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In comparison to other countries, power generation in Sub-Saharan Africa is poor. The demand for power has surged in recent times and continues to increase at a fast rate. The public–private partnership (PPP) model has been identified as an option to address the challenges in the power sector. The purpose of this research paper is to critically explore the reasons for entering into PPP power projects in Ghana by the public and private parties.

Questionnaires were used to elicit responses from respondents using a two-round Delphi survey. From 60 respondents contacted in round one, 48 responses were obtained, and these 48 respondents further took part in round two. Mean score ranking was used to rank the reasons for entering into PPP power projects, while analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run to test significant difference in perceptions among the respondents.

From round 2 of the Delphi survey, the significant reasons for public sector entering into PPP power projects were as follows: achieving improved value for money, access to additional capital, increased certainty of projects and greater efficiency of project delivery services. For private sector, most significant reasons were as follows: obtaining of investment support, improvement in private sector’s international image and synergy with public sector. From ANOVA analysis, there were significant different perceptions among some of factors on the respondent profile variables and the reasons for entering into PPP power projects, while other factors did not have significant different perception.

Significant reasons for both public and private sectors identified would be incorporated by the government when PPP policy guidelines and laws are reviewed. This will aid in the effective implementation of PPP for power projects.

Public-private partnership (PPP) power projects are associated with varying risk factors. This paper aims to develop a fuzzy quantitative risk allocation model (QRAM) to guide decision-making on risk allocation in PPP power projects in Ghana.

A total of 67 risk factors and 9 risk allocation criteria were established from literature and ranked in a two-round Delphi survey using questionnaires. The fuzzy synthetic evaluation method was used in developing the risk allocation model.

The model’s output variable is the risk allocation proportions between the public body and private body based on their capability to manage the risk factors. Out of the 37 critical risk factors, the public sector was allocated 12 risk factors with proportions = 50%, while the private sector was allocated 25 risk factors with proportions = 50%.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research presents the first attempt in Ghana at endeavouring to develop a QRAM for PPP power projects. There is confidence in the model to efficiently allocate risks emanating from PPP power projects.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, it explores the influencing factors of the government’s trust decision-making in the private sector; second, it explores how these influencing factors affect the government’s trust decisions.

A theoretical model was established, and a questionnaire survey was conducted among 152 professionals. The collected datas were analyzed by the structural equation modeling (SEM) method.

The study identified four critical factors that influence the government’s decision to trust the private sector in public-private-partnership (PPP) projects. All the four factors have a positively correlated impact on the government’s trust decision-making. The structural equation path analysis shows that the most important factor affecting the government’s trust decision-making is the trustee’s (private sector) trustworthy characteristics, and the path coefficient is 0.92. The path coefficients of risk perception and the trustor’s trust tendency are 0.83 and 0.74, respectively. The influence of the legal system environment on government trust decision-making is moderate, with a path coefficient of 0.68.

This paper contributes to the literature in two aspects. First, the factors influencing decision-making to government trust in the private sector in PPP projects have been identified. Second, a comprehensive view of the mechanism of government trust in the private sector in PPP projects has been theorized by the SEM method.

This study aims to evaluate the key risk factors inherent in public–private partnership (PPP) power projects in Ghana and further determine the critical risk factors affecting both the public and private sectors in PPP power projects.

Ranking-type Delphi survey in two rounds was conducted to establish a comprehensive list of critical risk factors of PPP. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques helped obtain experts for the Delphi survey. Mean score ranking, factor analysis, Cronbach α coefficient and Kendall’s concordance were used for analysis. The probability of occurrence and severity of each risk factor were computed to obtain the risk impact.

From the list of 67 risks, 37 risk factors were deemed to be critical. The five topmost risk factors were: delay payment on contract, private investor change, political risks, fluctuating demand of power generated and public opposition. Principal component analysis grouped the risk factors into seven major themes.

This study develops an authoritative risk factor list for PPP power projects, which reflects both sector and country conditions for prioritizing and mitigating risk factors. Delphi approach adopted in this study can be used by future studies in similar environments where PPP is novel and expert respondents scarce.

