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This article combines two sources of data to shed light on the nature of transactional legal work. The first consists of stories about contracts that circulate among elite transactional lawyers. The stories portray lawyers as ineffective market actors who are uninterested in designing superior contracts, who follow rather than lead industry standards, and who depend on governments and other outside actors to spur innovation and correct mistakes. We juxtapose these stories against a dataset of sovereign bond contracts produced by these same lawyers. While the stories suggest that lawyers do not compete or design innovative contracts, their contracts suggest the contrary. The contracts, in fact, are consistent with a market narrative in which lawyers engage in substantial innovation despite constraints inherent in sovereign debt legal work. Why would lawyers favor stories that paint them in a negative light and deny them a potent role as market actors? We conclude with some conjectures as to why this might be so.

Purpose – Study the investment and risk management approach of sovereign wealth funds when national wealth including natural resources is accounted for rather than only financial asset.

Methodology/Approach – Using a range of widely used asset classes, we simulate sovereign wealth fund returns when considering only financial assets but also under varying levels of national wealth holdings in oil. We optimize two-asset financial portfolios and three-asset portfolios when including oil to maximize the risk-adjusted returns.

Findings – Sovereign wealth funds by failing to invest for the national wealth portfolio are overlooking a major source of volatility. To reduce the level of volatility associated with yearly national wealth returns, allocating a higher percentage of fixed assets to high-quality fixed income and low-risk equities will maximize the risk-adjusted returns of national wealth for sovereign wealth fund states.

Social implications – By focusing solely on the financial assets managed by sovereign wealth funds, states are exposing themselves to significant national wealth risk.

Originality/Value of the paper – This is the first work to estimate the impact on national wealth of oil-dependent states by failing to account for volatile commodity prices through the investment strategies of sovereign wealth funds.

The study examines the joint effect of sovereign and call risks on the duration of callable sovereign bonds over the period 1996–2011. The results indicate that the sovereign risk-adjusted duration is significantly shorter than its Macaulay counterpart for U.S. dollar-denominated investment-grade callable sovereign bonds. Further, the “shortening” effect of sovereign and call risks on duration is generally stronger among bonds of lower ratings. Similar results are obtained when CDS prices are used as a proxy for changes in sovereign risk. Results from this study emphasize the importance of considering the joint effect of sovereign and call risks in managing the interest rate risk exposure in fixed income investments.

The social protests on the streets of indebted sovereigns in crises across the Eurozone have made debt restructuring an imperative. Further delay in achieving this expeditiously and equitably significantly exacerbates the social costs of crises from which current and future generations will struggle to recover. This article examines the feasibility of the drastic and widespread debt restructuring needed to resolve the problem in the face of existing private law sanctions that protect individual creditor rights. It relies on an analysis of US policy in the transition to a securitized market and of key sovereign debt cases to reveal the historical contingency of private law protections. It concludes by showing that the effectiveness of private law protections have always been constrained by the overriding imperative to achieve debt sustainability with negotiated and consensual workouts. This can be achieved in the Eurozone with statutory constraints on enforcement action pending the settlement of debt workouts as suggested in a recent proposal.

This is an essay that will be misinterpreted. Before I even mention genocidal rights, I want to make clear what my argument is not. First, my argument is not that genocide has not happened or does not continue to happen. Second, I will not suggest that genocide is not a serious crime. Finally, I will not try to develop a theory of victimhood – to challenge the centrality of the victim in discussions of genocide. Rather, my interest here will be the uncomfortably intimate relationship between genocidal violence on the one hand and the elaboration of civil, sovereign, and human rights on the other.

In October 2020, Zambia failed to make a $42.5 million interest payment on $1 billion in Eurobonds maturing in 2024, becoming the first African country to default on its debt obligations in the aftermath of COVID-19. Zambia's default highlights the fragmented nature of governance in sovereign debt markets. The Zambian default also underscores the continuing impact of colonial hangover in former colonies in Africa. Fragmented governance and colonial overhang create incentives for both debtors and creditors that contribute to cycles of sovereign debt. These cycles of debt pose a particular hazard to residents within countries that issue such debt. In African contexts, this has led to flows of funds for debt repayment that may significantly jeopardize the well-being of people who are already poor. Zambia's default also reflects the increasing need of African countries to navigate among different external actors, particularly China, which has given loans throughout Africa for varied projects, including infrastructure lending as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The Zambian default draws attention to the significant amount of Eurobond debt African countries have incurred in recent years and the burdens that such debt may impose. The circumstances of Zambia's default, as well as recent disputes about external debt in Mozambique, reflect continuing issues about transparency and public scrutiny of sovereign debt transactions and the broader societal impact of debt internally within African countries and in relations between African countries and varied external powers.

