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This study aims to explore the impacts of the knowledge structure of CEO on corporate innovation strategy in the background of China’s national policy of innovation-driven development.

Regression analysis is used to test the direct effects and the moderating roles of financial and power incentives. It screens 685 listed companies from Chinese stock market, with the time window from 2016 to 2018.

CEO’s knowledge breadth has a significant impact on innovation strategy, but the moderating effects of power and financial incentives are not significant. CEO’s knowledge depth is negatively correlated to corporate innovation strategy; moreover, power incentive significantly strengthens the relationship, whereas financial incentive significantly weakens it.

Firms are suggested to optimize CEO knowledge structure and organizational incentive system for better implementing innovation-driven development strategy.

It is beneficial to the exploration of the micro-mechanism that enables corporate innovation strategy. Scholars may gain additional insights into the strategic management of corporate innovation from the perspective of CEO’s knowledge structure.

Purpose – This research studies how the discipline of option-like personal equity portfolio and the market discipline of debt jointly affect executive compensation design.

Design/methodology/approach – A theoretical model is proposed based on the moral hazard problem of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) by integrating firm financial leverage, executive equity holding, and profit-sharing rule. Subsequently, a panel data set of executive compensation is analyzed to provide empirical evidence.

Findings – The discipline of option reduces the need of performance-based compensation. The discipline of debt reduces the use of incentive pay for lowly leveraged firms, but increases the use of incentive pay for highly leveraged firms. These two disciplines can be either complements or substitutes on affecting optimal contracts depending on firm leverage.

Research limitations/implications – The present study provides a starting point for further study of optimal compensation that is not only the conventional one of mainly aligning managerial interests with that of shareholders but also the one of reinforcing the joint discipline of debt and option.

Originality/value – This new perspective produces several results characterizing firms that the discipline of debt and the discipline of option can be either complements or substitutes on affecting incentive compensation design.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) vega on firm policies in the Australian share market based on a panel data set drawn from the 137 Australian public firms for the period 2003-2012.

To allow mutual causation between our variables, the authors use the two-stage least squares estimation method, controlling for firm fixed effects. The authors use the difference-in-differences model to test whether the 2009 Australian tax reforms may discourage high-vega CEOs to take value-enhancing risks.

The authors find the evidence that vega induces CEOs to adopt the riskier financial policy in the Australian capital market. This evidence is further supported by the negative association between vega and firm conservative activities including cash and hedging policies. Further, the result shows that the 2009 tax reforms reduce the CEOs’ willingness to engage in risky financial policy. This finding implies that regulators may restore the 2009 reforms’ “deferred tax point” back to its pre-2009 form.

Based on the study’s results, firms should grant CEOs more out-of-the money options with a longer time to expiration to offset the 2009 tax reforms’ negative impact on the CEO’s incentive to take value-enhancing risks.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between discretionary accruals (DAs) and audit fees and whether this relationship is affected by the chief financial officer's (CFO) compensation structure.

Using a large sample of cross‐sectional firms over the period 2000‐2006, multiple ordinary least square regression models are estimated.

The paper finds that there is a positive and significant association between DAs and audit fees. Evidence shows that this relationship is significantly higher as CFO's bonuses increase and that this relationship is moderated as CFO's salaries increase. It is also found that income‐increasing DAs are positively and significantly related with audit fees and that increase in CFO's bonuses signifies this positive relationship.

Results may change during the current financial crisis (i.e. 2007‐present) due to the increased regulatory scrutiny of executive compensation.

The study has regulatory implications because of the recent calls to require a mandate regulating executive compensation practices. The results support these calls as data show that increased bonuses are associated with higher discretionary accruals and thus higher audit fees. There is also a call to limit executive compensation to fixed amounts and data support that increase in salaries moderates the positive association between discretionary accruals and audit fees. These results can also be used by independent auditors when assessing risks and thus the results have practical audit implications.

The paper uses a large sample of public firms in years leading to the current financial crisis and contributes to the literature in executive compensation and audit practice.

This paper examines how a firm's hierarchical complexity, which is determined by the way it organizes its subsidiaries across the hierarchical levels, can impact its stock price crash risk.

The authors employ a measure of hierarchical complexity that captures the depth and breadth of how subsidiaries are organized within a firm. This measure is calculated using information about firms' subsidiaries extracted from the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) database that allows the authors to construct each firm's hierarchical structure. The data sample includes 2,461 USA firms for the period from 2012 to 2017 (11,006 firm-year observations). Univariate tests and panel regression are used for the main analysis. Two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) instrumental variable regression and various other tests are employed for robustness check.

The results show a positive relationship between hierarchical complexity and stock price crash risk. This relationship is amplified in firms with a greater number of subsidiaries that are hierarchically distanced from the parent company as well as in firms with a greater number of foreign subsidiaries in countries with weaker rule of law.

This paper is the first to investigate the impact hierarchical complexity has on crash risk. The results highlight the role that a firm's organizational structure can have on asset pricing behavior.

The purpose of this paper is to examine CEO wealth changes around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) to explore the shareholder-manager incentive alignment in major corporate equity financing decisions.

The authors decompose CEO wealth into three major components: price effect, board compensation grant, and CEO’s own portfolio adjustment. The authors then compare SEO-event sample vs non-event samples; and evaluate the dynamic and long-run CEO wealth effect.

