increase in risk-taking is observed when participants are provided with incentives to compete.

Original findings include that social comparison does not evoke motivation to compete unless incentives are offered and that increases in risk-taking depend both on what the other chooses and the incentives.

This research aims to test focus of attention effects in risky choice.

As opposed to traditional aspiration-level theory, the shifting-focus concept introduces a second reference point, the survival point, and assumes a shifting focus of attention between the two reference points. In this conceptualization, risk-taking is a function of focus of attention on the survival reference point or the aspiration-level and resources relative to the two reference points. Four randomized controlled studies tested this concept.

Study 1 showed that with aspiration focus the probability of choosing a risky option was higher below an aspiration-level than above it. With survival focus, the effect was reversed. Study 2 found that close to the survival reference point, the probability of choosing a risky option was higher with aspiration focus relative to survival focus. Study 3 revealed that with scarce resources the risk taken was higher with aspiration focus than with survival focus, and the scarcer the resources the stronger was the effect. Study 4 demonstrated that with aspiration focus the risk taken was higher below an aspiration-level than above it. With survival focus the effect was reversed.

In addition to providing support for the validity of the shifting focus concept, this paper elaborates on the theoretical model by providing evidence for moderation effects. Risk-taking was affected by a focus of attention on one of two reference points, and the effect was moderated by resources relative to the two focal points. An advanced model is proposed to capture the effects of focus of attention and resources on risk-taking behavior.

Despite its significance, research on how attribute framing affects ordering decisions in dual sourcing remains insufficient. Hence, this study investigated the effects of attribute framing in a sourcing task involving certain and uncertain qualities of two suppliers and analysed the role of attention with respect to suppliers' information in framing effects.

The impacts of attribute framing on sourcing decisions were demonstrated in two online between-subject (2 × 2 factorial) experimental studies involving professional samples. Study 2 was an eye-tracking experiment.

In Study 1 (N = 251), participants presented with a “high-quality” rather than a “low-quality” frame made different sourcing decisions, opting for larger percentage of order(s) from a supplier under the “high-quality” frame. This pattern holds true for suppliers who differ in risk. This finding was replicated in Study 2 (N = 129). Attention asymmetry related to the information on supplier quality contributes to this effect. Attention directed towards information regarding the supplier's quality under a positive frame mediated the relationship between attribute framing and sourcing decisions.

Highlighting the positive attributes of a risky supplier is essential when ordering from the risky supplier is an optimal decision. It is advantageous for suppliers to highlight positive rather than negative attributes when describing the quality of their components against others.

This is the first study to examine the effect of attention on the relationship between attribute framing and dual sourcing. This presents a new behavioural perspective wherein managers' attention to information plays a vital role.

The extensive normative literature on capital budgeting decision models tends to ignore many factors that influence choice processes. This paper identifies task factors, context factors, and decision maker factors which influence perceived risk in capital budgeting decisions. Central issues explored in the paper are (a) whether some context and decision maker factors can be included in a capital budgeting decision support system's knowledge system, and (b) whether a decision support system can adapt its choice models and interface to different decision situations based on knowledge about task factors, context factors, and decision maker factors.

We take Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) seriously by rigorously estimating structural models using the full set of CPT parameters. Much of the literature only estimates a subset of CPT parameters, or more simply assumes CPT parameter values from prior studies. Our data are from laboratory experiments with undergraduate students and MBA students facing substantial real incentives and losses. We also estimate structural models from Expected Utility Theory (EUT), Dual Theory (DT), Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU), and Disappointment Aversion (DA) for comparison. Our major finding is that a majority of individuals in our sample locally asset integrate. That is, they see a loss frame for what it is, a frame, and behave as if they evaluate the net payment rather than the gross loss when one is presented to them. This finding is devastating to the direct application of CPT to these data for those subjects. Support for CPT is greater when losses are covered out of an earned endowment rather than house money, but RDU is still the best single characterization of individual and pooled choices. Defenders of the CPT model claim, correctly, that the CPT model exists “because the data says it should.” In other words, the CPT model was borne from a wide range of stylized facts culled from parts of the cognitive psychology literature. If one is to take the CPT model seriously and rigorously then it needs to do a much better job of explaining the data than we see here.

A weighting or a rank‐dependent weighting function was used by revamped models of risky choice to explain that Allais Paradox arises because people behave so as to maximize overall value rather than EU. The risky choice behavior was, however, simply seen by the equate‐to‐differentiate model as a choice between the best possible outcomes or a choice between the worst possible outcomes. A “judging” task was designed to examine whether the knowledge of paired outcomes will permit prediction of preference. It was shown that the observed choices could be better accounted for by the equate‐to‐differentiate approach revealed by the judging data.

Behavioral economics poses a challenge for the welfare evaluation of choices, particularly those that involve risk. It demands that we recognize that the descriptive account of behavior toward those choices might not be the ones we were all taught, and still teach, and that subjective risk perceptions might not accord with expert assessments of probabilities. In addition to these challenges, we are faced with the need to jettison naive notions of revealed preferences, according to which every choice by a subject expresses her objective function, as behavioral evidence forces us to confront pervasive inconsistencies and noise in a typical individual’s choice data. A principled account of errant choice must be built into models used for identification and estimation. These challenges demand close attention to the methodological claims often used to justify policy interventions. They also require, we argue, closer attention by economists to relevant contributions from cognitive science. We propose that a quantitative application of the “intentional stance” of Dennett provides a coherent, attractive and general approach to behavioral welfare economics.

The authors believe that comparing individuals to groups' decision making is crucial provided that many important choices in society are made by groups, i.e. committees, governing bodies, juries, business partners and families. This study aims to discuss the aforementioned topic.

The authors analyze risky decision making in the context of the television game show Deal or No Deal – Italian edition. Specifically, the authors scrutinize and compare individual (standard “Deal or No Deal” edition) and group (special edition) choices in the risky choice context provided by programe.

After analyzing contestant's behavior in the standard edition episodes plus a special edition the authors calculate a risk index observing that no statically significant difference is present between individuals' and groups' actions.

In the “Deal or No Deal” special edition contestant were groups of two strangers. It is not uncommon to have couples playing on TV, however the individuals usually know each other well and have relationships in real life. The special edition therefore provides a unique setting (absent to best of the authors’ knowledge in the literature) for investigation and could offer real-world insight. Indeed, in many instances the authors have to contract/make decisions with people the authors do not know/know very little (i.e. occasional business partners, representative at other companies/institutions, insurance/finance advisors, new work colleagues, etc.).