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The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of industry specialization on the absorption and competitive pricing (or lack thereof) of audits of large Andersen clients (S&P 1500 companies) who switched to the remaining Big 4 international accounting firms in 2002 due to the demise of Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen). Did the audit clients pay a premium or discount in audit fees to their new auditor who specialized in their industry?

Ordinary least squares regression is used to test hypothesis of a positive association between industry specialization and audit fees charged to former Andersen's audit clients in 2002 following Andersen's demise. This study provides more control over size effects by design. Test variables are constructed based on national market share of audit fees within an industry. Logistic regression is used to examine the likelihood of choosing new auditor that is an industry specialist.

Results support hypothesis, consistent with auditor differentiation explanation. Proportion of clients that had engaged an industry specialist in 2001 increased from 38 percent (84 clients) to 48 percent (105 clients) in 2002. No evidence of price‐gouging in 2002 although clients who aligned with industry specialist paid a 23.2 percent premium in audit fees. Large clients lost bargaining power to negotiate lower fees. Findings are robust to the inclusion of additional alternative measures of company size.

Results of logistic regression analysis imply that large audit clients with former auditor of tarnished reputation, long auditor tenure and high leverage are more likely to switch to an industry specialist to possibly signal audit/financial reporting quality. Large sample companies may limit the ability to generalize findings to smaller companies.

Mandatory audit firm rotation (currently being debated in the profession) will have costly effect on the pricing of Big 4 audits for companies wanting to signal audit and financial reporting quality to affect market perception, and large companies would likely lose their ability to bargain for lower audit fees.

The paper focus on the alignment of Andersen clients and impact on audit fees with Big 4 industry specialists resulting from the sudden increase in audit market concentration. Prior to Andersen's collapse, evidence on the association of audit fees premium and industry specialists was mixed, and little attention has been given to the influence of auditor industry specialization on both audit fees and alignment of former Andersen clients with a Big 4 specialist. This paper fills that void.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the intensity of accruals and auditor industry specialization. It investigates whether a client firm’s accruals intensity is a factor associated with the firm being audited by an industry specialist auditor.

This paper employs an empirical archival methodology using publicly available data. The sample consists of client firms that switched auditors from 2004 to 2014.

The results show that accruals intensity is positively associated with the choice of an industry specialist auditor, measured both at the national and the city levels. These findings imply that companies with high levels of accruals choose an industry specialist auditor to signal the quality of their accruals and to gain more credibility for their financial reporting.

This paper provides original empirical evidence of the association between accruals intensity and the choice of an industry specialist auditor. This link is new to the literature. Extant literature shows that firms with high levels of accruals are regarded as risky and suffer from reduced credibility in financial markets. This study contributes to the literature by showing that these firms choose an industry specialist auditor to alleviate investors’ credibility concerns about the high levels of accruals. These findings provide insightful information to audit firms, to managers of firms that inherently display high levels of accruals and to the capital markets participants in general.

The purpose of this study is to examine the association between auditor industry specialization and accounting quality in the European Union (EU).

This study employs a difference-in-differences design and explores audit quality from different industry specialist perspectives and different accounting standard regimes. Specifically, this study examines accounting quality among audits performed by non-industry specialists, EU member country-level industry specialists (EUM-level), EU community-level industry specialists (EUC-level), as well as joint industry specialists.

This study finds evidence of an improvement in accounting quality among audits performed by non-industry specialists post-IFRS. There is also evidence of an improvement in accounting quality among audits performed by EUC-level industry specialists post-IFRS. In addition, accounting quality among audits performed by EUM-level industry specialists seems to be greater than that of audits performed by non-industry specialists in either the pre-IFRS period or the post-IFRS period. Overall, the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU appears to be associated with an improvement in accounting quality among some auditor groups.

Industry specialization and accounting quality are not directly observable constructs; this study inevitably employs proxy measures for both. The findings of this study are location-specific and apply to mandatory IFRS adopters only.

This study informs regulators with respect to the importance of industry specialist auditors and financial reporting quality, particularly within the context of the EU. The findings suggest that industry specialists were a significant accounting quality determinant during the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The findings have implications for regulators in the EU and beyond.

This study is among the first to investigate the impact of auditor specialization on accounting quality in the EU, particularly in connection with the adoption of IFRS.

