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This paper aims to examine the internal logical relationship between two intergenerational inheritance ways of passing property rights and residual control rights (RCR) and to construct a conceptual model comprising transfer elements, paths and timing of succession in this process.

Driven by the cases of Haixin, Tianyijiao and Changhe Group, this paper applies research methods of copying and expanding analysis logic, progressive deduction, content analysis and comparative research based on the perspective of HeXie theory to explore the deep interrelation of transfer elements, paths and timing during family business succession.

The findings present that the content of intergenerational inheritance of a family firm is the inheritance of property rights and RCR. First, the inheritance of property rights is a static inheritance of time-point delivery, whereas the inheritance of RCR is a dynamic inheritance process for a period of time. Second, the inheritance of property rights and RCR are not independent; only a “HeXie” succession of both rights can realize a successful inheritance of family firms.

This paper constructs the paths and timing model of intergenerational inheritance of property rights and RCR in family firms. This paper integrates the current literature studies on the family inheritance of property rights and RCR and explains their internal mechanisms. This paper also provides a theoretical foundation and empirical evidence for family business transitions in the business world.

In the “shareholder primacy” (SP) view of the modern corporation, shareholders are endowed with ownership rights over the corporation. This view stems from the property rights and agency theories of the business firm formulated by financial and business economists in the 1970s and 1980s, which subsequently fed into US corporate law debates. It relies on positive legal assumptions that have largely been debunked by legal scholars, and on normative economic ideas that are equally problematic. However, SP is still very influential – if not the dominant paradigm of corporate governance, especially in the United States. The goal of the present study is to come back to the theoretical debates around the foundations of the SP paradigm to seek to identify key ideational properties that may explain, in part, the resilience of such paradigm in policy, scholarship and business practice. In particular, this paper proposes that one important reason for the persistence of the SP ideology lies in the latter’s foundation on the radically contingent nature of shareholders’ claims over the corporation.

We argue that the stakeholder and CSR literature can benefit from more systematic thinking about ownership. We discuss general notions of ownership in the economics and legal literature and the entrepreneurial notion of ownership we have developed in prior work. On this basis, we argue that stakeholder theory needs to deal more systematically with ownership as an economic function that can be exercised with greater or lesser ability, may be complementary to other economic functions, and works better when assigned to homogeneous groups. Some stakeholder groups are likely to lack what we call “ownership competence,” even if they have made relationship-specific investments, in part because of a diversity of interests. We also discuss CSR from the perspective of ownership and support Friedman’s original position, but with a twist. The point of Friedman’s paper is not that firms “should” maximize profits, but that managerial pursuit of “socially responsible” activities in a discretionary way imposes costs on owners. We suggest this problem is exacerbated with entrepreneurial managers who can devise new ways to prop up their self-interested actions with new creative CSR initiatives.

The purpose of this paper is to summarize the institutional evolution of China's farmland property rights deformity with its internal logic, analyze its property rights deformity and the invasions of these rights under the family operation background, and puts forward fundamental suggestions for reforming farmland property rights in China.

The concept of “public domain” raised by Barzel in 1989 is used and extended to analyze China's farmland system.

There exist five sorts of public domain and two apparent characteristics of property rights deformity: the unclear final controlling rights for some valuable attributes of goods of the “public domain”; and the “public domain” deliberately created by the government. The public domain caused by technical factors and owner's real capability are herein excluded.

China's past and present farmland system is a result of the government's compulsory system arrangements instead of market evolution. The expansion of public domains III and V has directly shrunk peasants' residual property rights. The concept of “public domain” is developed to reveal the essence of China's farmland property rights deformity.

Shareholders and managers can work in a hierarchy in which principals attempt to control the actions of agents to achieve the wealth objective. Alternatively, shareholders and managers can work together as a cooperative team in which shareholders provide financial capital and managers provide human capital. The authors aim to examine the different implications for value creation provided by the two approaches.

By comparing the literature on the value implications of the incomplete contracting framework and control arrangements in principal-agent hierarchies, the authors identify deviations from optimal outcomes and suggest solutions.