The authors find when market reacts negatively to SEO announcement leading to losses in CEO’s existing firm-related wealth, CEO gets additional grants to offset the losses. Although this appears to be a rent-seeking activity, the authors find that the additional grants are mainly in the form of stock options which would have no value if stock price failed to pick up in the future. In this sense, the additional grants align the interests between shareholders and managers. Consistent with this argument, the authors show that the additional grants motivate CEOs to promote the stock performance, benefiting themselves as well as shareholders in the long-run.

The study explicitly calculates the contribution of each wealth component to CEO total wealth effect. The results improve the understanding of CEO compensation policy change after major corporate event and contribute to the literature of the optimality explanation of prevailing compensation policy.

This paper aims to derive insights about optimal managerial compensation and firm capital structure in unionized firms.

This paper uses applied game theory to address problems of CEO motivation in companies with unionized workforces.

Managers can use high levels of debt and costly bankruptcy to win wage concessions from workers. Alternatively, workers can obstruct management in the detection of poor work. CEO compensation that encourages rent sharing may reduce union hostility and associated deadweight losses. Shareholder value may be maximized by CEO incentive contracts with limited upsides, lower levels of pay, and some entrenchment protections.

This is the only study to use applied game theory to look at how CEO pay and capital structure affects the productivity of a unionized workforce.

This paper aims to investigate the economic determinants and the effects on firm value of the Chief Marketing Officer’s (CMO’s) equity incentives.

The empirical analysis uses 586 firm-year observations corresponding to 227 unique firms collected from Execucomp dataset over the period 2000-2009.

The paper documents that when a firm’s marketing intensity increases, the CMO’s equity incentives significantly increase; CMO’s equity incentives are positively related to shareholder value, and this positive relationship is incremental to that between the Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO)’s equity incentives and firm value; the positive impact of the CMO’s equity incentives on the firm value is partially mediated by marketing investments.

The paper helps understand under which circumstances firms provide the CMO with high-equity incentives and what the performance implications are of providing the CMO with long-term incentives.

Results indicate that companies should try to incent the CMO with equity-based incentives because the CMO can boost shareholder value on a way that is incremental to how the CEO does so. As a consequence, if the board of directors decides not to provide the CMO with sufficient equity incentives, it is likely that this decision will be suboptimal for shareholders.

This paper is the first to analyze the structure and effect on firm value of the CMO’s compensation in answer to calls for research on compensation of executives other than CEOs.

Scholars have investigated the association between executives' incentives and earnings management. Most of the extant literature focuses on equity executives' incentives, while most of the earnings management literature focuses on accrual earnings management (AEM), not real earnings management (REM). This paper investigates the association between chief executive officers’ (CEOs) and chief financial officer (CFOs) cash compensation and REM and explores who has more influence on REM, the CEO or the CFO.

The authors use the data of all listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period from 2009 to 2017 and ordinary least squares regression as a baseline model and the Chow test to capture whether the CEO's or the CFO's cash compensation has more influence on REM. To address potential endogeneity issues, the authors use a firm-fixed effect technique and two-stage least squares regression.

The authors find that CEOs' and CFOs' cash compensation is significantly associated with REM, suggesting that paying non-equity compensation to the CEO and CFO is negatively associated with REM. The authors also find that the CFO's cash compensation has a more significant influence on REM than the CEO's cash compensation, suggesting that the CFO's accounting and financial knowledge strengthens his or her power on the quality of financial reporting.

The study contributes to the literature of agency and contract theories by using cash-based compensation to provide strong evidence that CEO's and CFO's compensation is associated with REM. It also contributes to the earnings management literature by examining the effect of CEOs' and CFOs' cash compensation on earnings management using proxies for REM-related activities. The study also contributes to the institutional theory by providing empirical evidence on the governance role of executives' cash compensation in deterring REM. Finally, it is the first to examine the relationship between CEO's and CFO's cash compensation and REM, and the first to explore who is more influential regarding REM in emerging markets, the CEO or the CFO.

As a response to the call for investigations of the role of non-equity-based compensation in earnings management and the call to consider non-developed institutional contexts in governance research, this study extends prior studies by providing novel evidence on the relationship between CEOs' and CFOs' non-equity compensation and REM in China's emerging market. The study documents that the CFO has a greater influence on REM than the CEO does.

The purpose of this study is to present theory and empirical evidence on whether changes in leverage are systematically associated with changes in the CEO's risk incentives over time.Design/methodology/approach – A model is developed to explain the dynamic relationship between leverage and managers’ risk incentives, and empirically tested with data on executive stock option grants. The model relies on the observation that the risk sensitivity of a call option does not monotonically increase or decrease in the value of the underlying stock.Findings – It is found that changes in the CEO's risk incentives are not systematically correlated with changes in the firm's leverage over time.Research limitations/implications – The near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage, and therefore executives’ incentives to take equity risk are not correlated with firm leverage.Practical implications – For reasonable parameter values, this risk incentive‐maximizing stock price lies very close to the option's exercise price. This finding provides evidence that stock options plans granted approximately at‐the‐money encourage maximum risk‐taking by managers in a dynamic setting.Originality/value – This paper develops theory and evidence to explain why executive stock options are usually granted at‐the‐money.