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The purpose of this study is to examine both accruals and real earnings management in a large sample of private companies in the UK using data from 2002 to 2009 following the implementation of the UK Act of 2006.

A panel data analysis using GMM has been adopted to examine the objectives of the study and answer the research questions.

The results of this study showed that the imposition of the Companies Act of 2006, on its own, did lead to changes in earnings management behaviour, in both accruals-based earnings and real earnings management. Moreover, this study also found that firms that chose to provide IFRS financial statements tended to show less discretionary earnings management, however, it tended to have no impact on real earnings management.

In accordance with the research findings, standard setters with some insight tend to determine how capital markets see the information provided under the legislation such as the UK Act of 2006 in developed countries and thereby ensure long-term sustainability in a modern and sophisticated financial world. This study provides an insight into the successful implementation of the UK act of 2006, and its influence on the aspect of financial reporting.

The novel conclusion reached in the study is that there exists a strong and direct link between the smooth implementation of UK Act of 2006 and the practices of both accruals and real earnings management in real-world business and financial scenarios, particularly, in private companies.

This paper aims to understand real earnings management behavior in the context of a parent–subsidiary relationship. It explores the differences between business groups and firms that do not have controlled subsidiaries and provides potential explanations for any measured difference.

The study uses the random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) estimation to find the difference between the real earnings management behavior of business groups, represented by the ultimate parent firms and the nonparent firms from 73 countries.

The results show that ultimate parent firms have lower abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses than nonparent firms. In contrast, parent firms have higher abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) than nonparent firms. The results are unexpected because abnormal production costs usually have a dominant direct relationship with abnormal CFO. The results indicate that business groups use a route different from manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses.

The results reveal that parent firms use a route different from manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses. The results can be used to extend the discussion to specific business group cases, such as tracing the route or allocation of real earnings management (REM) pressure from a parent firm to its listed and private subsidiaries, and if the consolidation of minority voting rights and the transitivity of control affect the behavior in its subsidiaries.

Instead of the degree of diversification or affiliation, this paper investigates REM behavior based on the parent firm's control of its subsidiaries. With this approach, the study argues that business groups prefer a route other than manipulating production costs and discretionary expenses. The results may redirect the attention of regulators to the activities of parent firms that need more policing.

This paper examines the relationship between poison pills, real earnings management and initial public offering (IPO) failure.

The authors sampled 2,997 IPO firms that went public during 1993-2015.

The authors find that IPO firms manipulate earnings upward using real earnings management. The authors also find that IPO firms exhibiting a higher level of real earnings management have a higher probability of IPO failure. In addition, the authors find that weak shareholders' governance is positively associated with IPO failure.

These results suggest that poor governance structures in failed firms open the door to manipulating real activities and increasing operational risk.

The study findings are of most significant interest to potential investors and other stakeholders affiliated with a firm going public, an auditor, an underwriter, the lawyers who consult with the firm and employees or executives who might consider joining that firm.

This paper examines how board structure influences real earnings management and the interaction effect of CEO narcissism on board structure-real earnings management relationship.

The authors used panel data derived from secondary sources from publicly listed firms in Kenya during 2002–2017. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that board independence, board tenure and size have significant negative effect on real earnings management, while CEO duality positively affects real earnings management. Further, the interaction results show that CEO narcissism moderates the relationship between CEO duality and real earnings management.

The results suggest that real earnings management reduces when boards are independent, large and comprising of long-tenured members. However, when the CEO plays dual role of a chairman, real earnings management increases. The authors also find that when CEOs are narcissists, the monitoring role of the board is compromised.

The study adds value to the understanding of how board structure and CEO narcissism influence the monitoring role of the board among firms listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange.

This study examines whether managers adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures to suppress earnings management practices and whether corporate governance mechanisms could limit such practices.

A quantitative approach was followed, in which secondary data from listed firms from 2014 to 2019 were gathered. Descriptive statistics and inferential techniques were performed, which included correlation, ordered logistic regression and 2SLS panel regression analyses.

The findings indicate that firms use CSR disclosure to conceal managers' opportunistic behaviour via earnings management as an entrenchment strategy and that corporate governance mechanisms could significantly constrain such behaviour.

This study goes beyond the conventional agency theory by incorporating additional theoretical perspectives from stakeholder and legitimacy theories, resulting in a multi-theoretical perspective in conceptualizing the study.

The findings are expected to have significant policy implications, especially in limiting the opportunistic use of CSR disclosures and reducing earnings management practices to safeguard stakeholders' interests and ensure the sustainability of business entities.

The levels of CSR and board governance practices are captured using comprehensive indices. Moreover, earnings management was operationalized using both accrual-based and real earnings management proxies. Furthermore, while addressing an empirical dearth noted, the findings provide significant policy implications for limiting managers' opportunistic and unethical use of CSR disclosures with corporate governance mechanisms.

This study aims to see the moderating effect of board diversity on the relationship between ownership structure and real earnings management.

This study uses unbalanced panel data of 75 listed energy firms (346 firm-year observations) from three South Asian emerging economies (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) from 2015 to 2019. The two-step system GMM estimation is used for data analysis. This study also uses fixed effect regression to obtain robust findings.