The review indicates that a cooperative framework has some advantages over the hierarchical model. The stability of human capital and the relationship between managers and shareholders can be enhanced when shareholders provide capital in increments which vest over time and latitude for renegotiation of agreements is built into contracts.

By surrendering control using stock options programmes, managers are free to invest in relationship-specific assets. Shareholders can control the provision of capital by withdrawing investment if insufficient returns are realized, i.e. if stock options do not meet vesting requirements. The market can then be left to do its work.

This paper provides an original review of literature on cooperation and hierarchies in the shareholder–manager relationship and proposes solutions to identified deviations from optimal outcomes.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a theory of sovereign entrepreneurship, which is a special kind of political entrepreneurship.

This paper uses qualitative methods/historical survey.

Sovereignty is rooted in self-enforced exchange of political property rights. Sovereign entrepreneurship is the creative employment of political property rights to advance a plan.

Because a polity’s constitution is determined by its distribution of political property rights, sovereign entrepreneurship and constitutional change are necessarily linked. The author illustrated how sovereign entrepreneurship can be applied by using it to explain the rise of modern states.

In addition to studying instances of sovereign entrepreneurship in distant history, scholars can apply it to recent history. Sovereign entrepreneurship can be especially helpful as a tool for doing analytic narratives of low-n cases of political-economic development, especially when those polities attract interests for being “development miracles.”

This paper uses treats sovereignty as a political property right.

The literature on labor-managed firms identifies the source of under-capitalization in the Furubotn–Pejovich effect. Appropriable capital accounts can counteract the horizon problem, but they engender little-examined problems connected with the distribution, reinvestment, and reimbursement of net surpluses. This paper proposes that the introduction of cooperative bonds would provide a better match between the horizons of members and their firms. However, bonds generate risks of their own due to capital variability, thus requiring the imposition of various constraints and the retention of appropriate levels of collective reserves. Finally, a hierarchy of liabilities is proposed to protect parties who undergo information disadvantages.

Connecting and integrating the economics, organization, and management of the firm with other relevant perspectives in political science, constitutional law, and constitutional political economy, this paper revisits the nature of the corporation as a particular type of constitutional contract. The baseline argument is to show how far we can go in redesigning and democratizing the corporate form of business “societas” by using only organizational effectiveness criteria before any ethical or political options. In fact, on the basis of those (re-)foundations, the analysis addresses the questions of why the form of government of that societas should be (and in part already is in various corporate law systems) a “republic of rightholders”; who those “rightholders” should be; and which structures (organs and bodies) and decision and control procedures may sustain effective governance not only in terms of the representation of legitimate interests but also in terms of decision quality. The result is the specification of the requisite variety of “chambers” and within “chambers.”

This paper aims to prove the validity and necessity of knowledge stickiness and knowledge investment level.

Empirical study method is taken in this investigation which focuses on knowledge‐related industries' workers and proves the validity and necessity of knowledge stickiness and knowledge investment level with SPSS13.0 software.

The authors confirm the positive correlation between knowledge contribution and sharing residual claims based on management, and also confirm the positive correlation between knowledge stickiness, knowledge investment level and sharing residual claims based on technology. However, a negative correlation on management is also confirmed.

After an analysis on the incentive distortion caused by the information asymmetry between the principal and agent in the traditional incentive mode, a residual claims sharing structure containing knowledge contract is put forward.

This paper builds upon recent advances in the corporate governance framework to extend and complement the economic literature on producer cooperatives. We argue that the problem of governance in a cooperative is twofold and consists in designing mechanisms and setting up institutions that (1) encourage workers to define a goal that maximizes workers’ welfare and (2) induce managers to pursue and internalize such a broad goal. When compared to capital‐controlled firms, the agency problems become more complex and harder to solve in the cooperative framework. As empirical evidence of this problem and its corresponding solution, we illustrate the case of the Mondragón cooperatives, explaining in detail the incentive system and the control mechanisms now in place in this successful business group. The study of the governance architecture of Mondragón may help us to propose solutions to traditional problems of the cooperative firm and to reach a better understanding of both the governance of cooperatives and corporate governance in general.