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the young, but rapidly growing sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market, describes the function, trading, history, market participants, key statistical and stylized facts about CDS prices, determinants, price discovery, and risk issues.

The recent financial and sovereign debt crises around the world have sparked a growing literature on models and empirical estimates of defaultable debt. Frequently households and firms come under default threat, local governments can default, and recently sovereign default threats were eminent for Greece and Spain in 2012–2013. Moreover, Argentina experienced an actual default in 2001. What causes sovereign default risk, and what are the escape routes from default risk? Previous studies such as Arellano (2008), Roch and Uhlig (2013), and Arellano et al. (2014) have provided theoretical models to explore the main dynamics of sovereign defaults. These models can be characterized as threshold models in which there is a convergence toward a good no-default equilibrium below the threshold and a default equilibrium above the threshold. However, in these models aggregate output is exogenous, so that important macroeconomic feedback effects are not taken into account. In this chapter, we (1) propose alternative model variants suitable for certain types of countries in the EU where aggregate output is endogenously determined and where financial stress plays a key role, (2) show how these model variants can be solved through the Nonlinear Model Predictive Control numerical technique, and (3) present some empirical evidence on the nonlinear dynamics of output, sovereign debt, and financial stress in some euro areas and other industrialized countries.

This study aims to investigate beneficial right as a new legal concept and term accepted by the Indonesian legal system. The new concept was ratified to endorse government decision to use ṣukūk (as an Islamic financial instrument) in the financing of state budget deficit. Some legal issues emerged after the ratification such as the necessity to synchronize the beneficial right with other property rights in Indonesia and the disharmony between laws related to sovereign ṣukūk issuance.

The study uses a qualitative method with library study and interviews with relevant legal experts in Indonesia as the data collection techniques.

The findings show that the passage of Sovereign Ṣukūk Law 2008 that ratified beneficial right deemed as a concession point by the government to solve conflicts between legal restriction and employment of state-owned assets as the underlying asset of sovereign ṣukūk. The study deemed the necessity to improve the use of beneficial right in the Indonesian legal system which by the concept is not exercised for the issuance of sovereign ṣukūk only. There is the need to harmonize the administration of this right with other property rights in Indonesia.

The scope of study will be limited to the Indonesian regulation related to the use of beneficial right concept in the issuance of sovereign ṣukūk in Indonesia. The regulation as mentioned will be in the form of statutes, presidential or ministerial regulations, and also opinions of Indonesian legal and sharīʿah scholars regarding the matter.

This study may explore significantly the use of beneficial right for the issuance of sovereign ṣukūk by the Government of Indonesia. Specifically, the study reveals and addresses the issues that are following the ratification of beneficial rights originated from the common law system into the Indonesian civil law system.

This study aims to examine the fiscal policy drivers of sovereign sukuk market development in selected Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries. Specifically, the research aims to analyze the effects of fiscal deficit, public debt and government expenditure on sovereign sukuk market development, while controlling for macroeconomic and financial factors.

The sample consists of eight OIC member countries that play active role in the global sukuk market which include Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Indonesia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey and Sudan. In addition, the study covers a period of 10 years spanning between 2011 and 2020. Similarly, the study uses three models, namely, random effect, generalized least square and system generalized method of moments panel models. To check for the robustness of the results, the study replaces current values of fiscal policy variables with one-year lagged values.

The findings establish that fiscal policy variables significantly influence the development of sovereign sukuk markets. Specifically, public debt is a significant fiscal variable that promotes sovereign sukuk market development, while fiscal deficit has a negative effect on the development of sovereign sukuk market. However, the findings suggest that government expenditure does not influence sovereign sukuk issuance in the OIC member countries.

The study is significant to both investors and regulators in the sukuk market because it attempts to spotlight the importance of sound fiscal climate in developing sovereign sukuk market. Public debt is a facilitator, whereas fiscal deficit appears to be a constraint. Therefore, policymakers should determine the optimal mix of public debt and fiscal deficit in designing policies that promote sukuk market development.

The novelty of the study is its focus on the role of fiscal policy variables in facilitating sovereign sukuk market development. The study systematically establishes the link between fiscal policy and sovereign sukuk market in the OIC countries. Previous empirical studies focus extensively on the effects of macroeconomic, financial and institutional factors on sukuk market development.