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The four sections to this article have distinct but inter‐related objectives. Part I introduces the concepts, problems and tensions central to an understanding of the product liability debate. These issues recur throughout the article. Part II outlines the development of product liability law in Europe and assesses the impact of the European Directive on Product Liability. The “product liability crisis” in the United States is discussed in Part III, which looks at the law's development and proposals for reform. In Part IV the United States and European positions are compared and the case is made out for a global uniform product liability law which recognises the social responsibility of the producer towards those injured by his products.

This study analyses and discusses the application and constitutionality of the general onus of proof provision (section 82 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 [the “Act”]), the presumption in favour of the State when criminal sanctions are applied to an offending taxpayer (section 104(2) of the Act) and the mechanics for imposing administrative sanctions in terms of section 76(1)(b) of the Act. The conclusion reached is that the reverse onus presumption, as provided for in terms of section 104(2) of the Act, is unconstitutional. It is penal in nature and offends against the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial (sections 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996 [the “Constitution”]). The section 36 limitation of rights clause of the Constitution does not save it. Section 76(1)(b) of the Act read in conjunction with the deeming provision of section 76(5) of the Act, is inextricably linked to the section 82 general reverse onus provision of the Act. Hence, when these three sections are applied together, they create a reverse onus that, prima facie, violates the right to just administrative action (section 33 of the Constitution). Regarding the general reverse onus burden as provided for in terms of section 82 of the Act, the conclusion reached is that it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society and can therefore be regarded as constitutional.

In a recent edition of the nation's favourite soap, Coronation Street, a small incident occurred which illustrated in a nutshell the problems facing the deviser of an industrial design in seeking to protect that design from being copied. Angie, a student of fashion design at the local polytechnic put on a successful show of her designs. Emboldened by the favourable reception she set out a couple of days later for an appointment with a local dress manufacturer to try and sell her designs. She returned a few hours later in tears and with hopes dashed. She had arrived at the firm only to discover that her designs were already being made up into dresses. The designs had been copied at the show and already sold to or copied by them. The incident was not without its silver lining in that in getting drunk to forget the whole sad affair this lead to a romantic interlude with fellow lodger, Curley Watts! It is the purpose of this article to examine the main strands of protection for industrial designs and to look at a proposed new European Community Design Law which has recently been published by the prestigious Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law (Munich, 1991). This proposal is being put to the EC Commission as the basis for an EC Regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the leadin‘g international actor responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), must ensure that they strictly abide by accepted fundamental human rights norms when promulgating and enforcing resolutions for freezing assets of suspected terrorists.

The paper presents an overview of some fundamental human rights affected by the UN resolutions. It then compares leading case law from both the international (European Court of Justice) and domestic (the UK and the USA) perspectives. Finally, the paper discusses the leading academic critiques before exploring whether the UNSC is right to infringe or derogate from human rights norms in its counter‐terrorism policy. If so, in what circumstances and under what conditions may they be right to do so?

There are several fundamental human rights norms which are not respected by the UNSC in the area of terrorist financing.

Research could be expanded to other courts. Further research should consider additional human rights that were outside the scope of this paper.

The UNSC should allow special advocates on all matters both before the ombudsman and themselves. This should provide greater transparency.

The paper should draw attention to the seemingly incongruous position of the UNSC, tasked with protecting us and our human rights, when in fact they themselves may be breaching them.

The paper will be valuable to governments and regulators that seek to regulate the financial markets. It will also be useful to human rights activists.

Long has recently presented a statement of what the pro‐abortion position is and also a defence of it. I shall, as a pro‐abortionist, question the statement and attack the defence.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to show that the settings are not self-incriminating rights the right of non-self-incrimination) within the law and how the civil rights of the crown witness exist.

Design/Methodology/Approach – This prescriptive and descriptive study employs the normative legal approach and qualitative analysis.

Findings – The attorney general should prove that a criminal case is not too oriented toward witnesses, especially the crown witness, and that there is still other evidence (e.g., evidence of letters and the results of forensic analysis) and the value of convincing proof is difficult to be denied by the defendant. To avoid misinterpretation towards the presence of crown witness in a criminal case process, a regulation policy issued by the Supreme Court of Republic Indonesia is needed.

Practical Implications – Proffering a crown witness under oath is to prove that a crime opposes against the procedure of criminal law with respect the human right values.

Originality/Value – Forcing a person to prove his own guilt is an act contrary to the alleged principle of an innocent person and this research has not been published.

Illicit enrichment refers to the unjustified increase in the assets of a public official. Criminalisation of illicit enrichment is required under Article 20 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and as a State Party, South Africa is thus expected to deal effectively with illicit enrichment as an offence. This paper aims to address different approaches of various jurisdictions to deal with illicit enrichment and discusses the elements of the crime, drawing on a South African perspective, to determine how illicit enrichment can be criminalised in South Africa.

The research methodology used was a critical analysis of the definition and elements of the crime, as well as the global action taken to implement this offence. A comparative analysis was used to compare international frameworks with those of South Africa to conclude on the practicality and challenges of introducing the offence of illicit enrichment.

It was found that an element of the crime, in particular the lack of justification, has been a primary point of criticism, as it is claimed that illicit enrichment laws reverse the burden of proof when an accused is required to prove the legitimacy of his or her assets. However, this issue is not insurmountable in the South African context, and the paper concludes that the criminalisation of illicit enrichment is possible, as South Africa possesses the necessary legislation and case law to support such measure.

This paper contributes to the scholarly research on criminalising illicit enrichment in South Africa.

Outlines the Libertarian framework of rights and obligations in abortion. Argues that abortion is homicide based upon the scientific and philosophic evidence available and disputes further points believed by abortion proponents.

Individual rights as a part of our common heritage has evolved from the philosophies of Locke, Voltaire, and the declarations of the French and American Revolutions. The basic rights of liberty, free speech, religion, worship, the right to be innocent until proven guilty are a basic principle of the freedom to which we all subscribe.

The purpose of writing this paper is to defend the doctrine of commodification, or alienability: that there are no exceptions to the principle that all things that are owned may be legally sold.

The approach of this paper is to consider arguments to the contrary, mainly those, in this case, furnished by Kuflik, and then to refute these arguments.

The conclusion of this paper is that socialism, the view that purchases and sales, markets, free enterprise, is unjustified, is mistaken. Non‐alienability is part and parcel of the critique of markets. To the extent it is countered, markets are strengthened.

Future research would probe more deeply into anti‐market arguments.

The practical implications is that the law should legalize markets in body parts, and, more radically, should recognize voluntary slave contracts.

This is virtually an entirely original paper, in that there are only a very few publications that defend complete alienability, such as does this one.