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Since sovereign ratings provided by credit rating agencies (CRAs) are a key determinant of the interest rates a country faces in the international financial market and once sovereign ratings may have a constraining impact on the ratings assigned to domestic banks or companies, some studies have focused on identifying the determinants of sovereign credit risk assessments provided by CRAs. In particular, this study estimates the effect of fiscal credibility on sovereign risk using four different comprehensive credit rating (CCR) measures obtained from CRAs' announcements and two different fiscal credibility indicators.

We build comprehensive credit rating (CCR) measures to capture sovereign risk. These measures are calculated using sovereign ratings, the rating outlooks and credit watches issued by the three main credit rating agencies (S&P, Moody's and Fitch) for long-term foreign-currency Brazilian bonds. Based on monthly data from 2003 to 2018, we use different econometric estimation techniques in order to provide robust results.

The results indicate that fiscal credibility exerts both short- and long-run effects on sovereign risk perception, and macroeconomic fundamentals are important long-run determinants.

Since fiscal credibility reflects the government's ability to maintain budgetary balance and sustainable public debt, the government should keep its commitment to responsible fiscal policies so as not to deteriorate expectations formed by financial market experts about the fiscal scenario and, thus, to achieve better credit assessments issued by CRAs with respect to sovereign debt bonds. Sovereign credit rating assessment is a voluntary practice. It is up to the country whether they want to apply for a rating assessment or not. Thus, without a sovereign rating, one must find an alternative to measure the sovereign risk of a country. In this sense, an important practical implication that this study provides is that fiscal credibility can be used as a leading indicator of sovereign risk perceptions obtained from CRAs or even as a proxy for sovereign risk.

This paper is the first to verify how important the expectations of financial market experts in relation to the fiscal effort required to keep public debt at a sustainable level (i.e. fiscal credibility) are to sovereign risk perception of credit rating agencies. In this sense, the study is the first to address this relation, and thus it contributes to the literature that seeks to understand the determinants of sovereign ratings in emerging countries.

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are perceived as highly influential in the financial system since their announcements can affect several players in the financial markets, from big private financial and non-financial companies and their financial markets experts to sovereign states. In this sense, this study investigates whether sovereign credit news issued by CRAs (measured by comprehensive credit rating (CCR) variables) affect the uncertainties about the exchange rate in the future (captured by the disagreement about exchange rate expectations). The study is relevant once there is evidence indicating that CRAs' assessments are responsible for affecting international capital flows and, thus, sovereign rating changes can affect the expectations formation process regarding the exchange rate. In addition, there is evidence indicating that the disagreement about exchange rate expectations affects the disagreement about inflation expectations, which brings consequences to policymakers.

The dependent variables are the disagreement in expectations about the Brazilian exchange rate for different forecast horizons, 12, 24 and 36 months ahead and the first principal component of theses series. On the other hand, the CCR variables are built upon the long-term foreign-currency Brazilian bonds ratings, outlooks and credit watches provided by the main CRAs. Estimates are obtained using ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM); a dynamic analysis is performed using vector-autoregressive (VAR) through impulse-response functions.

Negative (positive) sovereign credit news, given by a rating downgrade (upgrade) and/or a negative (positive) outlook/watch status, increase (decrease) the disagreement about exchange rate expectations. This result holds for all disagreement and CCR variables.

The study brings practical implications to both private agents (mainly financial market experts) and policymakers. An important practical implication of the study concerns the ability of CRAs to affect the expectations formation process of financial market experts regarding the future behavior of the exchange rate. When a CRA issues a signal of improvement in a country's sovereign rating, this signal reflects the perception of improvement in macroeconomic fundamentals and reduction of uncertainties about the country's ability to honor its financial obligations, which therefore, facilitates the expectations formation process, causing a reduction in the disagreement about the exchange rate expectations. With respect to the consequences for policymakers, they will have more difficulty in guiding expectations in a country with a worse sovereign risk rating, where agents have difficulties in forming expectations and the disagreement in expectations is greater.

The study is the first to analyze the impact of CRAs' announcements on the disagreement about exchange rate expectations. Moreover, it connects the literature that investigates the effects of sovereign credit news on the economy with the literature that examines the main determinants of disagreement in expectations about macroeconomic variables.

This article combines two sources of data to shed light on the nature of transactional legal work. The first consists of stories about contracts that circulate among elite transactional lawyers. The stories portray lawyers as ineffective market actors who are uninterested in designing superior contracts, who follow rather than lead industry standards, and who depend on governments and other outside actors to spur innovation and correct mistakes. We juxtapose these stories against a dataset of sovereign bond contracts produced by these same lawyers. While the stories suggest that lawyers do not compete or design innovative contracts, their contracts suggest the contrary. The contracts, in fact, are consistent with a market narrative in which lawyers engage in substantial innovation despite constraints inherent in sovereign debt legal work. Why would lawyers favor stories that paint them in a negative light and deny them a potent role as market actors? We conclude with some conjectures as to why this might be so.

Purpose – Study the investment and risk management approach of sovereign wealth funds when national wealth including natural resources is accounted for rather than only financial asset.