Demand for private investment in infrastructure, notably in the power sector remains high, and this is anticipated to expand with the passage of time. Very little research currently exists on the power sector and specifically the private sector influencing factors (PSIFs) for entering into public–private partnerships (PPPs). The purpose of this study is to explore influencing factors for private sector participation in PPP power projects in Ghana.

Using purposive and snowball sampling techniques, questionnaires were used to gather responses from experts in the PPP power sector domain in a two-round Delphi survey. Reliability analysis was conducted using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient and level of agreement tested using Kendall’s concordance. Mean score ranking, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Chi-square test were the main analysis conducted on the influencing factors.

The most significant PSIFs were: obtaining of investment support; improvement in private sector’s international image; synergy with public sector; sharing of risks; and gaining of profits. From ANOVA results, all the influencing factors had no significant different perception between the number of years in PPP practice and the motivations for the private sector entering into PPP power projects. Using Chi-square, the association between the variables indicated they were statistically significant.

The findings in this study are significant for multinational power generation firms that seek to enter the Ghanaian energy sector to help fill the generation gap and deficit.

The output of this research contributes to the checklist of influencing factors for private sector participation in PPP power projects and enhances the development of PPP practice.

This study aims to investigate the dual effects of commitment-based governance on the relationship between formal control and public–private partnership (PPP) project performance. Formal control and relationship governance are two primary forms of inter-organizational governance that affect project performance. However, little is known about the interplay between formal control and commitment and its effect on PPP projects. More specifically, previous studies have failed to distinguish the function routes of relationship governance resulting from different types of formal control (process and outcome control).

This study adopts a questionnaire survey to empirically investigate the mechanism that commitment-based governance influences the relationship between formal control and PPP performance. After collecting data from public and private sector professionals involved in 101 Chinese PPP projects, the theoretical framework proposed in this paper is verified by the empirical results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis.

The results show that process control has an inverted U-shaped effect and outcome control has a significant positive influence on PPP project performance. Furthermore, commitment moderates the effect of formal control on PPP project performance by increasing the relevance of outcome control and mediates the inverted U-shaped relationship between process control and PPP project performance.

Managers should recognize that process control is a double-edged sword and prevent the overuse of process control. Managers should direct their attention toward efforts to improve the commitment, which allows for the effectiveness of outcome control strategies. Additionally, this study new measurement method for relationship governance suggests that managers should be aware of the difference in parties' perceptions of the relationship.

This study allows for a comprehensive understanding of the relationship governance-control nexus from a commitment perspective. The authors bring into light the dual role of commitment-based governance in the relationship between the two types of formal control and PPP project performance. Moreover, the new approach to measure relationship governance offers valuable insight into the measurement of variables about individual's perception.

The purpose of the study is to elicit risk factors that are peculiar to public-private partnership (PPP)-procured mass housing in Nigeria from the expert perspectives in ensuring the success of the scheme thereby reducing housing deficit in the country.

The risk inherent in construction projects had been established through literature in general. The risk in PPP projects is emerging because of the recent acceptance of the procurement option by governments all over the globe. The Nigerian Government has also adopted the procurement option in bridging the housing deficit in the country. This study, therefore, conducts a Delphi survey on the probability of risk occurrence peculiar to PPP mass housing projects (MHPs) in Nigeria. Pragmatic research approach through the mixed method of both quantitative and qualitative methods was adopted for this study. The quantitative method adopts the administration of questionnaires through the Delphi survey, whereas the qualitative method used interviews with the respondents. A two-stage Delphi questionnaire was administered to construction practitioners that cut across academics, the public and the private sectors by adopting convenient sampling techniques and following the Delphi principles and procedures. A total of 63 risk factors were submitted to the expert to rank on a Likert scale of 7 and any risk factors that the mean item score (MIS) falls below the grading scale of the five-point benchmark is deemed not necessary a risk factor associated with PPP MHPs and thereby expunged from the second round of the Delphi Survey. The interview was subsequently applied to the respondents to substantiate the risk factors that are peculiar to PPP-procured mass housing in the study area.