The extant literature has established that industry-specialist auditors gain performance-enhancing industry-specific sub-specialty knowledge (e.g., Solomon, Shields, & Whittington, 1999) via training and on the job experience. This knowledge has been shown to allow specialists to outperform non-specialists on a range of industry-specific tasks. The current study extends this line of research by comparing and contrasting the relative performance gains enjoyed by industry-specialist auditors in two different industry settings, one regulated and the other unregulated. When specializing in regulated industries, auditors gain very detailed industry-specific knowledge which is not the case for specialists in unregulated industries (Dunn & Mayhew, 2004). By comparing industry-specialists to non-specialists with matching industry-based experience, this study measures the relative benefits of specialization in different industry settings, rather than the benefits of specialization per se, which has been well established in the literature. This study finds that the performance gains made by regulated industry-specialists significantly outweigh those made by unregulated industry-specialists on industry-specific tasks. The implications of these results for future research and practice are explored in the body of the chapter.

This study investigates how the timeliness of financial reporting by listed companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is influenced by the interaction effect between industry-specialist auditors and board governance.

The Emirati capital markets – the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) – were used to obtain the data, which covered the seven-year period between 2011 and 2017. In total, 385 observations were obtained. Descriptive statistics and multiple regression were the principal statistical tests employed using the panel data method.

The results of the direct effect tests reveal that board independence and industry-specialist auditors have no significant influence on financial reporting timeliness. Nevertheless, the results also show that the timeliness of financial reporting by listed companies in the UAE is influenced by the interaction effect between auditors' industry specialisation and the governance of firm boards. More specifically, the results reveal that financial reporting timeliness is positively associated with board independence for companies audited by industry-specialist auditors. This finding is consistent with the notion that industry-specialist auditors complement the role of effective board governance.

This study only focuses on secondary data from non-financial companies listed in the UAE markets. Therefore, the outcomes may not be generalisable to sectors related to finance. Future researchers are recommended to examine financial sectors and apply alternative measurements such as surveys or interviews with directorial boards and external auditors. Furthermore, this study used only one measure of industry-specialist auditors, while board governance was limited to board independence. Future studies could utilise different measurements for industry-specialist auditors and more board governance measures to obtain more robust findings.

The evidence provided indicates that when a company listed in the UAE has a high-quality board, it benefits by engaging auditors who specialise in the industry in terms of improving the timeliness of financial reporting. The findings also indicate the need for closer monitoring of management to safeguard their reputation. This might attract the attention of the Big Four audit firms and industry–specialist auditors to continuously re-evaluate their audit work, professional training and staff skills, while they might also try to differentiate their performance and monitoring capabilities from the non-Big Four audit firms and non-industry specialist auditors.

The main contribution of this study to the overall body of research is the concept that having independent directors is associated with improved reporting timeliness because financial reports are monitored with greater efficiency by industry–specialist auditors. This study provides evidence for the interaction effect between internal and external governance mechanisms on financial reporting quality, which has not been the focus of prior studies on financial reporting quality.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of higher-quality auditors on corporate risk-taking.

Agency theory suggests that managers have incentives to avoid risk in the interests of perquisite consumption and self-preservation, while investors prefer that managers invest in all projects with a positive net present value, i.e. projects that generally increase corporate risk. Empirical literature finds that managerial risk-aversion is mitigated (and firm value enhanced) when investor protection is higher. The authors examine whether higher-quality auditing is one such mechanism to encourage shareholder-focused corporate risk-taking. They model measures of corporate risk as a function of whether a firm is audited by an industry specialist or not, controlling specifically for accounting quality. They then examine the incremental effect of higher-quality audits on other forms of external monitoring (analyst coverage and institutional holdings) for corporate risk.

Using a sample from 2003 to 2007, the authors document a positive relationship between local-level audit industry specialization and both the standard deviation of annual stock returns and research and development expenditures (their measures of corporate risk-taking). They then find the effect is mitigated when firms have alternative external monitoring, in the form of either higher analyst coverage or greater institutional holdings.

Given the nature of the question the authors ask, particularly in the context of the auditor–client relationship, a potential limitation is the difficulty in assigning causation. Nonetheless, this study underscores the importance of auditors as an effective mechanism for monitoring corporate managers.

