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Interfirm contracts are a ubiquitous economic institution in market economies. In this study, we examine the determinants of one important aspect of interfirm contracts – contract duration. We begin with Joskow's (1987) study that demonstrated that contract duration is governed by mechanisms that economize transaction costs. Our study extends Joskow's study in several ways: First, while Joskow's study focuses on one particular area of extreme resource dependence, between the coal mine and the power company, we examine patterns of contract duration and their determinants across broader economic sectors, thereby providing a more general test of the key ideas in transaction cost economics. Second, we investigate the role of social institutions as a distinct mechanism underlying the design of contract duration, especially in terms of mitigating risks and transaction costs. Finally, by situating our study in China, we extend the research context beyond industrialized market societies to a transitional economy where interfirm contracts are an emerging economic institution. The empirical study is based on the analyses of information on 877 contracts from 620 firms collected in two Chinese cities, Beijing and Guangzhou, in 2000.

Legal and Sharīʿah issues abound in creating security to finance waqf property development in Malaysia, for it involves integrating the Sharīʿah concept of waqf with requirements of Malaysian land law as well as the requirements of modern finance under civil law. Banks and financial insti­tutions will not generally finance property development without any form of security for the loan. The best type of security transaction under Malaysian land law is to create a charge on the land under the National Land Code 1965, rendering the land liable as a security which upon default of the chargor, would entitle the chargee to seek statutory remedies including sale of the land. Such may not be feasible for waqf properties due to the inalienable nature of such properties. Due to the remedy of sale of the land upon default, the same issues would arise in regard to other types of securities like a lien and a loan agreement cum assignment. There is therefore a need to diversify the available options in creating security over waqf property. What are the existing Sharīʿah restrictions on waqf property? Do these restrictions affect the creation of security over waqf lands under conventional Malaysian land law? What are the legal and Sharīʿah issues relating to creating a charge over waqf lands? What are some feasible options? Initial findings are that creating a charge on a lease of waqf land as well as resorting to a hybrid form of a traditional security transaction in Malaysia, called ‘Jualjanji’, may hold some answers. Through doctrinal legal research and content analysis, this chapter explores these issues and recommends feasible solutions.

We empirically investigate the hypothesis that the less transparent (more difficult to value) the target’s assets are the more likely it is that the acquiring firm can obtain higher short- and long-term returns. We analyze a sample of 1,538 friendly acquisitions partitioned in two separate dimensions: acquisitions of public versus private firms, and acquisitions of a firm’s assets versus acquisitions of a firm’s assets and its management. Using a sample of (nondiversifying) real estate transactions with a public REIT as the acquirer, we find that acquisitions of public firms have insignificant short-term abnormal returns. Acquisitions of private targets have positive and significant short-term abnormal returns. The acquirer’s abnormal returns are higher in both cases when the transactions involve acquisition of the target firm’s management. We find parallel results when analyzing the acquirer’s Q over the merger year and the three following years. Our conclusions are robust to the type of financing (cash, stock, or a combination) used in the acquisition.

A new database demonstrates that between 1600 and 1830, Parliament passed thousands of acts restructuring rights to real and equitable estates. These estate acts enabled individuals and families to sell, mortgage, lease, exchange, and improve land previously bound by landholding and inheritance laws. This essay provides a factual foundation for research on this important topic: the law and economics of property rights during the period preceding the Industrial Revolution. Tables present time-series, cross-sectional, and panel data that should serve as a foundation for empirical analysis. Preliminary analysis indicates ways in which this new evidence may shape our understanding of British economic and social history. The data demonstrate that Parliament facilitated the reallocation of resources to new and more productive uses by adapting property rights to modern economic conditions. Reallocation surged in the decades following the Glorious Revolution and was concentrated in areas undergoing urbanization and industrialization. The process was open to landowners of all classes, not just the privileged groups who sat in the Houses of Lords and Commons. Parliament's rhetoric about improving the realm appears to have been consistent with its actions concerning rights to land and resources.

This paper examines the evolution of Intellectual Property (IP) commercialization in historical perspective. IP Law imposes an incentive structure that determines the extent of societal investment in those assets. From their inception at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, IP has expanded due to the introduction of new technologies. Property rights allocation over these assets has traditionally been assigned to governments centralizing the recognition of such property. For a long period of time, government intervention was critical to allow IP commercialization; hence, the political economy of IP was dictated by the prevailing ideology of policymakers in favor or against market transactions. The resulting clash of ideologies has marked the position of developing countries seeking exclusions from open IP commercialization to obtain temporary relief from foreign competition of technology producing countries, as well as that of industrialized countries, seeking to export their technologies overseas. The emergence of blockchain technology, as a decentralized transaction exchange protocol that makes intermediary centralized institutions (i.e. governments) certifying IP irrelevant over a large portion of intellectual property (i.e., trade secrets and copyrights) will create revolutionary institutions facilitating IP commercialization, such as NFTs. We examine this historical evolution in the context of legal institutions governing intellectual property transactions and technology transfer.

Entrepreneurs in a competitive economy face three fundamental problems. They need to search for and discover a business opportunity (Kirzner, 1973), evaluate it (Knight, 1921), and then seize the opportunity to reap entrepreneurial profits (Schumpeter, 1911) (Langlois, 2007). The problem that we address is how the ability to exploit business opportunities is influenced by entrepreneurial search and the economic organization of entrepreneurship (Arrow, 1962; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b; Aghion et al., 2005; Foss, Foss, & Klein, 2007). In many cases, the discovery for a new business opportunity needs to be motivated by expected gains, since the search and evaluation of business opportunities is a costly, resource-consuming process (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Foss & Klein, 2005; Teece, 2007; Foss & Foss, 2008).¹ We show the critical role of expectations for understanding of the economic organization of entrepreneurship, and argue that transaction cost economics, with its insistence on bounded rationality, but farsighted contracting offers useful insights and presents rich opportunities for further theoretical and empirical research (cf. also Furubotn, 2002).

This chapter offers a practitioners’ perspective on how Islamic banks in Malaysia deal with unlawful sources of funds. Specifically, it investigates the practice of Islamic banks in Malaysia in dealing with funds that originate from unlawful sources such as accepting deposits for safe-keeping and investment and providing financial facilities to customers whose incomes come from unlawful sources. This is regardless of whether the sources of fund are wholly unlawful or there is a mix of lawful and unlawful sources. A quantitative methodology is adopted to collect data from selected industry practitioners who are directly involved with Islamic banks, mainly officers of Sharīʿah departments, members of Sharīʿah committees and other stakeholders of Islamic banks. Based on a simple descriptive analysis, it is found that majority of the respondents opine that when the sources of funds are deemed unlawful, the bank cannot accept such deposits, investments or give financing to a customer if he or she is known to possess unlawful sources of funds. With respect to the mixed sources of funds or activities, that is, lawful and unlawful, the bank should not be prevented from receiving the funds either for safe-keeping, investment or payment of financing. The study also finds that banks have the right to investigate the sources of funds of the customers whether they are derived from Sharīʿah compliant, non-Sharīʿah compliant or mixed sources as part of the general due diligence implemented by such banks.