The findings show that risk factors such as maintenance frequent than expected, life of facility shorter than anticipated and maintenance cost higher than expected fall below 5.0 benchmark with MIS of 4.64 and 4.55 indicating that the risk factors are not peculiar to PPP mass housing in Nigeria.

The implication for practise of this research is that these risk factors provide the PPP stakeholders with the comprehensive checklists that can aid in developing PPP risk assessment guidelines in the sector though both partners should be aware of the dynamic nature of risk because new ones might be emerging.

The authors hereby declare that the research findings are a product of a thorough research conducted in the study area and have not to be submitted or published by another person or publisher and due acknowledgement was made where necessary.

This paper aims to determine the demand category and level of government and investors in public–private partnership (PPP) projects. It emphasizes the importance of meeting the demands of stakeholders and controlling the unreasonable demands. This study aims to improve the demand management of stakeholders in the PPP project and lay a foundation for the research on behavior based on the motivation theory.

This paper opted for a questionnaire survey to collect data based on indicators identified through literature. The participants come from the government and private sector (investors, contractors, operators, etc.) in China PPP Lecture Hall. The reliability, validity and variance analyses are used to test the reliability of data. Factor analysis and entropy method are used to determine demand categories and weights.

The government’s 14 demands are divided into four groups: satisfy public activities, self-interest, responsibility and relief financial pressure; 6 investor's demands are divided into development ability and satisfy social activities. The self-interest of government is higher than that of the publicity in PPP projects; investor's social reputation is most important, it is a foundation for obtaining external resources and achieving enterprise development.

Because of the chosen research approach, the demand indexes cannot be exhausted. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to enrich relevant contents further.

This paper includes implications for a targeted demand control mechanism and for managing the unreasonable demand.

This paper comprehensively identifies the demand hierarchy of the government and investors, and provides the theoretical basis for the target management of stakeholders.

Promoting low-carbon in the construction industry is important for achieving the overall low-carbon goals. Public–private partnership is very popular in public infrastructure projects. However, different perceptions of low-carbon and behaviors of public and private sectors can hinder the realization of low-carbon in these projects. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to cooperate towards low-carbon goals, an evolutionary game model is constructed.

An evolutionary game model that considers the opportunistic behavior of the participants is developed. The evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) under different scenarios are examined, and the factors that influence the willingness to cooperate between the government and private investors are investigated.

The results illustrate that a well-designed system of profit distribution and subsidies can enhance collaboration. Excessive subsidies have negative impact on cooperation between the two sides, because these two sides can weaken income distribution and lead to the free-riding behavior of the government. Under the situation of two ESSs, there is also an optimal revenue distribution coefficient that maximizes the probability of cooperation. With the introduction of supervision and punishment mechanism, the opportunistic behavior of private investors is effectively constrained.

An evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation between the public sector and the private sector in the field of low-carbon construction. Based on the analysis of the model, this paper summarizes the conditions and strategies that can enable the two sectors to cooperate.

Pre-construction of a project comprises stages that are pivotal for the procurement performance. It is defined as the duration from the project's initiation to construction. However, Private Public Partnerships (PPPs) have been subjected to a long pre-construction, thereby leading to an inefficient development process. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to pay attention to the influencing factors elongating the pre-construction duration.

Based on data of 5,677 PPP projects between 2009 and 2021 in China, the authors adopt the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model in duration analysis to empirically analyze the following underlying dynamics determining the duration of PPP pre-construction stages: (1) policy uncertainty; (2) corruption; and (3) procurement method selection. To observe the influencing paths more specifically, the authors divided the pre-construction duration into the pre-tendering period and tendering period and regressed them separately.

The results indicate that the pre-construction duration is significantly prolonged with increased policy uncertainty and corruption degree as well as the use of tendering methods. Meanwhile, the above factors have a greater impact on the pre-tendering period than the tendering period.

The contribution of this study is twofold: (1) theoretically, this paper provides new evidence on the impact of PPP policy uncertainty, corruption and procurement method selection on the pre-construction duration. It complements empirical studies on the factors elongating the time efficiency of PPPs projects. (2) In practice, it provides a specific path for the government to improve the time efficiency of PPPs.