This study provides novel evidence that auditors affect managerial decision making beyond a simple effect on financial statements, and should be of interest to boards of directors, regulators and investors.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of auditor switching and lowballing on conditional conservatism, particularly how different types of auditor switching, namely, upward, downward and lateral switching to/from Big 4 and industry specialists, affect earnings quality in the following selected Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand.

Using conditional conservatism as a proxy for earnings quality, this study hypothesises that upward switching from non-Big 4 to Big 4 auditors, or from non-specialist to specialist auditors, would result in high conditional conservatism, while downward switching would lead to low conditional conservatism. The study further tests whether lowballing provides a viable explanation for reduced earnings conservatism in firms that switch from Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditors, or from specialist to non-specialist auditors.

The analysis, on a sample of 28,073 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2016, shows that the decision to downgrade auditors leads to lower conditional conservatism in the year of switching, compared with other firms and the pre-switching year. The evidence further shows that, when firms downgrade their auditors, lowballing contributes to a decrease in conditional conservatism in the first year of audit switching. Further, this research finds that switching to specialist auditors will result in increased conditional conservatism, while switching from specialist auditors to non-specialist auditors will result in reduced conditional conservatism.

The findings of this study are useful to investors who are looking to diversify their investment portfolio in developing markets, as evidence about auditor switching and quality of financial reporting may be an important factor in their investment decisions. Downward auditor switches and lowballing could act as red flags to investors in the sense that these events could signal a decrease in conditional conservatism and, hence, quality of earnings.

This research offers new evidence to support the view that management decisions to switch to lower-quality auditors will force newly appointed auditors to acquiesce to clients’ demands for reporting low-quality earnings.

This paper aims to examine whether firms retaining industry-specialist auditors receive better price and non-price terms for bank loans.

Based on a sample of companies retaining big N auditors during the 2000-2010 period, this paper constructed six proxies for auditor industry expertise and tested three major loan terms: loan spreads, number of general and financial covenants and requirements for collateral.

It was found that companies retaining industry-specialist auditors receive lower interest rates and fewer covenants. Banks are also less likely to demand secured collateral. These findings are supported by several sensitivity tests.

The findings suggest that auditor industry expertise provides incremental value to creditors and that bank loan cost is one economic benefit for companies hiring specialist auditors.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the impact of auditor industry expertise on the cost of private debts.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the interaction effect of auditor industry specialization and board governance on earnings management. This study examines whether board independence is more or less effective in constraining earnings management for firms audited by industry specialists than for firms audited by non‐specialists.

The US data were collected from the RiskMetrics Directors database and the Compustat database. Regression analysis was used to test the research proposition.

It was found that earnings management is more negatively associated with board independence for firms audited by industry specialists than for firms audited by non‐specialists, consistent with the notion that there is a complementary relationship between auditor industry specialization and board governance. The findings suggest a positive interaction effect of auditor industry specialization and board governance on accounting quality.

This study contributes to the literature by documenting explicit evidence that high quality boards can be more effective through hiring industry specialist auditors. This study also suggests that it may be worth investigating the interaction effect among different corporate governance mechanisms on accounting quality.

This paper investigates the relationship between audit quality (as measured by auditor size and industry specialization) and earnings management (as measured by unexpected accruals) for Taiwan IPO firms.

First uses unexpected accruals in the modified Jones model to measure earnings management in the IPO process. Then uses auditor type (big five versus non‐big five) and industry specialist to measure audit quality. The hypothesis predicts that Taiwanese firms with higher quality auditors engage less in earnings management in the IPO process. The sample consists of 367 new issues between 1999 and 2002 from the Taiwan Economic Journal database.

It is found that big five auditors are related to less earnings management in the IPO year in Taiwan. This shows that higher quality auditors constrain earnings management for Taiwan IPO firms.

The finding shows that high quality auditors constrain earnings management and provide more precise information. This is important, given that management has incentive to engage in earnings management in the IPO process to garner greater proceeds and at‐issue earnings management is negatively related to post‐issue earnings performance and stock returns.

The research might be of interest to investors in IPO firms, given that at‐issue unexpected accruals are opportunistic.

The study contributes to the literature in that it shows that audit firm size is an important determinant in earnings management for Taiwan IPO firms.