Methodology/Approach – Using a range of widely used asset classes, we simulate sovereign wealth fund returns when considering only financial assets but also under varying levels of national wealth holdings in oil. We optimize two-asset financial portfolios and three-asset portfolios when including oil to maximize the risk-adjusted returns.

Findings – Sovereign wealth funds by failing to invest for the national wealth portfolio are overlooking a major source of volatility. To reduce the level of volatility associated with yearly national wealth returns, allocating a higher percentage of fixed assets to high-quality fixed income and low-risk equities will maximize the risk-adjusted returns of national wealth for sovereign wealth fund states.

Social implications – By focusing solely on the financial assets managed by sovereign wealth funds, states are exposing themselves to significant national wealth risk.

Originality/Value of the paper – This is the first work to estimate the impact on national wealth of oil-dependent states by failing to account for volatile commodity prices through the investment strategies of sovereign wealth funds.

The study examines the joint effect of sovereign and call risks on the duration of callable sovereign bonds over the period 1996–2011. The results indicate that the sovereign risk-adjusted duration is significantly shorter than its Macaulay counterpart for U.S. dollar-denominated investment-grade callable sovereign bonds. Further, the “shortening” effect of sovereign and call risks on duration is generally stronger among bonds of lower ratings. Similar results are obtained when CDS prices are used as a proxy for changes in sovereign risk. Results from this study emphasize the importance of considering the joint effect of sovereign and call risks in managing the interest rate risk exposure in fixed income investments.

The social protests on the streets of indebted sovereigns in crises across the Eurozone have made debt restructuring an imperative. Further delay in achieving this expeditiously and equitably significantly exacerbates the social costs of crises from which current and future generations will struggle to recover. This article examines the feasibility of the drastic and widespread debt restructuring needed to resolve the problem in the face of existing private law sanctions that protect individual creditor rights. It relies on an analysis of US policy in the transition to a securitized market and of key sovereign debt cases to reveal the historical contingency of private law protections. It concludes by showing that the effectiveness of private law protections have always been constrained by the overriding imperative to achieve debt sustainability with negotiated and consensual workouts. This can be achieved in the Eurozone with statutory constraints on enforcement action pending the settlement of debt workouts as suggested in a recent proposal.

This is an essay that will be misinterpreted. Before I even mention genocidal rights, I want to make clear what my argument is not. First, my argument is not that genocide has not happened or does not continue to happen. Second, I will not suggest that genocide is not a serious crime. Finally, I will not try to develop a theory of victimhood – to challenge the centrality of the victim in discussions of genocide. Rather, my interest here will be the uncomfortably intimate relationship between genocidal violence on the one hand and the elaboration of civil, sovereign, and human rights on the other.

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the young, but rapidly growing sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market, describes the function, trading, history, market participants, key statistical and stylized facts about CDS prices, determinants, price discovery, and risk issues.

The recent financial and sovereign debt crises around the world have sparked a growing literature on models and empirical estimates of defaultable debt. Frequently households and firms come under default threat, local governments can default, and recently sovereign default threats were eminent for Greece and Spain in 2012–2013. Moreover, Argentina experienced an actual default in 2001. What causes sovereign default risk, and what are the escape routes from default risk? Previous studies such as Arellano (2008), Roch and Uhlig (2013), and Arellano et al. (2014) have provided theoretical models to explore the main dynamics of sovereign defaults. These models can be characterized as threshold models in which there is a convergence toward a good no-default equilibrium below the threshold and a default equilibrium above the threshold. However, in these models aggregate output is exogenous, so that important macroeconomic feedback effects are not taken into account. In this chapter, we (1) propose alternative model variants suitable for certain types of countries in the EU where aggregate output is endogenously determined and where financial stress plays a key role, (2) show how these model variants can be solved through the Nonlinear Model Predictive Control numerical technique, and (3) present some empirical evidence on the nonlinear dynamics of output, sovereign debt, and financial stress in some euro areas and other industrialized countries.

The importance of obtaining a sovereign credit rating from an agency is still underrated in Africa. Literature on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings in Africa is scarce. The purpose of this research is to determine what the determinants are for sovereign credit ratings in Africa and whether these determinants differ between regions and income groups.

A sample of 19 African countries' determinants of sovereign credit ratings are compared between 2007 and 2014 using a panel-ordered probit approach.

The findings indicated that the determinants of sovereign credit ratings differ between African regions and income groups. The developmental indicators were the most significant determinants across all income groups and regions. The results affirm that the identified determinants in the literature are not as applicable to African sovereigns, and that developmental variables and different income groups and regions are important determinants to consider for sovereign credit ratings in Africa.

The results affirm that the identified determinants in the literature are not as applicable to African sovereigns, and that developmental variables and different income groups and regions are important determinants to consider for sovereign credit ratings in Africa. Rating agencies follow the same rating assignment process for developed and developing countries, which means investors will have to supplement the allocated credit rating with additional information. Africa can attract more investment if African countries obtain formal, accurate sovereign credit ratings, which take the characteristics of the continent into consideration.