Search results

Strong versions of the Precautionary Principle (PP) require regulators to prohibit or impose technology controls on activities that pose uncertain risks of possibly significant environmental harm. This decision rule is conceptually unsound and would diminish social welfare. Uncertainty as such does not justify regulatory precaution. While they should reject PP, regulators should take appropriate account of societal aversion to risks of large harm and the value of obtaining additional information before allowing environmentally risky activities to proceed.

This study explores the interrelationship between regulatory risks and strategic controls within the financial supervision architecture of an emergent global financial centre of China that embraces innovation as part of its strategic objectives.

This paper employs a longitudinal case study approach to examine the institutional dynamics of the key financial regulators in connection with the regulated financial institutions in Hong Kong before and after the financial tsunami of 2008.

First, this study reveals an organic development of a specialised financial regulatory architecture that resists transforming itself structurally despite the significant impact of externalities. Second, in this post-financial crisis analysis, regulated financial institutions swiftly respond by strengthening their risk controls through compliance with the guidelines imposed by the regulator. Institutional dynamics in influencing the implementation of risk controls through a top-down interactive mechanism are observed. Such dynamic and pertinent rapid responses induce the pursuit of optimal risk management within a regulatory framework.

This paper provides a longitudinal case study to reveal regulatory risks and strategic controls of the global financial centre of China. It unveils mitigating risk control measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The study demonstrates how regulatory institutions strive to take precautionary, coercive measures such that the regulated institutions mimic and implement prudent mechanisms.

Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.

Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.

Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.

This chapter discusses the regulatory challenges faced by financial institutions in emerging countries and it presents their specific features compared to financial institutions in developed countries. It offers a practical way of implementing regulatory changes while accounting for emerging countries’ specific features. Using a principle-based approach, this chapter builds on the recent regulatory developments in both developed and developing market economies. It relates these developments to industry best practices as well as the current state of the art in risk management and corporate governance. The findings show how the regulation of financial institutions in emerging countries differs from that in developed countries. Different approaches to mitigate the divergences and fill the gaps are discussed. Both regulators and financial institutions in emerging countries will find this chapter offers a practical point of view based on field and industry experience on how to interpret and apply regulations and adopt best practices in risk management in a way that accounts for emerging countries’ specific features.

The hefty fines levied on credit institutions in recent years for cases of misconduct, including poor behavioural standards, operational control deficiencies and regulatory breaches more broadly, has been defined by regulatory authorities and the financial sector more broadly as ‘conduct risk’. There is no official definition of conduct risk, as conduct risk profiles are unique to each firm and, therefore, there can never be a one-size-fits-all framework in place. Conceptually, conduct risk is a broad notion that touches every part of an enterprise framework, including culture, customer contact, corporate governance, ethics and integrity, conflicts of interest and compliance, amongst others. As a result, credit institutions tend to associate conduct risk with regulatory censure, financial detriment, poor customer outcomes, and, importantly, reputational damage. In light of the significant consequences of misconduct, recent regulatory measures have sought to specifically target these drivers. In this chapter the author discussed the regulatory spotlight on conduct risk, which continues to top the regulators’ agenda in view of its seriousness and considered the role of the board in managing conduct risk, whilst elaborating on the importance of board evaluations in this respect.

This introduction unpacks the key question that informs the articles in this special issue. How does a social sphere inform regulation and, more specifically, how can the regulatory capacity of a social sphere be harnessed, as an alternative or significant complementary force to state regulation and reliance on the self-regulatory capacity of markets? This question is salient and topical also in light of the search for new regulatory strategies and perspectives in the aftermath of the 2007 financial and subsequent EU sovereign debt crises, which have led to a major realignment of economy and society in a number of countries.

This introduction argues that economic sociology is a crucial reference point for understanding more about the social practices that constitute business behavior. It enables to explore the scope and significance of often interlinked social and legal norms for regulating various transnational risks that economic activity can give rise to. The introduction therefore locates the quest for understanding more about the regulatory capacity of a social sphere in debates that draw on Karl Polanyi’s analysis of the embedding, disembedding, and re-embedding of economic activity into social norms. The introduction highlights one of the key themes developed in this special issue, the idea of society within economy which questions an assumed conceptual distinction between economy and society.

This introduction concludes by specifying how the accounts of risk regulation developed in this special issue chart a path that is different from recent explorations of the role of a social sphere in regulation, which were conducted under the banner of “the sociological citizen,” “regulatory sociability,” and “collaborative governance.”

The governance of capital market institutions did not receive much interest compared to their banking sector counterparts, partly due to their different ownership structures. Recent trends; increased competition, technological advances, structural changes, globalization, all had their share of impact on governance systems of capital markets institutions particularly on exchanges. Corporate governance of non-financial firms and capital markets institutions differ in several ways. Firstly the role of risk management differs since they may impose systemic risks to the financial system. Secondly well-implemented governance structures and processes are required but are not sufficient in capital markets since there are several conflicts of interests to be addressed. Therefore whether and how effectively they function is what matters. Thirdly the governance structures of such institutions exhibit different effectiveness on their decisions.The governance of FIs in capital markets is discussed in terms of board structure and management, risk governance, supervisors, shareholders, executive compensation, role of regulators, authorities and values and culture. The role of stock exchanges in corporate governance are discussed separately in terms of implementing corporate governance codes, demutualisation and its impact on regulations, transparency and accountability issues and the effects of M&As among exchanges. Market needs strong analytical tools and reliable benchmarks to assess governance risk. The corporate control and the regulation of the institutions by the exchanges when the corporations (regulated) are the competitors of the exchanges (regulators) or owned by the stockholders of the exchanges must be addressed. The risk of regulatory arbitrage, calls for the need of harmonisation among regulators. Better regulation of FIs and greater global coordination among regulators are seen as the most two important issues to prevent another crisis.

Traditionally, individual states have shared responsibility for regulating the US insurance industry. The Dodd–Frank Act changes this by tasking the Federal Reserve with regulating the systemic risks that particularly large insurance organizations might pose and assigning the regulation of swap-based substitutes for insurance and reinsurance products to the SEC and CFTC. This paper argues that prudential regulation of large insurance firms and weaknesses in federal swaps regulation could reduce the effectiveness of state-based systems in protecting policyholders and taxpayers from nonperformance in the insurance industry. Swap-based substitutes for traditional insurance and reinsurance contracts offer protection sellers a way to transfer responsibility for guarding against nonperformance into potentially less-effective hands. The CFTC and SEC lack the focus, expertise, experience, and resources to adequately manage the ways that swap transactions can affect US taxpayers’ equity position in global safety nets, while regulators at the Fed refuse to recognize that conscientiously monitoring accounting capital at financial holding companies will not adequately protect taxpayers and policyholders until and unless it is accompanied by severe penalties for managers that willfully hide their firm’s exposure to destructive tail risks.

The aim of this study is to investigate whether and how Spanish listed companies adopt formalized and integrated models of risk management during the period 2016–2018 and disclose them inside annual reports. Such investigation rebuilds the international regulatory and self-regulatory framework about risk management and examines the pressures and constraints influencing the adoption and implementation of ERM model in Spain. Indeed, the instability and uncertainty of the global macroeconomic context and the new threats to the corporate profitability and survival are now contributing to the development of a new dimension of risk management system more updated, dynamic and integrated. The results of the content analysis on ERM disclosure in annual reports show that Spanish listed companies are not equipped with structured and integrated risk management systems and their risk management approach is not aligned with any ERM framework. Notwithstanding, the Spanish companies are taking remarkable steps to strengthen the risk management systems towards a higher level of integration and systematization.