The findings show that firms with a greater ownership concentration and managerial ownership significantly reduce real earnings management. In contrast, the data refute the idea that institutional and foreign ownership affect real earnings management. We also find that board diversity interacts significantly with ownership concentration and managerial ownership, meaning that board diversity moderates the negative link of the primary relationship that reduces real earnings management. On the other hand, board diversity has no interaction with institutional and foreign ownership, implying no moderating effect exists on the primary relationship.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is unique research investigating how different ownership structures affect real earnings management in the emerging nations’ energy sector, which the earlier studies overlook. More specifically, this research focuses on how board diversity moderates the relationships between ownership structure and real earnings management, which could be helpful for future investors.

This paper explores the relationship between earnings management and firms' value through the moderating effect of the missing elements – corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and state ownership in Russian companies. The main argument of the paper is that CSR disclosure can be used as a mitigating mechanism to weaken the negative relationship between earnings manipulation and market value. Additionally test whether state ownership is an important moderating factor in this relationship are conducted as state has always played an important role in the emerging Russian market.

The hypotheses are tested on panel data for 223 publicly listed Russian firms for the period 2012–2018. A number of robustness tests are used to check the obtained results for consistency. Following previous research GMM method is employed to address endogeneity concerns.

Supported by stakeholder theory, it is observed that firms that disclosed more CSR information experience a weaker negative relationship between earnings management and market value because investors and other stakeholders positively evaluate a positive CSR image. This negative effect of earnings management on market value is even weaker for state-owned companies as market participants appreciate involvement of state-owned companies in CSR activities and place greater expectations on these firms to be responsible without clear understanding whether these actions are “window dressing” for this type of companies or not.

The study results provide new insights into the relation between earnings management, firm's value, CSR disclosure and state ownership in emerging-market firms. The paper highlight the importance of considering country-specific factors, such as state ownership, while analysing the market reaction on CSR disclosure and earnings management since the institutional peculiarities may help to explain differences in the obtained results.

This study aims to examines both accrual and real-based earnings management (EM) behavior of listed corporations in tax-free countries during different economic situations. It also addresses the link between firm- and country-level determinants of accrual and real-based EM and explores economic conditions' influence on these determinants.

The study examines 1,608 firm-years, covers sixteen years (2004–2019), clustered into three periods according to the global financial crisis (GFC): four years prior (2004–2007), two years during (2008–2009), and ten years post the GFC (2010–2019). We employ the modified Jones model (performance-matched) developed by Kothari et al. (2005) to measure the accrual-based EM (positive and negative discretionary accrual EM) and the three levels model for Dechow et al. (1998) to measure the real-based EM (cash flow from operating, discretionary expenses and abnormal production cost).

The study finds a significant increase in EM practices in the listed corporations in tax-free countries during the economic downturn. These corporations are found to understate their earnings during the economic stress period. Simultaneously, the firm-level determinants of EM practices were at the same level of significance during different economic conditions in accrual-based EM. In contrast, the country-level EM determinants vary based on the economic conditions.

Financial reports' users gain a deep understanding of the quality of financial reports in the context of tax-free country. And, the study outcomes inspire policymakers to develop relevant legislation to mitigate financial reports' risk and adequately protect the financial reports' users.

The aim of this paper is to provide additional insights on the association between real earnings management (REM) and crash risk, particularly from the perspective of an emerging market economy. It also examines the moderation role that internal and external corporate governance may play in this area.

Relying on archival data from the RESSET and CSMAR databases over a timeframe from 2010 to 2018 of China listed company, the authors test the hypotheses by regressing common measures of crash risk on the treatment variable (REM) and crash risk control variables identified in the prior crash risk literature. The authors also introduce monitoring proxies (internal controls as an internal governance and institutional ownership as an external governance) and assess how effective internal and external governance moderate the relation between REM and stock price crash risk.

The results suggest firms with higher REM have a significantly greater stock price crash risk, and that this association is mitigated by external monitoring. That is, greater institutional ownership, particularly pressure insensitive owners, mitigates the impact of REM on stock price crash risk. However, internal control does not mitigate the association between REM and stock price crash risk.

Following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act, prior research has documented an increase in the use of REM and a positive association between REM and cash risk. The authors demonstrate that they persist in one of the largest emerging markets where institutional regulations, market conditions and corporate behaviors are different from those in developed markets. Also, the assessment of the moderation effect of internal and external governance mechanisms could have meaningful implications for investors and regulators in Chinese and other emerging markets.

Using a sample of 9,898 firm-year observations from 1,821 unique Chinese listed firms over the period from 2004 to 2019, this study aims to investigate whether the market rewards meeting or beating analyst earnings expectations (MBE).

The authors use an event study methodology to capture market reactions to MBE.

The authors document a stock return premium for beating analyst forecasts by a wide margin. However, there is no stock return premium for firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts, suggesting that the market is skeptical of earnings management by these firms. This market underreaction is more pronounced for firms with weak external monitoring. Further analysis shows that meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is indicative of superior future financial performance. The authors do not find firms using earnings management to meet or just beat analyst forecasts.

The authors provide evidence of market underreaction to meeting or just beating analyst forecasts, with the market's over-skepticism of earnings management being a plausible mechanism for this phenomenon.

The findings of this study are informative to researchers, market participants and regulators concerned about the impact of analysts and earnings management and interested in detecting and constraining managers' earnings management.

The authors provide new insights into how the market reacts to MBE by showing that the market appears to focus on using meeting or just beating analyst forecasts as an indicator of earnings management, while it does not detect managed MBE. Meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is commonly used as a proxy for earnings management in the literature. However, the findings suggest that it is a noisy proxy for earnings management.